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Abstract
China has been a centrally planned economy for about forty years but recent market- 
oriented economic reform has brought significant change, especially to the rural 
economy where there has been a remarkable development of township, village and 
private non-agricultural enterprises (the TVP sector). In 1971 the share of the TVP 
sector in China's industrial production was 3 per cent. By 1986 it had increased to 21 
per cent (Byrd and Lin, 1990).
The TVP firms operate in a more competitive environment compared with the state 
sector. However, they are still restricted by many economic and social-political 
constraints, particularly in the labour market.
This thesis examines individual wage determination in the TVP sector in the year of 
1985. Up to 1985, the general situation of the TVP labour market appeared to be a 
mixture of old and new systems. On the one hand, the level of employment was 
mostly controlled by the community authorities. On the other hand, the majority of 
firms had decision-making power over wage setting.
The emphasis of this thesis is placed on the applicability of the human capital model 
to the TVP wage determination. It is found that in the male labour market, labour 
market experience plays a very important role in the individual wage determination. 
However, the importance of the different experience variables (agricultural 
experience, firm tenure, other non-agricultural experience) varies between different 
employee groups (staff and workers). Agricultural and the other non-agricultural 
experience play an important role in staffs wage determination while firm tenure 
dominates other experience variables in workers' wage determination.
The most unusual result for the total male sample analysis is an insignificant effect of 
education on individual wage determination. The analysis for the piece rate and time 
rate groups separately suggests that this insignificant effect reflects education having
no impact on increasing labour productivity in the TVP sector due to most of the jobs 
being unskilled. However, a further analysis involving consideration of the effect of 
institutional change displays a new picture: education in fact has a significant impact 
on wage determination for the group of people who found their job by their own 
effort, while it is insignificant for those who were assigned to their job. The thesis 
also manages to show that these different results both reflect a labour productivity 
effect. Apart from these, the role of education as a screening device for the TVP job 
assignment is also confirmed.
Women are paid 20 per cent less than men in the TVP sector. This pay differential 
arises mainly because of within occupational discrimination. Occupational 
segregation does not contribute heavily to this wage differential.
A comparison with other studies shows that the experience-earnings profile for the 
TVP sector is like the case in the United States rather than in Japan, though the 
employment system in the TVP sector is similar to that in Japan.
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1INTRODUCTION
This dissertation is a study of individual wage determination in China's rural 
township, village or privately owned non-agricultural enterprises (the TYP sector) in 
1985. The principal data1 used by this study were collected jointly by the World Bank 
and the Institute of Economics of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in 1986 
and 1987. Four counties were involved in the survey: Wuxi county in Jiangsu 
province, Nanhai county in Guangdong province, Jieshou county in Anhui province 
and Shangrao county in Jiangxi province. These four counties represent different 
levels of rural industrialization and different degrees of administrative control or 
different ownership structures. These four types of development conditions, 
particularly from the point of view of rural industrialization, should approximately 
represent the situation in most areas of rural China.2
Before economic reform in 1978, China's rural economy contained only an 
agricultural sector: non-agricultural activities conducted by the rural population were 
of minor importance and were generally viewed as being integrated with the 
agricultural sector rather than as having a separate identity. However, market-oriented 
economic reform initiated in the late 1970s has encouraged the rapid development of 
rural non-agricultural activities so that another sector has emerged within the rural
1 Five questionnaires were designed for the township, village and private enterprises sample survey: a 
Workers Survey Questionnaire (WSQ) for TVP employees; an Enterprise Survey Questionnaire 
(ESQ) for management teams of sample firms; an Enterprise Director Questionnaire (EDQ) for 
directors of sample firms; an Enterprise Quantitative Questionnaire (EQQ), filled out by accountants 
of sample firms; and a Township Leader Questionnaire (TLQ). The total number of firms included in 
the survey is 121. The ESQ, EDQ and EQQ each sampled 121 firms. The WSQ was conducted in 46 
firms of the total 121 sample firms, and the total number of observations is 1174. The main part of 
this study is based on the Workers Survey Questionnaire.
2 For detailed information on the characteristics of each regions, see Byrd and Lin (1990).
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economy—the so-called TVP sector. This sector was fast growing and by 1985, about 
20 per cent of the rural labour force was engaged in the TVP sector. Its total value of 
output accounted for about forty-four per cent of the gross rural social product3.
1.1 Scope of the study
Most of the theoretical and empirical work on individual wage determination has 
been undertaken in market economies. The dominant paradigm is the human capital 
model. This model assumes that individuals maximize their lifetime income and firms 
maximize profits. The theory is reinforced by the free choice of employers to choose 
their workers and the free choice of employees to choose their employer. Labour 
mobility seems to be essential for the applicability of the model.
The TVP is regarded as the most market oriented sector in the Chinese non- 
agricultural economy. However, as will be demonstrated in the next chapter there was 
very limited labour mobility in rural China until 1985. Firms could not choose their 
workers freely. Nor could employees freely choose their employer. Most workers 
were assigned to a firm and, once employed, could not easily leave. Nor could firms 
easily fire labour. However, it appears that in most instances firms could control 
individual wage determination. Under these circumstances the questions of whether 
human capital theory applies and whether the individual wage determination pattern 
in the TVP is similar to those in the western market economies naturally arise. These 
are the major questions to be addressed by this thesis.
1.2 Importance of the study
Before economic reform in 1978, the wage policy in urban sectors was based on two 
principles: minimization of labour cost through the payment of low wages and
3 See Township and Village Enterprises Statistical Material, 1978-85 (Bureau of Township and 
Village Enterprises, 1987).
equalization of earnings. The Communist Party tried hard to narrow the wage gap 
between different occupational and educational groups and was successful (Jackson, 
1990). Economic reform encouraged a strengthening of the motivating function of 
wages in order to stimulate better work performance. However, because of the 
political sensitivity of labour reform (White, 1985)4, the introduction of market 
oriented wage determination to the urban sectors was very slow. In the meantime, 
since the rural TVP sector is much less controlled by the government, and has much 
less of a socialist tradition compared with the urban sectors, wage determination is 
more market oriented in that sector. However, as will be shown in the next chapter, 
the rural labour market, in which the TVP sector is a key element, was distorted in the 
sense that the quantity of labour employed by the firms was mostly controlled by the 
township or village authorities.
An examination of the pattem of wage determination in the TVP sector, and a 
comparison of it with wage determination in the western market economies, will 
provide a clear indication of the extent to which the TVP wage determination system 
is market oriented. It will also permit some policy issues to be addressed and thus 
provide a basis for formulating proposals for further reform of the TVP wage 
' determination system. Finally, understanding the current pattem of wage 
determination also provides a guide to the likely future of the wage determination 
system in the urban sectors if reform continues.
1.3 Outline of the Study
There are eleven chapters in this dissertation. Apart from the introduction and 
concluding chapters, the thesis is organized into three parts.
4 White pointed out that "labour reform is an area of particular political sensitivity since it engages 
deep ideological issues rooted in Marxist definitions of 'socialist' and 'capitalist' modes of 
production." (White 1985).
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Empirical and theoretical background
The first part comprises three chapters. Chapter 2 provides a brief overview of 
China’s rural economy, the institutional changes to its production and income 
distribution systems, and the development of the TVP sector.
Chapter 3 describes the general characteristics of the rural labour marker. It looks at 
labour supply to and demand from the TVP sector, recruitment, dismissal and job 
changes within the sector, and wage levels and wage determination. It concludes that 
the rural labour market is not a free market because employment is mostly controlled 
by the local government. Most firms, however, have decision making power over 
their wages.
Chapter 4 surveys the human capital literature and the empirical evidence on the 
model as applied to industrial and developing countries, as well as China. It concludes 
with a model of individual wage determination for the TVP sector. The model 
develops a special function of wage determination in a situation where local 
governments allocate labour and the wage is not used to attract employees to the firm. 
In this model the wage is used to encourage employees not to shirk work but to 
induce work effort from each individual. To do this, employees are paid according to 
their marginal productivity of effort so that extra productivity is rewarded. Hence, 
this model hypothesizes that the human capital model should be applicable to 
individual wage determination within the TVP sector. The following two parts of the 
thesis will provide empirical tests of this hypothetical model.
Empirical study of wage determination in the TVP male labour market.
Part two comprises Chapters 5, 6 and 7. Chapter 5 applies the human capital model to 
the analysis of individual wage determination for male employees. In general, the
4
human capital model seems to work well. Firm tenure and other job experience5 
affect wages in the normal way. Formal education, however, does not seem to affect 
wages. The reasons for this are analyzed in depth.
An attempt is made to ascertain whether the wage determination patterns of staff and 
workers differ. It is found that work experience variables (agricultural experience, 
firm tenure and other non-agricultural experience) have a different impact. For staff, 
agricultural experience seems to play a significant role, while for workers, firm tenure 
is the most important variable. The chapter gives some possible explanations for these 
results.
To further analyze whether wage determination in the TVP sector reflects labour 
productivity effects or socially determined rules of payment, the total male sample is 
sub-divided into piece rate and time rate groups and the human capital model is 
estimated for these groups separately. The hypothesis tested in this section is that 
piece rate payment is a direct measure of labour productivity and any relationship 
between wages and human capital variables for the piece rate group reflects labour 
productivity effects. The results show that the wage determination pattern for the time 
rate workers is more similar to that for the piece rate workers than to that for the time 
rate staff. This implies that they are paid according to the labour productivity. It 
seems consistent with the general hypothesis: individual wage determination in the 
TVP sector does reflect labour productivity effects.
Chapter 6 analyzes the impact of institutional change on wage determination and 
examines in further depth the relationship between education, wages and occupation. 
The TVP labour market has been moving towards a more market oriented situation: a 
movement away from job assignment by the local authorities towards firms choosing 
their own employees in terms of quality. The total male sample can be subdivided
5 Other job experience is obtained by subtracting firm tenure from total experience.
5
into two groups to capture the effects of this change: a market oriented group which 
includes those who found their jobs through their own effort; and a non-market 
oriented group which includes those who were assigned to their job by the township 
or village authorities. For the market oriented group the firm can choose which 
person is employed and it has an interest, therefore, in choosing the most productive 
workers.
The experience variables have similar effects in the wage determination for each 
group indicating that these relationships have not changed as the TVP sector has 
evolved towards market orientation. However, the effect of education differs between 
the two groups. It has a significant effect on the wage determination of the market 
oriented group but an insignificant effect on the wages of the non-market oriented 
group. It is conceivable, therefore, that the role of education in wage determination is 
being affected by institutional changes and this is the reason why education is 
generally found to be insignificant in aggregate wage equations.
Chapter 6 then attempts to determine whether the different roles of education for the 
two groups reflects a labour productivity effect. This is done by disaggregating the 
two groups further into piece rate and time rate employees. It is found that the 
education effect is consistent across the disaggregation within each group. More 
education increases the pay of both piece rate and time rate employees in the market 
group. This seems to suggest that education does have an impact on the labour 
productivity of these employees and productivity is rewarded. In the non-market 
group, education affects neither the piece rate nor the time rate employees' wage.
This raises the possibility that there are differences in the underlying technological 
processes of the market and non-market groups. Because of these technological 
differences, people involved in higher technological production need to be more 
educated compared with those who undertake more simple jobs. The gradual
6
liberalization of the TVP labour market has led to these technological differences 
being reflected in the way that workers are allocated to firms.
Does education, therefore, play no role for the non-market group? When data are fed 
into an occupational assignment model, it is found that education does have a role. 
More educated people are more likely to be in the staff group than in the workers' 
group. However, the wage gap between these two groups is so slight that there is no 
correlation between wage and education. The situation is different for the market 
oriented group, where education also affects occupational attainment but this in turn 
is reflected in the wage structure.
A puzzle then arises. If education has neither a direct nor indirect (through 
occupation) effect on wage determination for the non-market group, why did some 
people still invest in education? Furthermore, if occupation does not have an impact 
on wage determination, what is the motivation for people to seek to be promoted?
The chapter suggests that there is a non-wage side-payment for seniority in the non- 
market oriented group. These side-payments include shorter hours of work, better 
work conditions and the opportunity to appoint family members and other relatives to 
jobs in the TVP firms. If it was possible to incorporate the non-wage benefits into the 
wage variable, it might be possible to find a positive correlation between education 
and earnings for the non-market oriented group. The chapter provides some empirical 
evidence to support this hypothesis.
Chapter 7 makes three comparisons. First, it compares the results of the TVP male 
wage determination found in this study to those found by Gelb (1990) using the same 
data set. Second, it compares wage determination in the TVP sector to that in China's 
urban sector (Byron and Manaloto, 1990). Third, it compares the earnings distribution 
in the TVP sector to that in Japan and the United States.
7
For the first comparison, the chapter indicates that the main differences between 
Gelb’s study and this study come from the different methodologies employed by the 
two studies. And many of Gelb's results are misleading and are changed when 
variables and data are disaggregated. These changes are important and contribute 
significantly to our understanding of the TVP labour market.
Comparison with the Byron and Manaloto (1990) study shows that the wage 
determination patterns for urban China and the TVP sector are quite similar.
The chapter ends with a comparison of the TVP earnings distribution with that in 
Japan and the United States. The comparison shows that the TVP workers' 
experience-earnings profile is similar to that of the United States rather than to that of 
Japan.
Female wage determination and the gender wage differential
Women earn 20 per cent less than men in the TVP sector and the question is whether 
this earning gap, which is so similar to that of the industrial economies, can be 
explained by differences in labour productivity or by wage discrimination against 
women.
Chapter 8 provides a description of the gender wage differential and a comparison of 
the structure of wage determination of men and women. This comparison suggests 
that the wage determination process for women in general is similar to that for men. 
However, the rate of return to education is higher for women than for men, and it has 
a significant effect on wage determination of the total female observations while it is 
only significant for the wage determination of the male market group. Furthermore, 
the impact of the different experience variables on wage determination for the female 
staff group are different from those for male staff.
8
Chapter 9 calculates the impact of gender wage discrimination using the approaches 
proposed by Blinder (1973) and Cotton (1988). It is concluded that over 80 per cent 
of the gender wage differential can be explained by wage discrimination (without 
considering gender differences in occupational attainment).
Chapter 10 focuses on the determinants and role of female occupational segregation. 
According to economic theory, the difference in occupational attainment plays an 
important role in the explanation of the gender wage differential. In this chapter, two 
major issues are addressed. The first concerns the determinants of female 
occupational attainment and whether they are similar to those for males. The 
empirical results suggest that the determinants of occupational attainment are quite 
similar. The second issue is: to what extent the gender wage gap can be explained by 
occupational segregation in the TVP sector. The chapter answers this question by 
adopting Brown, Moon and Zoloth's (1980) approach. The estimated results suggest 
that the occupational attainment of men and women is very similar, but it is the 
different pay in the same occupation that matters. Within-occupation wage 
discrimination in the TVP sector in China is quite serious compared with other 
developing and industrial economies, while the wage effects of discrimination in 
• occupational attainment are not as serious as within-occupation discrimination. The 
chapter explains this phenomenon as the result of the unique situation of decision­
making in the TVP sector with respect to employment and the wage level: township 
and village governments, which have decision-making power over the occupational 
distribution, implement an equal opportunity policy in the TVP occupational 
distribution, while employers, who makes TVP firms' decisions regarding the wage 
level, actually discriminate against women.
Conclusion
Chapter 11 summarizes the main findings and conclusions of the dissertation, and 
poses some questions for further research.
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PARTI
EMPIRICAL AND THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
The TVP sector operates in China's rural economy. To understand its wage 
determination system, it is useful to know the development of the rural economy, its 
income distribution system and the situation of the rural labour market. Furthermore, 
it is also worthwhile to have an overview of theoretical frameworks through which 
individual wage variations are analyzed in economics. These are the basic contents of 
this part of the thesis.
Chapters 2 and 3 provide an empirical background for the study: the rural economy 
and its development, rural income distribution system and its institutional changes 
and the general characteristics of the rural labour market.
Chapter 4 surveys the human capital literature: its basic contents, debates which 
concern this study, and the empirical evidence on the human capital model. It also 
specifies a theoretical model for analyzing wage determination in the TVP sector.
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2BACKGROUND: THE RURAL ECONOMY AND THE TYP SECTOR
Before providing a detailed description of the rural economy and the development of 
the TVP sector, it is useful to understand the relationship between the rural and urban 
economies.
The rural economy was separated from the urban economy in the sense that no labour 
migration was allowed between the late 1950s and the start of economic reform in 
1978. The successful implementation of this labour immobility policy was strongly 
supported by the household registration system: people bom in a rural community had 
to stay there for their whole lives; their children also belonged to the same 
community.
Before economic reform, all rural non-agricultural activities were integrated into the 
agricultural sector. The local commune or brigade controlled all aspects of production 
and income distribution was independent of the activities of individuals. Institutional 
changes in the rural economy and its income distribution system have had a great 
impact on the emergence and development of the TVP sector and the pattem of its 
income distribution. Thus, in order to comprehend wage determination in the TVP 
sector, the background of the whole rural economy and the history of the TVP and its 
income distribution system have to be briefly investigated, though it is beyond the 
scope of this study to discuss them in any detail.
l l
2.1 Institutional change in the rural economy and its income distribution 
system
Since 1949, China's rural economy has experienced dramatic institutional changes. 
Redistributive land reform at the beginning of liberalization in 1949 established a 
small family farming system. At that stage the income distribution was simply that 
each family received an income equal to its total family output minus government 
direct taxes.
However, this small family farming system did not last long. Between 1955 and 1957, 
China launched a large-scale agricultural cooperative movement and soon after (the 
period of the Great Leap Forward), the people's commune movement swept across 
rural China. The economy and administration of a given area (about 4,000 households 
and a population of 20,000 on average) were put under a single organ, the commune, 
within which there were no independent property owners. An attempt was made to 
apply communist principles of production and income distribution1 which state 'from 
each according to his/her ability, to each according to his/her needs' (Lou, 1990; 
Griffin and Griffin, 1984).
The Great Leap Forward was a disaster which resulted in the loss of life of 30 million 
■ (Johnson, 1988). In order to recover from this disaster, there was once again a 
restructuring of the rural institutional system. Between November 1961 and February 
1962, rural ownership was changed to a three-tiered system: commune, brigade and 
production team. The basic accounting unit was also changed, first from a commune 
to a brigade, which generally had a population of 1,000-2,000, and then from a 
brigade to a production team. The average team consisted of about 30 households or 
about 150 people (Byrd and Lin, 1990)2. The production teams were entitled to have
1 During a brief period (1958-59) all members of the commune ate together with the food being 
provided from a communal kitchen without charge (Johnson, 1988).
2 Both productive and administrative hierarchies in rural China had three levels before the economic 
reform: commune, brigade and production team.
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relatively independent power in their management of land, labour and other publicly- 
owned properties. However, communes and brigades were part owners of the 
production teams' properties and provided economic and administrative supervision to 
the teams. Therefore, it was often the case that communes or brigades used 
production teams’ land, labour or outputs without any compensation.
During this period (1961-78), the individual income distribution in the production 
team followed a work point system: each individual labourer's work points were 
evaluated against each day of work among the members of the team. Full points per 
day for a healthy man aged 20-45 were usually 10. However, the value of these work 
points in terms of money was unknown until the end of the year. At the end of each 
year, the net distributable income of a production team was divided by the total work 
points earned by all members who worked in the production team. The main 
difference between the work point system and a normal wage system is the ex ante 
indeterminacy in the value of a work point.
The work point system affected individual incentives in the following ways:
(1) The value of each work point was determined not only by an individual's own 
effort but also by the efforts of all the other co-workers. The nature of agriculture is 
such that it is difficult to monitor work performance. Consequently, members of the 
production team have an incentive to shirk in the hope that other people would pay 
their contribution and in the belief that no matter how hard they worked, the results of 
their extra contribution would be shared by all the members in the team.
(2) Food grain was distributed on a per capita basis and was paid for by work points 
earned by households. The households not earning enough work points to pay for 
food were, in principle, required to pay back the production team from the next year's 
earnings. However, in practice this was rarely enforced. Therefore, those who earned 
more than enough to pay for the grain ration had to bear the burden (Lee 1984).
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Although during this period the size of production units decreased from the commune 
or brigade to the production team, the income distribution system discouraged 
individual work incentives. This, together with the low output prices and rapid 
population growth in rural areas, led to low agricultural productivity and a low rate of 
rural development. Actually a vicious circle existed: with constant or even slightly 
decreasing arable land areas, rapid population growth and poor production and 
income distribution systems, agricultural productivity dropped lower and lower, 
generating a very low income for the rural population, so that agricultural 
reinvestment was scarce. This in turn reduced rural labour productivity and further 
depressed the income of the rural population.
Between 1976 and 1977, a production team in the Anhui province secretly initiated a 
partial privatization movement. The farmers in the team were so poor that they did 
not care if they were caught and punished by the Party. They divided their team land 
into equal sized small pieces on a per capita basis, and each family member got 
his/her share. The production team made contracts with each family. The family 
should pay an amount of grain as taxes to the central and local governments, and the 
amount of grain required for the so-called collective accumulation for the production 
team, the brigade and the commune by the end of the year. The rest of the output 
would be the family income. Since both production and income distribution systems 
shrank to the smallest unit where each member's interests were highly correlated, not 
surprisingly, by the end of the year, the total output of the production team more than 
doubled, and the farmers in the team had enough to eat. Lots of teams followed them 
the year after, and they were all successful. At last, the central government realized 
that this was the only way for Chinese farmers to get rid of poverty. So in 1978 they 
introduced this new system, the so-called household responsibility system (HRS), to 
the whole country. This was the beginning of China's rural economic reform.
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As a result of both the household responsibility system and an increase in grain 
prices, China's grain output increased 18 per cent per annum, and farm family income 
increased 43 per cent per annum between 1978-1985.
2.2 Development of the TVP sector
Historical background
The predecessor of China's rural non-agricultural sector was the rural sideline 
production and handicraft industry, undertaken by 10 million individual Chinese 
farmers as part-time jobs in 1954. Afterwards, those who were working part-time or 
full-time in the handicraft industry were organized into specialized "sideline 
production teams" under agricultural producer cooperatives during the 1955-57 
period (Byrd and Lin, 1990).
China's commune and brigade (the predecessors of township and village) enterprises 
began in the late 1950s during the period of the Great Leap Forward. In order to fulfil 
the target set by the Communist Party to catch up with industrial countries in respect 
of 'industrialization', each commune and brigade established its own steel plant3. Most 
of the strong labour was organized to work in those plants. Only women and children 
were left in the fields. By the end of 1959, there were 700,000 small enterprises in 
rural China, and more than 5,000,000 farmers were employed in them. The total 
output value (evaluated by the government not by the market) was over Y10 billion, 
and this was 10 per cent of total national industrial output value in that year (Zhang, 
1988).
However, that was only a statistical figure. The steel produced by these small plants 
was of such low quality that it was never used as an input. In the meantime,
3 The main target was that the total national output of steel should catch up with the United 
Kingdom, in three years and with the United States in five years.
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agricultural production was destroyed by siphoning manpower, funds and materials 
from the agricultural sector. A nation-wide economic crisis ensued. In 1960, the 
central government called for a readjustment of the national economy. As a result, 
most of the commune and brigade enterprises were closed. Only a small number of 
enterprises which were engaged in producing agricultural tools, repairing agricultural 
machinery, or processing food, remained.
It was not until 1970 that a new peak of development of rural commune and brigade 
enterprises appeared. Again it was called for by the central government in an effort to 
speed up agricultural mechanization. Most of enterprises established during the 1970- 
77 period were those associated with agricultural production, such as agricultural 
machinery and farm tools production, and chemical fertilizer.
Rural township (formerly commune), village (formerly brigade), or privately owned 
enterprises have experienced an extremely rapid growth since 1978, especially since 
1983. This growth was a direct result of the agricultural reform. After the 
introduction of the household responsibility system and the increase in grain prices in 
1979, the rural economy underwent two major changes: (1) the increase in incentives 
to produce associated with the household responsibility system caused a sharp rise in 
labour productivity, which, in turn, created a large agricultural surplus; and (2) the 
implicit agricultural surplus labour now became explicit. Nevertheless, in spite of the 
latter, the regulations separating urban and rural economies have not been changed 
very much. Labour flows from rural to urban areas were still limited (at least until 
1985)4.
Under the pressure caused by the inability of plentiful surplus labour to migrate to 
urban areas, and with agricultural production surplus in hand, rural areas started their
4 A labour force survey of 222 villages showed that the permanent migration of rural labour to urban 
areas, up to 1986, only accounted for 1.75% of the total labour force (The Nation-Wide 222 Villages 
Labour Survey Data, 1990).
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own new process of industrialization. Hundreds of thousands of manufacturing, 
construction and other non-agricultural enterprises were set up, first in the south-east 
and coastal areas and then all over the country. They have absorbed agricultural 
surplus labour and raised the income of the rural population. As a result of ten years 
of development, the labour absorbed by the TVP sector accounted for 23.6 per cent of 
the total rural labour force in 1988 (Chinese Statistical Yearbook, 1989). And income 
per capita in rural areas increased 30 per cent per annum from 1978 to 1988. Among 
the components of this income increase, income from non-agricultural production 
increased 140 per cent per annum during the same period (Figure 2.1).
Figure 2.1
Change in total income and income from non-agricultural production
(1978-88)
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Source: Chinese Rural Statistical Yearbook, various issues, Beijing: Chinese Statistical Press.
Change in the income distribution system in the TVP sector
Before 1978, the income distribution system for commune and brigade enterprises 
was quite complicated. The workers in these enterprises, drawn from production 
teams, were paid within the same work points payment system as those who worked 
in the fields. Enterprises had to transfer a certain amount of their revenue to each of 
the production teams in proportion to the number of workers supplied. Workers did
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not get paid until the end of the year and were paid directly by their production team 
according to the work points they earned from the team. They were not paid directly 
by the enterprise.
After the introduction of the household responsibility system, the income distribution 
system in the agricultural sector changed dramatically. The production team, which 
had been the basic accounting unit, lost most of its administrative and economic 
functions. Both production and income distribution were now operated within 
families. Under these circumstances, it was impossible and meaningless for those who 
worked in the enterprises to have their income distributed within their home 
production team (now it is called the group of villagers). Therefore, the income 
distribution system of commune and brigade enterprises was transformed from the old 
work point system to a within-firm wage system in the 1978-83 period. During this 
transformation period, various wage systems appeared: within-firm work points 
system; fixed cash wage, which took wage levels in state-owned enterprises as the 
point of reference (but the wage paid was normally slightly lower); half fixed cash 
wage which was paid monthly plus half within-firm work points, paid at the end of 
the year; etc.
1983 was a turning point for the TVP sector: the production responsibility system was 
introduced to most of the township- or village-owned firms. This meant that the 
enterprises had more power over managerial decision making. Privately-owned rural 
non-agricultural enterprises were encouraged. And the majority of commune or 
brigade enterprises (by 1984 they changed to township and village enterprises) 
switched to a monthly cash wage system.
The cash wage system links an individual's work effort with his/her payment more 
directly than the work points system, and gives an individual more incentive to work 
hard. Specifically, most of the firms adopted a piece rate wage system if it was
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possible. For those jobs which were impossible to count by piece, a time rate wage 
supplemented by a bonus system was adopted.
Economic standing of the TVP sector in China's economy
So far, the development of the TVP sector and the institutional changes in its income 
distribution system have been investigated. The general situation of the TVP sector 
and its position in the whole economy should also be kept in mind.
Economic importance. As mentioned above, the TVP has grown rapidly since 1978. 
Up to 1988, its value of output accounted for 26.6 per cent of the value of national 
non-agricultural production and its employment accounted for 23.6 per cent of the 
total rural labour force (see Table 2.1).
Table 2.1
Development of rural non-agricultural enterprises 1978-1988
1978 1988
Rural labour (thousand persons)
Total 306,380 400,667
Labour in TVP 22,181 92,955
% of the total 7 23
Non-agri. output (billion yuan)
Total 545 2,398
Rural 46 638
% of total 8 27
Industrial output (billion yuan)
Total 424 1,822
Rural 39 453
% of total 9 25
Source: Chinese Statistical Yearbook (1989), Beijing: Chinese Statistical Press.
TVP enterprises were active in all but one of the fourteen main sub-sectors of Chinese 
industry in 1986. In some particular industries the share of the TVP output varied 
from a quarter to three-quarters of total output. For instance, in 1986, the TVP
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produced 75 per cent of all bricks made in China, 22 per cent of cement, 26 per cent 
of coal, 26 per cent of silk, 47 per cent of silk textiles, 27 per cent of edible vegetable 
oil and 27 per cent of machine-made paper and cardboard (Byrd and Lin, 1990).
The TVP has also played an increasingly important role in China's export industry. Its 
share of total national export value reached 11.0 per cent in 1987 and 15.2 per cent in 
1988 (Chinese Rural Statistical Yearbook, 1989). It is obvious that the TVP sector 
has already become a pillar of the national economy.
Marketization. China’s economic reform which started in the late 1970s aimed to 
transform a Stalin styled centrally planned economy into a market oriented one. After 
ten years of reform, the rural agricultural and the TVP sectors were the two most 
market oriented sectors within the Chinese economy.
Compared with the state-owned industrial sector, the TVP has several features 
indicative of a market oriented economy:
(1) A relatively hard budget constraint. A soft budget constraint is one of the main 
characteristics of a firm in the centrally planned economy (Komai, 1980). Compared 
with the state-owned industrial sector, a firm in the TVP sector has a relatively hard 
budget constraint because its owner has little power with respect to financial support. 
In China, the township is the lowest level of government. Its financial resources are 
very limited. If a township-owned firm is not competitive in the market, it is beyond 
its owner's power to get financial support for it. The possibility of obtaining financial 
support is even lower for a village-owned firm, and it is impossible for a privately- 
owned firm. A relatively hard budget constraint encourages firms to perform well in 
order to survive.
(2) A relatively small proportion of inputs and outputs are planned by various levels 
of government. Before economic reform, almost all inputs and outputs of state-owned 
enterprises were controlled by the central government. Economic reform introduced
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the policy of decentralization and the proportion of resources controlled by the central 
government gradually declined. However, provincial and prefectural government 
plans still play an important role in state-owned enterprises.
By contrast, the TVP sector has hardly any inputs obtained from, or outputs sold 
through, any level of government plan (which implies no low price inputs and no 
ensured sales). TVP input and output transactions are mostly through the market 
mechanism.
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3THE CHINESE RURAL LABOUR MARKET
China's rural labour market is one in which the rural population is the labour supplier 
and the rural agricultural sector and the TVP sector are the labour demanders. This 
chapter describes the general characteristics of China's rural labour market in which 
the TVP sector is one of the key elements. The primary aim of this description is to 
provide a background to the more detailed study of wage determination presented in 
Parts 2 and 3 of this thesis.
3.1 Labour supply for the TVP sector
China's township-, village- or privately-owned enterprises operate in rural areas. 
Given the limitations on urban-rural labour mobility described in Chapter 2, labour 
supply for the TVP sector can only come from the rural agricultural sector. The 
characteristics of this labour supply are outlined below.
Agricultural surplus labour
China, until the early 1970s, had rapid population growth and hence a plentiful labour 
force. However, the conventional labour transfer from rural to urban areas did not 
occur in the process of industrialization in China. Before the economic reforms of the 
1980s, an urban-biased economic development strategy prevented the rural population 
from moving to urban areas. Migration between rural regions was also restricted 
because of very low rural labour productivity and unbalanced rural development. 
Urban industry hardly absorbed any labour from rural areas after 1949. In effect, the 
rural economy was rigidly separated from the urban economy by an almost total lack 
of labour migration.
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The consequence of rapid population growth combined with labour immobility was a 
rapid decline in arable land per rural labourer (Table 3.1).
Table 3.1
Changes in rural labour force and arable land in China in 1952-1988
Year Rural labour 
(10m persons)
Arable land 
(10m Mu)
Arable land per 
rural labourer(Mu)
1952 18.243 211.844 11.6
1957 20.566 235.866 11.5
1962 21.373 210.343 9.84
1965 23.534 214.936 9.13
1970 28.120 215.231 7.65
1975 29.946 224.318 7.49
1980 31.836 219.569 6.90
1985 37.065 215.439 5.80
1988 40.067 217.303 5.40
Source: Chinese Statistical Yearbook (1989), Beijing: Chinese Statistical Press.
The rapid decline in arable land per labourer implies a rapid decrease in the marginal 
productivity of labour. By 1980 the arable land per labourer was approximately one 
half of the 1952 ratio (Table 3.1). According to Rawski's estimates, average labour 
productivity (per man-day) of the agricultural sector declined from 1.46 yuan in 1957 
to 1.24 yuan in 1975 (Rawski, 1979). This reinforces the proposition advanced on the 
basis of the data in Table 3.1 that the marginal productivity of labour in the 
agricultural sector had been declining. If there was any other job opportunity which 
offered a higher opportunity cost than agricultural earnings, there would be an ample 
supply of labour from the agricultural sector. The potential supply of labour can be 
seen as implicit agricultural surplus labour. This surplus labour was an important 
motivation for the development of the rural TVP sector.
The economic reform which began in 1978 brought a great change to the Chinese 
rural economy. The extremely rapid growth of the TVP sector has absorbed much of 
the surplus rural labour. However, in most rural areas, about eighty per cent of the
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rural labour force is still farming the limited arable land. They are the potential labour 
supply for the TVP sector.
The situation differs in each of the four counties. In Wuxi and Nanhai, where the 
rural TVP sector has developed more rapidly, around fifty per cent of the rural labour 
force was absorbed by non-agricultural activity by 1985, and as long as inward labour 
mobility is restricted there is a problem of labour shortage for the TVP firms in these 
counties.
In contrast, in 1985, there was still implicit surplus agricultural labour in the two less 
developed counties, Jeishou and Shangrao. Here, there have been no problems of 
labour supply from the agricultural sector as the wage rate paid in the TVP was 
higher than in the agricultural sector.
Labour mobility
General Situation of Labour Mobility in Rural China. Although the regulations 
regarding labour mobility were marginally relaxed, both rural-urban and rural-rural 
labour mobility were still extremely restricted in 1985. This can be demonstrated 
using data from a nation-wide survey of 222 villages called the Hundreds Villages 
Labour Survey Data (HVLD)1.
The HVLD data set shows that permanent migration of rural labour to urban areas 
only accounted for 1.75 per cent of the total labour force in 1986 (see Table 3.2). 
From the table data, we can easily imagine the even lower degree of labour mobility 
at the beginning of the reform period.
1 The "Nation-wide 222 Villages Labour Investigation", carried out by the Institute of Rural 
Development of the Chinese Academy of Social Science, covered 222 villages in Shanghai, Jiangsu, 
Zhejang, Fujien, Hebei, Shangxi, Inner Mongolia, Heilongjiang, Guangxi, Ningxia and Qinghai 
provinces in China. This data set (HVLD) is drawn from this investigation.
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Table 3.2
Labour mobility in the 222 villages, 1986
Inflow/outflow Total
(persons)
% of total Permanent
(persons)
% of total Seasonal
(persons)
% of total
Total labour 189,006
Outflow 26,993 14.3 5,596 3.0 21,397 11.3
to rural area 14,599 7.7 2,293 1.4 12,306 6.3
to urban area 12,394 6.6 3,303 1.8 9,091 4.8
Inflow 7,793 4.1 4,083 2.2 3,707 2.0
from rural 7,060 3.7 3,440 1.8 3,620 1.9
from urban 733 0.4 647 0.3 86 0.1
Source: The Material o f the Nation-wide Hundreds Villages Labour Survey, 1978-1986, Beijing: 
Chinese Statistical Press.
In rural China, not only is the labour outflow quite small but the labour inflow is also 
very weak. The HVLD data show that only about 4.1 per cent of the total labour force 
came from areas outside the villages. Of this inflow 52.4 per cent was a permanent 
inflow, which means that only 2.2 per cent of the total labour force inflow is 
permanent. If we believe the representative nature of this data set, China’s rural areas 
are very deficient in labour mobility.
Labour Inflow in the Four Counties under Survey. More detailed information 
about labour inflow is available in the township-, village-, or privately-owned 
enterprises sample survey. In all four counties, most of the labour in township and 
village enterprises came from within the community (Tables 3.3 and 3.4).
The figures in Table 3.3, which were derived from the 120 firm survey data, indicate 
that about 80 per cent of employees in the TVP came from the communities within 
which the enterprises were located, and only 9 per cent of the labour force came from 
other counties and provinces. An examination of the characteristics of the employees 
who came from other counties or other provinces shows that most of them were 
technicians. However, Nanhai is an exception in that about 18 per cent of workers 
came from the other counties or provinces.
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It is interesting to compare the situations in Wuxi and Nanhai, both of which are 
characterized by a local labour supply insufficient to meet demands of the TVP firms. 
In Wuxi only 3 per cent of the total labour force came from other regions while 94 
per cent came from the same community. In Nanhai, however, both the inter-regional 
and inter-community labour inflows are relatively strong, with about 33.8 per cent of 
the total labour force coming from other communities and 15.3 per cent coming from 
other counties or provinces.
Data from the Workers Survey Questionnaire indicate a similar lack of labour 
mobility (Table 3.4). The slightly different results (the percentage of employees who 
came from the same village or township in Table 3.4 is slightly lower than that in 
Table 3.3) are caused by differences in sample sizes. Table 3.4 is derived from a 
survey of 1074 workers. These workers belonged to only 49 of the 120 firms in the 
firm survey. Consequently, Table 3.3 may be more representative.
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Table 3.3
Original home of employees in sample enterprises
(%  distribution of employees in sample firms)
Same
township or 
village
Other 
townships 
(villages) in 
the county
Other 
counties in 
the province
Other
provinces
Wuxi
all employees 94.0 3.0 1.6 1.4
workers 94.2 3.5 1.7 0.7
technicians 78.6 1.4 5.3 14.6
manag, staff 93.1 0.6 0.5 5.9
Jieshou
all employees 79.7 12.7 4.8 2.8
workers 80.6 12.1 5.2 2.7
technicians 65.9 18.3 2.4 13.4
manag, staff 78.1 16.5 2.3 3.2
Nanhai
all employees 50.9 33.8 14.2 1.1
workers 47.7 35.0 16.0 1.3
technicians 85.1 3.0 10.9 1.0
manag, staff 53.5 39.7 5.6 1.2
Shangrao
all employees 80.9 14.8 2.1 2.2
workers 83.6 11.4 1.9 2.7
technicians 68.5 5.6 5.6 20.3
manag, staff 73.9 18.5 1.7 5.9
Source: Meng, The Rural Labour Market in Byrd and Lin (eds) China's Rural Industry, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.
Table 3.4
Where do you come from?
(%  distribution of sample workers)
Total Wuxi Jeishou Nanhai Shangrao
same village 52.3 58.4 32.5 53.0 66.7
same township 17.2 22.3 6.1 17.8 22.7
same county 20.9 8.8 52.5 16.5 3.5
other county 4.8 4.9 3.9 9.7 2.8
other province 4.8 5.4 5.0 3.0 4.3
total observations2 1074 473 297 260 144
Source: Workers Survey Questionnaire.
2 The regional distribution of the sample for the Workers Survey Questionnaire shown in this table 
will be the same for all the other tables derived from the same sample.
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Data on the distance between workers' permanent living places and their factories 
reinforces this picture of a lack of labour mobility (Table 3.5). More than 90 per cent 
of the workers lived within 20 Li (10 km) of their factories, which also means that 
most of the workers were from the same township or village.
Table 3.5
Distance from home to firm (% distribution of sample workers)
Distance
(Li)
Total Wuxi Jieshou Nanhai Shangrao
0-20 94.94 96.8 93.5 88.2 93.4
21-100 2.24 0.7 5.4 5.7 3.7
100 above 2.82 2.6 1.0 6.1 2.9
Source: Workers Survey Questionnaire.
Conclusion
The above discussion of the labour supply situation for the rural TVP sector suggests 
that:
(1) In general, China’s TVP sector has a large labour supply.
(2) The labour supply for the TVP sector is drawn from a very small region and is 
normally confined to each community.
(3) Because of labour market segmentation, the labour supply for the TVP sector 
varies from region to region, depending on the level of economic development in 
each region.
3.2 Recruitment, dismissal and job changes 
Recruitment
Except in Jeishou, more than 50 per cent of the employees were assigned to their job 
by or through community authorities when the enterprises were first set up (Table 
3.6). Employers in Wuxi county have least freedom in choosing employees, 
compared with both Nanhai, which has a similar situation of supply and demand of
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labour, and compared with Shangrao and Jieshou, where a large amount of potential 
surplus labour still exists. With regard to the two developing counties, Shangrao has 
more control over its firms' recruitment than Jieshou.
Table 3.6
Ways of obtaining employees when the firms were first established
(% distribution of sample firms)
Total Wuxi Jieshou Nanhai Shangrao
assigned by community 53 85 22 52 55
through resource pool3 5 • • 14 5
directly by firm 32 12 42 39 40
through social relations 6 • • 14 9
other 4 3 8
total observations6 115 34 37 24 • 20
Note: (a) Including those who invest in the firm, in terms of either land or money.
(b) The regional distribution of the sample for the Enterprise Survey Questionnaire shown in 
this table will be the same for all the other tables derived from the same sample.
Source: Enterprise Survey Questionnaire.
The responses to the question "how did you get your current job" in the Workers 
Survey Questionnaire (Table 3.7) are fairly consistent with the data shown in Table 
3.6 in that most job-finding in Wuxi and Shangrao depends on community 
arrangement. Even in Nanhai about 40 per cent of the workers were assigned to their 
current job by the community authority. Among the five methods of finding jobs, 
"through examination" and "through own efforts" are closest to market transactions.
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Table 3.7
How did you get your current job?
(% distribution of sample workers)
Total Wuxi Jieshou Nanhai Shangrao
community arranged 43 58 16 38 44
through social relation 23 16 28 41 22
through examination 16 16 31 4 3
through own effort 13 9 13 16 21
through resource pool 5 1 13 1 10
Source: Workers Survey Questionnaire.
Dismissal
The number of workers actually fired by firms or directors is very limited. Although 
97 per cent of the directors surveyed in Jieshou, 82 per cent in Wuxi, 73 per cent in 
Nanhai and 68 per cent in Shangrao thought they had power to dismiss employees, 
the average number of workers dismissed by each firm in 1985 was less than one 
person in all four counties. The sharp difference between the views of directors and 
the practical record of dismissing workers (for instance almost all the directors in 
Wuxi thought they had this right) can be explained by political and social constraints. 
Some communities in Wuxi issued regulations that prevented enterprises from 
dismissing employees unless they found new jobs. Each dismissal had to be approved 
by the community authority (Meng, 1990). The principal reason for all dismissals 
among the surveyed firms in 1985 was violation of the worker regulations3.
A situation of insufficient or excess personnel could mean that the enterprise has little 
decision-making power over its employment level. There are three important features 
of the personnel situation in the TVP firms. First, when the TVP sector is in the initial 
stage of development, firms have to accept the employment quota given by the 
authority which is likely to be greater than its optimal demand, as in Shangrao, for 
example. Second, with the development of the TVP sector, local shortages of labour
3 Such as fighting with co-workers, destroying machines, etc.
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often arise and in these situations, the community authority typically prefers to 
increase the wages and tolerate labour shortages rather than accept workers from 
outside the community, as, for example, in Nanhai and Wuxi. Third, no matter what 
the labour demand and supply situation is, dismissing workers is very difficult, 
otherwise Wuxi would not have had excess personnel. The judgement of the firm on 
the suitability of its worker numbers confirms this impression (Table 3.8).
Table 3.8
Do you have the right number of employees in your firm?
(% distribution of sample firms)
Total Wuxi Jieshou Nanhai Shangrao
not enough 9 16 11 27 ..
too many 8 9 8 52
just right 83 75 81 73 48
Source: Enterprise Survey Questionnaire.
Among the firms with excess workers, three firms in Jieshou stated that the reason for 
not dismissing employees was that the enterprise itself would not want or allow such 
reductions, while most firms in Wuxi and Shangrao replied that the township or 
village (TV) authorities would not allow the number of workers to be reduced. 
Employees also believe that they have little chance of being dismissed (Table 3.9).
Table 3.9
Do you think it is possible that you will lose your current job?
(% distribution of sample workers)
Total Wuxi Jieshou Nanhai Shangrao
very possible 9 8 4.1 15 11
not very 46 49 42.0 53.1 37
not possible 45 43 54 32.2 52
Source: Workers Survey Questionnaire.
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Job changes
Desired job tenure. Most workers are willing to stay in their present job for more 
than five years (more than 76 per cent of the total sample). There are, however, 
differences among the four counties (Table 3.10).
Table 3.10
How long are you willing to stay in your current job?
(% distribution of sample workers)
Total Wuxi Jeishou Nanhai Shangrao
less than 1 year 3 2 1 5 7
1-3 years 11 12 3 22 16
3-5 years 9 8 6 15 14
above 5 years 77 78 90 58 63
Source: Workers Survey Questionnaire.
Nearly 80 per cent of sample employees were willing to stay in the current job for 
more than 5 years (Table 3.10). Very few of them wanted to quit within one year. 
Furthermore, in the four counties less than 10 per cent of workers wanted to leave 
their factories (Table 3.11). It is easy to imagine that the main reason for not wanting 
to leave a job is the segmentation of labour market and, therefore, the high cost of 
searching for a new one. In the developing regions, job vacancies are scarce. 
Therefore, looking for a new job within the region is very costly. Nevertheless, it was 
also very hard for those living in the developing regions to find jobs in a developed 
region, at least until 1985. By the time the survey was conducted, most developed 
regions did not allow outsiders to join their local labour market. This was because the 
objective of these regions' local governments was first to absorb their local surplus 
labour and then to maximize income per capita within the region. Allowing outsiders 
to come into the region would reduce the income level of insiders. In the developed 
regions, although job finding was not very difficult, some political or social costs 
were imposed on the job search of those who were in township- or village-owned 
enterprises, so that skilled labour could be retained by those firms.
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Table 3.11
Do you want to leave your factory?
(% distribution of sample workers)
Total Wuxi Jieshou Nanhai Shangrao
yes 8 8 3 9 22
no 92 92 97 91 78
Source: Workers Survey Questionnaire.
The proportion of permanent and casual employees. The ratio of permanent and 
casual employees to the total labour force can shed further light on job changes. In the 
less developed regions, a permanent job is valued as employment security but in the 
more developed regions it is more of a restriction on job changes. The survey 
provides a general picture of the situation in the TVP sector (Table 3.12). Except in 
Nanhai, more than 75 per cent of labour in the sample firms held permanent 
positions. The employment system in Nanhai, however, has undergone remarkable 
changes since the reform began. The ratio of permanent workers has decreased very 
sharply from 92 per cent in 1980 to 40 per cent in 1985, thus, by 1985, casual labour 
was the dominant form of employment (Table 3.13).
Table 3.12
The percentage of permanent and casual jobs in total employment
Wuxi Jieshou Nanhai Shangrao
permanent 91.2 75.8 40.2 78.7
casual 8.8 24.2 59.8 21.3
Source: .Meng, The Rural Labour Market in Byrd and Lin (eds) China’s Rural Industry, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.
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Table 3.13
Percentage of permanent and casual workers in total employment of TVPs in
Nanhai county 1980-85
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
permanent 91.8 87.9 86.3 76.1 48.3 40.8
casual 8.2 12.1 13.7 23.9 51.7 59.2
Source: Meng, The Rural Labour Market in Byrd and Lin (eds) China's Rural Industry, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.
Even if a firm ran at loss, more than sixty per cent of the workers would prefer to 
remain in the factory receiving half payment (Table 3.14). This result implies that the 
cost of job searching must be very high. Except in Nanhai, most employees do not 
want to move. Reasons vary among counties. In Wuxi, where labour supply, is tight, 
workers do not seem to be allowed to move. Community authorities in both Wuxi and 
Nanhai have issued regulations to restrain job changing. The flow of labour between 
enterprises must be approved by the township authorities. A fine of 500-2000 Yuan is 
imposed on anyone who seeks a job outside the community. Those who leave the 
community to find jobs outside face non-economic punitive measures, such as denial 
of family members' rights to job assignments from the community authority and 
higher tuition for school children (Meng, 1990). In Jieshou and Shangrao, where 
labour supplies are greater than demands, the obvious reason is that it is difficult for 
them to find new jobs. However in both cases, job searching costs must be very high.
Table 3.14
Choice if factories ran into losses
(% distribution of sample workers)
Total Wuxi Jieshou Nanhai Shangrao
remain with half pay 66 65 84 47 58
find a new iob 34 35 16 54 42
Source: Workers Survey Questionnaire.
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In response to the question "As a director, if your firm ran into loss, what responses 
are you inclined to use?", more than half of the directors in the sample firms in Wuxi 
and Jieshou indicated they would not dismiss workers or shut down the firms (Table 
3.15). This implies either that this behaviour is not allowed (as in Wuxi) or that the 
firm itself does not want to engage in such activities (as in Jieshou). As a matter of 
fact, lowering the wage level without dismissal is probably a cooperative firm's 
response.
Table 3.15
Firms' response if ran into losses
(% distribution of sample firms)
Total Wuxi Jieshou Nanhai Shangrao
dismiss part of employees 38 41 21 48 50
bankrupt 5 10 19
lower wage rate 52 59 72 42 19
ask for government subsidy 5 7 12
Source: Enterprise Director Survey Questionnaire.
Conclusions
The above discussion has given us a general picture of recruitment, dismissal and job 
changes in the rural TVP sector. Three points can be concluded:
(1) Most employment in rural non-agricultural sectors is arranged by community 
administration or by social contact with community or firm leaders; only a low 
proportion of workers acquire their jobs through their own efforts in the market.
(2) The firms have very limited rights in hiring or firing workers.
(3) Because of labour market segmentation, the cost of job searching is very high in 
rural China and job changing by employees is of minor importance.
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3.3 Wage level and wage determination
As mentioned in Chapter 2, the TVP income distribution system has undergone a 
transitional phase from a work point system within the agricultural sector to a cash 
wage system. The questions asked in this section are: (1) What is the TVP's wage 
level compared with the agricultural sector and the urban industrial sector? (2) How 
large are the wage differentials among the firms? (3) To what extent is the TVP wage 
level determined by market factors and to what extent is it arranged by the 
community authority?
General features of the wage level and wage differentials in the TVP sector
Considering Chinese rural labour markets as a whole, there are three striking features 
of the wage level in the TVP sector. First, similar to the situation in the other 
developing economies, the wage level in the Chinese TVP sector is above the rural 
reservation rate, which is indicated by the agricultural income. The wage level of the 
TVP sector in China falls between the wage levels in the urban industrial sector and 
the agricultural sector (Figure 3.1). The calculation of the wage levels for the 
agricultural sector is based on the rural residents sample data collected by the State 
Rural Investigation Team, but it is not very accurate. According to Wakashiro (1990), 
in 1985, the daily wage was 4.9 yuan for growing crops, 4.4 yuan for livestock 
farming, 8.4 yuan for processing agricultural products, 8.6 yuan for commercial 
service and restaurants, and 15 yuan for transportation and industrial processing in 
rural China. This information indicates that the wage level in the agricultural sector 
was far below that in the TVP sector. The agricultural wage in my calculations, 
therefore, may be over-estimated.
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Figure 3.1
Comparison of wage level among the TVP, agricultural, and urban industrial
sectors, 1980-88:
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80 81 82  83  84  85  86  87  88
Year
I _ J Urban state-owned sector H H H H  Agricultural sector ■ TVP sector
Sources: Data for both the urban state-owned sector and the TVP sector are from the Chinese 
Statistical Yearbook, 1989; the data for the agricultural sector are calculated from the 
sample data in the Chinese Rural Statistical Yearbook, 1989.
The second characteristic is that the growth rate of the TVP's wage is much higher 
than that of wages in the agricultural sector, and in most recent years it is also higher 
than the growth rate of wages in the urban industrial sector (Table 3.16).
Table 3.16
Growth rate of wage in different sectors
(percentage)
Year Urban Rural
agriculture TVP
1981 -1.1 9.5 10.5
1982 1.4 16.7 -15.8
1983 1.6 -1.9 46.7
1984 22.0 10.5 14.4
1985 15.8 -1.9 16.7
1986 16.9 4.5 11.5
1987 10.6 6.4 12.3
1988 20.6 13.7 22.5
Sources: Chinese Statistical Yearbook, 1988 and 1989; Chinese Rural Statistical Yearbook, 1989; 
Statistical Material of Rural Township and Village Enterprises (1978-1985). Beijing: 
Chinese Statistical Press.
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The third point to be made concerning the wage structure in the TVP sector is the 
sizeable wage differences across regions. Looking at the minimum, maximum, mean 
and standard deviations of wage levels in 28 Chinese provinces in 1980, 1985 and 
1988, it is seen that not only are there large differences across regions, but also that 
the earnings gap has been slightly widening in recent years (Table 3.17).
Table 3.17
Statistical characteristics of the TVP's wage rates in 28 provinces
(yuan)
Year minimum maximum mean S.D. C.V. (%)
1980 249 592 455 98 21.5
1985 417 1028 743 154 20.7
1988 806 1763 1073 237 22.1
Note: S.D.=Standard deviation 
C.V.=Coefficient of variation
Sources: Chinese Statistical Yearbook, 1989; and Township and Village Enterprise's Statistical 
Material (1978-1985). Beijing: Chinese Statistical Press.
Wage levels and wage differentials in the four counties
The average wage level of the four counties in 1985 is 69 per cent higher than the 
average wage level of the TVP sector. Among the four counties, the wage levels in 
Jieshou and Shangrao are nearly the same as the national average, but Nanhai and 
Wuxi's are much higher, and this is consistent with the different situations of labour 
demand and supply during this period. Since 1982, the wage level in Nanhai has 
grown more rapidly than in Wuxi, even though both counties experienced excess 
labour demand. These phenomena are clearly displayed in Figure 3.2.
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Figure 3.2
Wage level in the four counties and the national average (1980-1985)
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Sources: Data for the four counties are from the Enterprise Quantitative Questionnaire and for the 
national average from the Chinese Statistical Yearbook, 1988.
Wage differentials among the sample Firms in each of the four counties. A
comparison of the minimum, maximum, mean and standard deviations of the wage 
level within each of the four counties shows that wage differentials among the sample 
firms in Nanhai and Shangrao are much higher than in Jeishou and Wuxi (Table 
3.18).
Table 3.18
Statistical characteristics of the TYP wage rate in four counties
County Minimum Maximum Mean S.D
Jeishou 29 92 61.09 15.39
Wuxi 55 151 105.06 18.79
Shangrao 25 150 63.92 26.91
Nanhai 67 300 169.33 58.48
Note: S.D.=standard deviation 
Source: Enterprise Survey Questionnaire
Wage differentials within firms. We have no data to indicate the wage differentials 
within each firm. However, the Workers Survey Questionnaire provides some
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information concerning wage differentials within sample firms from the perspective 
of the workers. Generally speaking, in each of the four counties, most surveyed 
workers do not consider that there are large wage differences within their own firm, 
but they still indicate a preference for narrowing the wage gaps (see Tables 3.19 and 
3.20).
Table 3.19
Wage difference among workers in your firm
(%  distribution of sample workers)
Total Wuxi Jeishou Nanhai Shangrao
very great 7 8 3 11 9
quite great 35 42 33 31 23
quite small 46 43 43 49 58-
no difference 12 8 21 9 11
Source: Workers Survey Questionnaire.
Table 3.20
Wage difference among workers should be
(% distribution of sample workers)
Total Wuxi Jeishou Nanhai Shangrao
smaller 42 44 30 46 57
remain the same 41 36 43 48 35
greater 17 20 27 6 8
Source: Workers Survey Questionnaire.
The workers were also questioned about their perceptions of the wage differences 
between ordinary workers and firm's leaders and technicians (Table 3.21 and 3.22).
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Table 3.21
Wage difference between ordinary workers and firm leaders
(% distribution of sample workers)
Total Wuxi Jeishou Nanhai Shangrao
very great 13 15 2 24 9
quite great 36 43 26 36 34
quite small 43 38 56 36 44
no difference 8 4 16 4 13
Source: Workers Survey Questionnaire.
Table 3.22
Wage difference between ordinary workers and firm's technicians
(% distribution of sample workers)
Total Wuxi Jeishou Nanhai Shangrao
Very great 7 4 6 16 5
Quite great 38 36 49 35 35
Quite small 44 50 33 41 40
No difference 12 10 12 8 20
Source: Workers Survey Questionnaire.
About fifty-five per cent of sample employees do not consider that there are large 
wage differences between skilled workers and unskilled workers. However, the 
situation differs from county to county. More than 50 per cent of the surveyed 
workers in Nanhai and Jeishou believed that the wage differences between employees 
with different skills were very or quite great. In Wuxi and Shangrao, about 60 per 
cent of the surveyed workers thought there were quite small or even no differences 
between unskilled workers and technicians. This pattern is similar to the pattern of 
marketization in the four counties: Nanhai and Jeishou are the more market oriented 
counties of the four, while Wuxi and Shangrao are controlled more tightly.
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Wage determination
In a perfectly competitive labour market, the wage rate is determined by the forces of 
labour demand and supply. In a tightly controlled economy, the wage level is 
normally assigned by government. In a cooperative firm, the distribution of income is 
determined by all the members in the cooperative.
The responses to the question "who has decision making power about the wage and 
bonus level in your firm?" in the Enterprise Survey Questionnaire show that nearly 70 
per cent of sample firms have some form of decision making power over the firm's 
wage and bonus levels (Table 3.23).
Table 3.23
The decision making power over the wage and bonus levels in the firm
(% distribution of sample firms)
Total Wuxi Jieshou Nanhai Shangrao
by township or village government 26 31 17 21 44
jointly by the firm and government 9 12 8 4 13
by the firm with approval from gov. 23 33 19 21 14
by the firm independently 37 24 53 33 29
others 5 0 3 21 0
Source: Enterprise Survey Questionnaire.
The responses to the question "do you have decision-making power on wage and 
bonus determination?" in the Enterprise Director Questionnaire roughly confirm the 
results reported above (Table 3.24).
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Table 3.24
Do you have decision making power on wage and bonus determination?
(% distribution of sample firms)
Total Wuxi Jieshou Nanhai Shangrao
wage:
Yes 62 57 70 65 58
No 38 43 30 35 42
bonus:
Yes 69 68 71 75 59
No 31 32 29 25 41
Source: Enterprise Director Survey Questionnaire.
There is also a question in the Enterprise Survey Questionnaire asking the reason for 
changes in the wage or bonus levels in 1985 (Table 3.25). Among the five choices, 
'assigned by township or village governments' is no doubt a non-market factor; 
'increasing in profit' is most probably a cooperative's response because in a 
cooperative firm, marginal productivity of labour is equal to wage plus average profit 
per member, represented by a bonus or some other form. The third and fifth choices 
are surely market factors. The fourth choice is ambiguous, and fortunately only two 
firms choose it.
These data suggest that the wage and bonus changes in 1985 were probably mostly 
market oriented. However, the degree of marketization differs across counties. In 
Wuxi county 41.4 per cent of wage changes in sample firms were assigned by 
township or village governments. In Nanhai, however, the decisions of township or 
village governments account for only 10 per cent of wage changes among the sample 
firms.
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Table 3.25
The reasons for changes in the wage or bonus in 1985
(% distribution of sample firms)
T o ta l W u x i JeLshou N a n h a i S h a n g ra o
assign ed  by T V  govern m en t 23 41 16 10 44
increasing in  profit 25 28 29 25 13
increasing in w ork v o lu m e 38 24 52 4 0 33
in flu en ced  by other firm s’ w a g e  increase 2 . . . . 5 7
in fla tion 12 7 3 20 3
Source: Enterprise Survey Questionnaire.
Conclusions
(1) The wage level is higher in the Chinese rural TVP sector than in the agricultural 
sector and lower than in the urban state-owned sector. It is higher than the income in 
the agricultural sector because the marginal productivity of labour in the TVP sector 
is much higher than in the agricultural sector. Moreover, in order to absorb labour 
from the agricultural sector, the wage in the TVP sector has to be higher than that in 
the agricultural sector.
Lewis' model suggests that the finding that the wage in the modem sector is higher 
than that in the agricultural sector is due to higher living standards in the urban area 
than that in the rural area (1954). However, his explanation does not seems helpful in 
our case, because the TVP sector is also located in the rural area. My explanation is 
three-fold. First, a potential surplus agricultural labour can only become explicitly 
surplus when the opportunity cost of agricultural labour is higher than the current 
income. Second, no matter what the labour supply situation is, the wage in the TVP 
sector has to be approximately equal to the marginal cost of effort, otherwise 
employees will choose to shirk work because it is difficult for employees to be 
dismissed in the TVP (for detailed analysis see Chapter 4). Third, because the wage in 
the TVP is higher than that in the agricultural sector, a cost of job searching is 
incurred even under the old recruitment system. For example, in order to be assigned 
to the TVP sector, people have to try to establish a good relationship with the
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township or village leaders. The efforts devoted to this purpose, either in money 
terms or non-money terms, should be seen as their job searching cost which has to be 
compensated by the wage they get from the TVP firm.
The fact that the wage in the TVP sector is lower than that in the urban state-owned 
sector is most probably due to the restriction on labour mobility from the rural areas 
to the urban areas. In this circumstance, employment in the TVP sector is the only 
alternative opportunity for the rural labourer to make himself/herself better off 
compared with the income level in the agricultural sector.
(2) Wage differentials between provinces and counties are very large, and this can 
probably be explained by the segmentation of the labour market together with the 
different stage of economic development in different regions.
(3) The majority of the firms have decision making power over their wage settings. 
However, wage determination in Nanhai and Jeishou is much more market oriented 
than in Wuxi and Shangrao.
3.4 Concluding remarks
The intention of this chapter was to provide a general picture of the Chinese rural 
labour market in which the TVP sector operates. It was established that:
(1) Although the level of development of labour markets in different regions was 
uneven, in a county like Wuxi, where the community authority's control was very 
tight, only 30 per cent of sample firms' wage levels were arranged by the authorities 
directly.
(2) These labour markets are distorted, and three specific distortions have been 
identified.
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First, labour mobility is restricted at both inter-regional and inter-community levels. 
That means that these markets are segmented into very small pieces (typically each 
market corresponds with the community). Second, within each of these markets more 
than half of the sample firms' labour allocation is arranged by the community 
authority. Third, for a very small number of sample firms, even wage determination is 
arranged by the community authority.
(3) Because of market segmentation, labour costs in developed regions increased very 
rapidly while at the same time labour supply to the TVP sector still exceeded labour 
demand in developing regions.
(4) The degree of labour market distortion varies from county to county, and this 
variation is not determined by the level of economic development.
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4LITERATURE REVIEW OF HUMAN CAPITAL MODEL AND 
HYPOTHETICAL MODELLING OF WAGE DETERMINATION IN
THE TVP SECTOR
Labour economics provides a number of theories to explain individual wage 
differences. This chapter reviews two of them, human capital theory and wage 
discrimination theory. These theories are going to be used to analyze the case of 
individual wage differentials in China's TVP sector in this study.
4.1 Neo-Classical Theory of Human Capital
The simplest neo-classical theory of the labour market is based on the assumption that 
individuals are identical in terms of productivity. This enables the problem of labour 
demand to be simplified to one where firms employ labourers to the point where the 
value of the marginal productivity of labour is equal to the marginal cost of labour. 
Since individuals are assumed to be equally productive, they must receive the same 
wage.
However, this theory is too abstract. Individuals are not identical in terms of 
productivity, nor in terms of ability. Galton (1869) first introduced the idea of ability 
differences influencing productivity. Following him, the ability school concentrated 
on the questions of how ability differs across individuals and how these differences 
influence the distribution of earnings (Pareto, 1897; Pigou, 1932; Staehle, 1943; 
Boissevain 1939; Roy, 1951 and Mandelbrot, 1960).
However, since innate ability is difficult to measure, it is hard to verify the theoretical 
formulation of the early models, and a new school, the human capital school, was
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developed under the leadership of Schultz (1960, 1961, 1971), Becker (1962, 1964, 
1967), and Mincer (1957, 1958, 1960, 1962, 1970, 1974, 1976).
General description of human capital theory
Instead of viewing ability as an innate characteristic of an individual, the human 
capital school saw ability as a produced characteristic. Four essential propositions 
form the basis of human capital theory:
(1) Individual productivity can be increased through augmentation of human capital 
which includes such areas as knowledge, skill, general physical acuity and endurance.
(2) Human capital can be gained from acquired education, training, good nutrition, 
exercise and health care.
(3) Labour is paid according to its marginal productivity.
(4) Individuals are optimisers, which implies a person will invest in human capital to 
the point where the marginal cost of investment equals the expected marginal benefit.
According to these four points, wage differences can be explained largely by 
differences in the distribution of human capital across the labour force. These 
differences are in turn are caused by differences in the distribution of investment in 
human capital.
The most important human capital variables are education and on-the-job training. 
The latter may be decomposed into general training and firm-specific training.
The private and the social costs of schooling are analysed in human capital theory. 
The demand for education depends on private decisions, while the supply of 
educational facilities depends largely on social costs and benefits calculated by 
government. The private cost of schooling includes the individual's forgone earnings 
during the education period and tuition fees paid by the individual, while all the
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facilities and other human costs such as the teachers’ time provided by society and the 
government are counted in the social cost of education.
The economic relationship between investment in, and return to, education is 
generally presented using the internal rate of return. The internal rate of return to 
human capital is defined as the discount rate at which the cost of investment is equal 
to the present value of the income stream yielded by the investment.
The calculation of the private rate of return to education only considers the private 
costs and the future money income received by an investor. However, externalities 
have to be considered when estimating the social rate of return to education. These 
externalities include factors such as the observation that children of more educated 
parents receiving more preschool education in the home and more guidance and 
encouragement in the later school years. In addition, education apparently reduces the 
propensity to engage in crime. These externalities are mostly positive, implying that 
they will increase the social rate of return to education.
The cost of on-the-job training needs to be analysed from the perspective of both the 
employee and employer. From the employee's point of view, the cost of on-the-job 
training is said to be the opportunity cost of training, which is the difference between 
the employee's alternative earnings and current earnings. On the other hand, the 
"teaching" provided by more senior employees and the equipment and materials used 
are included in the cost from the employer's point of view, in the sense that they could 
have been used in producing current output if they were not being used to raise future 
output.
Evaluating the rate of return to on-the-job training is much more complicated than the 
case of formal education. If a firm's wage and marginal product represent the cost of, 
and the return to, on-the-job training, respectively, the internal rate of return approach 
requires the present value of the marginal product stream to equal the present value of 
the wage stream. This can be written as (Becker, 1962):
49
R E,
( 1)
/ i - l  D n-1
y — th—  = y — i___
^ ( l  + r ),+1 f^d  + r y 1
where Rt represents the return to on-the-job training, 
Et represents the cost of on-the-job training, 
n is the number of periods, 
r is the internal rate of return.
Assuming training is given only during the initial period, the cost of training in the 
initial period would equal wages plus the outlay on the training, and the cost in the 
other periods would equal wages alone. The returns during each period would equal 
the marginal products. In this case, equation (1) becomes:
ti— 1 MP  n_1 W
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where K represents the firm’s outlay on training,
MP0 is the actual marginal product in the initial period, 
W0 is the trainee's wage earned in the initial period.
Equation (2) can also be written as: 
MP0+G=W0+K
«-1 A4 P  _  w
where G = Y ----------L.
t r  (1 + r ) f
(3)
G is the excess of future receipts over future outlays. It measures the return to the 
firm from providing training.
If the opportunity cost is considered, equation (3) becomes:
MPq+G=W0+C (4)
where MP0' is the trainee's alternative marginal product,
MPq-MP0 is the opportunity cost of the trainee,
C=K+(MP0’-MP0), is the total cost of training.
There are two kinds of training, general training and firm-specific training. 
Completely general training produces a portable skill and the marginal product would 
rise by the same extent even if the worker changed firms. In a competitive labour
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market, wage rates would rise by exactly the same amount as the marginal product. 
Therefore, as trainees may quit after training, the firm which provides general 
training may not be able to capture any of the return. In this case the firm would 
provide the general training only if they did not have to pay any of the cost. The cost 
of this kind of training will be borne entirely by the trainees.
In the case of general training, the wages and marginal productivity are raised by the 
same amount in the future competitive labour market, which implies MP=Wt, so that:
g  = ^ mpl_ wl = 0
t t  (1 + r ) ‘
Therefore equation (4) becomes:
MP0'=W0+C
and because C=(MP0'-MP0)+K, then W0-MP0-K, which implies employees would 
pay for general training by receiving wages below their current productivity.
The cost of, and return to, general training are presented in Figure 4.1.
Figure 4.1
Cost of and return to general training
MP
Wage
Tenure
In Figure 4.1 C is the total cost of training, K is firm's outlay and C-K is the 
employee's forgone earnings.
Completely firm-specific skills can only increase a trainee's future marginal
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productivity in the firm providing the training. If the cost of the specific training is 
borne by the trainee, he/she may not be able to capture the return to the investment 
because at any time during his/her tenure, the firm is free to dismiss him/her, and the 
firm-specific skill he/she gained from the specific training is useless in terms of 
increasing his/her marginal productivity in other firms. Accordingly, it might seem 
that the cost of this type of training should be borne by the firm. However, if a firm 
paid for the specific training of an employee who quit to take another job, the firm 
would suffer a loss in terms of not being able to capture further return. Because of 
this possibility, Becker concluded that the firm will shift some training costs as well 
as returns to employees.
In the case of specific training, an employee's future increase in marginal productivity 
will not be equal to the increase in his/her wage (MPt>Wt), so that the present value 
of the return from training collected by the firm will be positive (that is, G>0).
Assume G' measures the return collected by employees and G" measures the total 
return (G"=G'+G), and let a  be the fraction of the total return collected by the firm. 
Then the following relation will hold:
G = ctG"
Since G"=C, equation (4) becomes:
MPq +aC = W0 +C 
and so W0 = MP0’ -  (1 - a ) C
This implies the employee pays a fraction (1-a) of the cost and gets the same fraction 
(1-ol) of the return. (A formal version of Becker's model about the investment in, and 
return to, firm-specific training can be found in Hashimoto, 1981, where it is called 
an investment and benefit sharing model). Figure 4.2 presents the analysis for firm- 
specific training.
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Figure 4.2
Cost and return to firm-specific training
Tenure
In Figure 4.2 (l-a)C  is the part of training cost borne by the employee and a C is the 
part borne by the firm. From the firm's perspective, the cost of the firm-specific 
training is divided into a wage in excess of the marginal productivity during training 
period component, W0-MP0, and the additional cost of training (firm's outlay) 
component, K.
In the education market, the private rate of return is the key factor in determining an 
individual's demand for education, and the supply of training depends on a calculation 
of social costs and benefits. In the on-the-job training market things are slightly 
different. The demand for general training depends entirely on the trainee's decision 
because the total cost of general training is borne by trainees. The demand for specific 
training depends on both employee's and employer's decisions due to the fact that the 
total cost of training is shared between them. The supply of on-the-job training 
depends on the employer's own decision which is made according to how many 
trained people the firm requires. However, in a real market situation, each individual 
makes different decisions about how much human capital it is worthwhile to acquire.
What are the factors which account for different levels of human capital investment? 
Human capital economists explain these factors by using demand and supply analysis. 
Individuals choose to invest in human capital at different levels because their demand
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for and supply of human capital differs.
The main factor which influences differences in individual human capital demand 
curves is individual ability. The more trainable a person, the higher the rate of return 
to his/her investment in human capital and therefore the further to the right is his/her 
demand curve for human capital. The most important factor which affects the position 
of an investor’s supply curve is access to capital in order to finance educational costs. 
The poorer a person or his/her family, the higher is the cost of any given level of 
training. According to Becker (1964) this relationship can be presented as Figure 4.3.
Figure 4.3.
Demand and supply for human capital
($) return to investment
($) investment in training
(1) Assume two individuals have the same supply curve, say Slc, but different demand 
curves; one with higher ability (D and the other with lower ability (Dla). In this 
case the equilibrium point for the person with higher ability is B and for the one with 
lower ability it is A. This means the person with higher ability will invest more in 
human capital than the person with lower ability (C^ as compared with Cb) so that 
the rate of return to their investment will be different (R ^  as compared with Rb).
(2) Consider, on the other hand, two persons with the same ability (same demand 
curve, say D but different financial situations. The cost of training for the person
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with a good financial background will be lower than for the person who has a 
relatively poor financial situation. Therefore, the supply curves for these individuals 
are different, say for the former, it is Slc and for the latter, Shc. Therefore, the 
equilibrium point of investment for the former is B , while for the latter it is C. That 
means the former will invest more (C/c as compared with Chc) but earn less than the 
latter (Rlc as compared with Rhc) because the cost is lower than for the latter.
(3) If supply and demand are positively correlated the result will be that the more 
ability and the more financial opportunities a person has, the greater the potential for 
earnings.
Functional form of the earnings and human capital relationship
Mincer is the pioneer who integrated the theories of human capital and income 
distribution (1958, 1974)1. The functional form of the relationship between earnings 
and human capital developed by Mincer is that the logarithm of earnings is a linear 
function of years of schooling (5) and a quadratic function of work experience (X), 
that is:
lnY=aJ+a2St+a3Xt+a4Xt2+Ut (5)
where Yt is earnings at age t,
St is schooling,
Xt is labour market experience,
Ut is a stochastic error.
This functional form initially comes from the definition of the present value of 
earnings for a person with S years of schooling, which is:
1 The equation of the form ”log Earnings=a(0)+a( 1 )Schooling” was first published in Becker and
Chiswick’s "Education and the Distribution of Earnings” (1966).
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( 6 )Vs = \ Ls E,e-nd,
where Et is earnings,
L is the age of retirement, 
r is the discount rate.
Assume that a person with S years of schooling will earn a constant income Es. Then 
from (6) we get2:
— (e-'s -e~ rL) = V (7)
r
Assume that the number of years spent at work, N , is independent of the number of 
years spent in school. That is:
L=N+S (8)
Then equation (8) may be substituted into (7) to yield:
— e_rS (1 -  e"* ) = V = ^ -(1  -  )
r r
or Es=Eoe's
so that lnEs=lnE0+rS (9)
If post-school training is taken into consideration, the model will be more
complicated. Assume:
/^potential earnings at age t,
T,=actual earnings at t,
C,=human capital investment in on-the-job training at t,
A^investment ratio at age t, or Kt=CJEr
and assuming the rate of return to on-the-job training is constant rtr, then: 
E,=E,-i+rl,C,.I=El_I(l+rlJKl_I)
Solving this equation recursively yields:
£ , = £ s f +
i = 5 + 7
So,
2 This derivation draws upon Blinder (1976).
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( 10)ln Et =lnEs + J^ ln fl  + rtrKt )
i=S+l
Substituting (9) into (10) and for small rtrKiy we get: 
lnEl -  InE0 + rS + rv ^ j Ki
i=S+l
This can be transformed to:
lnEt = lnE0 +rS + rD. ^ K (z )d r  (11)
where X is the measure of time spent at work since the end of schooling.
Equation (11) is not estimable. Mincer (1974), Ben-Porath (1967) and Becker (1967) 
proposed that the ratio of investment in human capital during the post-schooling 
investment period must decrease with years of work experience. They specified 
different functional forms for the relationship between years of labour market 
experience and the investment ratio of on-the-job training K(t). In this brief overview 
only Mincer's (1974) linear specification is reviewed, which is:
K(t)=K0(l-t/T) (12)
Substituting (12) into (11), and integrating gives:
lnEt=lnE0+rS+rtrK0X-(r[rk0/2T)X2 (13)
Recalling that Et is potential earnings and that actual earnings is defined as:
Y=Et(l-Kt)
then lnYt=lnEt+ln( 1 -Kt) (14)
Substituting (12) and (13) into (14) yields:
lnYt=lnE0+rS+rtrK0X-(rlK0/2T)X2+ln[l-K0-(K0/T)X]
Mincer further assumed that f(X)=ln[ 1 -K0+(K0/T)X] can be approximated by a
second-order Taylor series expansion, which enables him to write:
In Y ,= a ,+  a2S, + a,X, + a4Xf + U, (15)
An extension of the human capital model: occupational choice
The human capital model views the individual as an optimiser who invests in his/her
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human capital so as to maximize his/her net present value of income. This theory has 
been extended to explain an individual's occupational choice (Stigler and Blank, 
1957; Fleisher and Kniesner, 1980; Brown, Moon and Zoloth, 1980).
The basic idea of the occupational choice model is that individuals will compute the 
net present value of income from each occupation and choose the occupation with the 
highest net present value. This model is discussed further in Chapter 6.
4.2 Debates Concerning the Human Capital Theory
In the literature, there are a number of debates about human capital theory. It is worth 
noting that some of them are concerned this study.
The proxy for work experience
By assuming that during schooling no time is spent in the employed labour force, and
that after schooling all time is spent in the employed labour force, Mincer(1974)
defined the proxy for work experience as:
j=A-S-5
where A is age,
S is years of schooling,
5 is pre-school age.
However, he recognised that using j  as an experience proxy for females is hazardous.
The reason for this is that for married females, the assumption about continuity of
work experience after schooling is probably not true. Blinder points out that
Even if attention is restricted to women who have never married, ..., 
the problem remains if females either (a) suffer more unemployment,
(b) have lower labour force participation, or (c) work fewer hours 
when employed than do males.(1976: pp. 14)
Blinder worked out how the regression estimates could be biased in Mincer's equation 
if j  is used as a proxy for experience in inappropriate circumstances. He denoted the
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discrepancy between real experience X and j  by e, so that 
j=X+e
In Mincer's equation the measurement error attaches to two of the regressors, j  and j2. 
Moreover, each e is non-negative, so the mean error is positive. If only schooling and 
j  appeared in the regression, Blinder expected the coefficient of j  would be biased 
downward, so the coefficient for schooling would be biased upward.
Blinder (1973) used age as a proxy for experience instead of j, and this was criticised 
by Rosenzweig and Morgan (1976). They showed how Blinder's specification 
(lnY=b0+b1S+b2A+b3A2+u) could result in a downward bias in the estimated return 
to schooling for the total observations (both males and females together). They 
defined age as:
A=S+5+j
and substituted this into Blinder's equation:
lnY=b0+b1S+b2(5+S+j)+b3(.5+S+j)2
=zbß+[bj+b2+( 10+2j+S)b3)S+[b2+( 10+2S)b3]j+b3p
We can see from the above equation that the true schooling coefficient is equal to 
[b1+b2+(10+2j+S)b3] where bl and b2 are positive and b3 is negative. Thus the larger 
the j  and the higher the average level of schooling, the less the magnitude of the 
underestimation.
Education as a screening device
The conventional view of the positive correlation between education and earnings is 
that schooling enhances earnings through increases in an individual’s labour 
productivity. In the early 1970s a new theoretical argument emerged suggesting that 
schooling may serve to identify those individuals who are more productive in the 
market, which determines the individual's job assignment; in turn the individual's 
occupational level determines earnings. The extreme form of the screening hypothesis
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is that an individual's productivity is unaffected by the formal schooling process 
(Wolpin, 1977). And, therefore, the rate of return to schooling is only informationally 
based.
The formal presentation of this screening model was first developed by Spence 
(1973) and Stiglitz (1975). The basic assumptions of this model are: (1) there is 
imperfect information on an individual's productivity in the market; (2) firms are risk 
neutral and act competitively; (3) it is prohibitively costly to identify each individual's 
productivity within a work group (Stiglitz, 1975).
Under these circumstances, it is worthwhile to label an individual’s labour 
productivity. From the employers' point of view,
if individuals differ in their capabilities according to the jobs they 
perform, and if substitution of labour is imperfect between jobs, firms 
would maximise output only by some non-arbitrary assignment of 
workers to jobs. Aggregate output is therefore larger if workers can be 
identified and 'assigned' to their most productive use (Wolpin, 1977: 
pp. 949).
From the employees' point of view,
Individuals who can be labelled as 'more productive' are able thereby 
to obtain a higher wage, .... Thus, by its very nature, screening 
information has important effects on the distribution of income 
(Stiglitz, 1975: pp.283).
Both human capital and screening hypotheses suggest there will be a positive 
relationship between education and earnings. Because of the common nature of their 
predictions, it is difficult to disentangle the hypotheses empirically. In other words, if 
one detects positive a relationship between education and earnings, it is hard to know 
if it is the effect of education enhancing labour productivity and productivity being 
rewarded, or the effect of more inherently capable people having experienced higher 
education and education being rewarded. While various tests have been proposed in 
the literature for distinguishing between the impacts of human capital and screening 
(Miller and Volker, 1984; Wolpin, 1977) the results of applications of these tests have
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been inconclusive.
The age-earnings profile: efficiency wage model
Many empirical studies have reported a quadratic shape for the age-earnings profile 
consistent with the theoretical model proposed by Mincer (1974). The conventional 
human capital theory explains that this phenomenon is associated with the 
accumulation of human capital year by year along with labour market experience. 
The wage change through time depends on the change of life-cycle labour 
productivity.
More recent theoretical work has sought to explain the quadratic life-cycle wage 
growth without appealing to life-cycle productivity growth. The most challenging 
alternative to human capital theory is efficiency wage theory. Within the efficiency 
wage theory there are two hypotheses which challenge the productivity hypothesis 
and hence, the human capital hypothesis. One of these is the incentive hypothesis and 
the other is the labour turnover hypothesis.
Lazear developed the incentive hypothesis in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
Even in the absence of on-the-job training or skill acquisition, upward 
sloping age-earnings profiles are prevalent.... This results because 
holding out payments until later in the individual's lifetime alters the 
worker's incentives to reduce his effort on the job (Lazear, 1979: pp.
606).
The basic logic of Lazear's model presented in his 1981 paper can be simplified as 
follows:
(1) The cost of monitoring is a positive function of the effort provided by employees.
(2) Effort has a negative effect on the employee's utility (U) but a positive effect on 
the wage.
(3) Capital markets are perfect and there is complete information so that an employee
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is indifferent between a wage path which offers him/her a spot wage according to 
his/her spot productivity, and one which pays less than the value of marginal 
productivity (VMP) initially and more than the VMP later on until time T (the time 
for retirement), so long as the total present value of his wage stream is equal to the 
total present value of his/her VMP stream.
(4) Since dU/de<0 (e is effort provided by the employee), employees have an 
incentive to shirk. However, if shirking is detected, it will result in immediate 
dismissal. Therefore, the steeper the age-earnings profile, which implies the higher 
the employee's different payment compared with his/her VMP, the greater the cost of 
shirking.
(5) Since the firm pays the employee more than his/her VMP when he/she is senior, 
the firm would also seek to terminate the labour contract before time T. If it did so, 
however, the firm would lose its reputation for honesty. Without honesty, no one 
would sign a contract with the firm. The flatter the age-earnings profile, the lower the 
possibility of the firm being dishonest because the gain from terminating the labour 
contract is less than the cost of it.
(6) The steeper profile increases employee’s effort provision but decreases the firm's 
honesty. Therefore, there will be an optimal profile which maximises the worker's
expected lifetime earnings, expressed formally as:
[  { W(f) - en[f { t ) + £(r)] x J V (  r ) -  W + f ( t )9,  (
subject to the constraint that the expected present value of lifetime marginal product 
equals the expected value of wages paid out.
(7) The competitive firm would choose the optimal upward sloping age-earnings path 
which discourages employees from shirking and ensures that firms earn zero profit. 
Lazear concluded that the important point is that the optimal paths are upward 
sloping, even though there is no on-the-job training and no rising VMP schedule.
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(8) Since the upward sloping age-earnings profile is only a way through which 
employees are encouraged not to shirk, piece rate or self-employment, which itself 
embodies perfect monitoring, will have a flatter profile than time rate work.
Comparing Lazear's model and the standard human capital model, a similarity is 
observed: in both models, employees are not paid according to their spot VMP. 
However, as pointed out by Lazear, the explanations of this quadratic profile provided 
by the two models are totally different. For the specific human capital model, no 
matter how large the difference between the employee's spot VMP and earnings, the 
two will be positively correlated over a life time. For the Lazear model, however, the 
correlation between productivity and wage over the life cycle is zero.
In the efficiency wage school there is another hypothesis which explains the quadratic
tenure-earnings profile. The self-selection, or labour turnover hypothesis, was
developed by Salop and Salop (1976). Their basic idea is expressed as follow:
The firm discourages high turnover individuals from applying and 
encourages low turnover workers to apply for employment by 
predictably increasing an employee's wage with his tenure at the firm.
(Salop and Salop,1976: pp. 620)
The assumptions of the model are:
(1) There are positive turnover costs to firms in a perfectly competitive labour 
market.
(2) Individuals are identical in every respect, except that they differ exogenously in 
their probabilities of quitting, so that there is an incentive for firms to seek out and 
hire slow quitters.
(3) Workers are indifferent among all firms paying the competitive wage.
(4) Labour supply is perfectly inelastic.
(5) There is L amount of labour supply and n firms in the market, and each firm can 
hire its desired labour force at the going wage rate w. In addition, each firm trains its 
new workers, and incurs expenses of T per new employee.
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(6) The proportion a  of L workers have probability of qs of quitting each period, and 
the rest, the proportion of (7-a), have a larger probability >qs of quitting.
Consequently the average quit rate is: 
q = a q s + ( l - a ) q f
In this model, the firm maximizes profits by choosing that work force for which the
present discounted values of the expected marginal cost and marginal revenue product
per worker are equal. The firm's expected present value of total costs are:
^  _ WL (r + q)TL
pdv — +r r
where r is the internal rate of return to human capital, TL is the firm's total training 
cost, and the subscript pdv stands for the present discounted value.
Because of the perfectly competitive market condition, a firm has only one way to 
raise its profits, and that is to employ those who have lower quit rates; this decreases 
its turnover cost (perfectly inelastic labour supply and the exogenous quit rate ensures 
that firms that can attract low turnover rate workers gain from it). Therefore, the 
firm's objective is to find a way to attract those workers with a lower quit rate so as to 
minimise the firm's turnover cost.
Salop and Salop designed a self-selection system (called a Two-Part Wage system, 
TPW) by which the firm can reach its objective. Under this system the new employee 
pays the firm an entrance fee of Dy, in return for which he/she receives wages of 
w +D2 during his/her tenure with the firm (where w is the market wage rate). The 
tenure earnings profile for TPW, therefore, is steeper than for the normal market case.
By setting D2 and D2, the firm can encourage slow quitters to apply, and discourage 
fast quitters from applying. This strategy will reduce the firm's turnover cost and 
increase its profit.
The optimal Dj and D2 are derived in the following way: let q represent the quit- 
probability for a risk-neutral worker, and E(q) represents his present value of net gain
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from TPW. Then,
E(q) = ~Dx + 2 . (1 -Q)D2(l-<7)** ' -  ' * « * 1
1 + r (l + r)‘ (1 + aT
which can be reduced to: E{q) = - D x + D2 (------)
r + q
In this case, the employee would be indifferent between a steeper and a normal 
profile if E(q)=0, which implies:
A = 1
D2 r + q
However, if E(q)>0 (which implies Dj/D2>l/(r+q)), the employee would prefer the 
steep profile, while if E(q)<0, he/she would prefer a flat profile.
Therefore, if the firm sets D7/D2 so that 
l/(r+qf)<Dj/D2<l/(r+qs>)
the slow quitter would prefer the steeper profile and so apply at the firm, and the fast 
quitter would prefer the flat profile and so stay with the other firms (carrying on at 
the wage rate of w*). Even if the firm sets Dj/D2=l/(r+qs), making the slow quitters 
indifferent between the steep and the flat profiles, the fast quitters won't apply to the 
firm with a steep profile. Then the firm’s average quit rate will be lower than the 
market average quit rate q, and the turnover cost will be lower than the market 
average cost.
As with the incentive hypothesis, the self-selection hypothesis is not concerned with 
the impact of on-the-job training and changes in the marginal productivity of labour 
on changes in earnings when it implicitly explains the steep tenure-earnings profile. 
However, its basic assumption of a positive turnover cost implies that there are some 
positive firm-specific training costs borne by the firm at the beginning of 
employment. This is because the main component of the turnover cost is the training 
costs.
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4.3 Neo-Classical Theory of Wage Discrimination
The gender wage differential is a big issue for the TVP wage determination. It is of 
interest to explain this differential in this study. The following review provides a 
theoretical framework for the analysis.
Wage discrimination is defined as the wage difference which is caused by the 
personal characteristics of the worker that are unrelated to his/her productivity.
In general, there are four sources of discrimination: (1) personal taste; (2) imperfect 
information; (3) monopsony power, and (4) crowding.
Personal taste
A neo-classical theoretical analysis of wage discrimination may be conducted under 
the assumption of perfect or imperfect competition. The theory of wage 
discrimination under perfect competition has been fully developed by Becker (1957) 
and Arrow (1972, 1973).
Becker (1957) analysed discrimination based on personal taste. He writes that:
money, commonly used as a measuring rod, will also serve as a 
measure of discrimination. I f an individual has a 'taste for 
discrimination,' he must act as if he were willing to pay something, 
either directly or in the form of a reduced income, to be associated 
with some persons instead of others. When actual discrimination 
occurs, he must, in fact, either pay or forfeit income for this privilege 
(1957: pp. 6).
Three economic agents who discriminate against some definable group of employees 
were considered. They are employers, employees and consumers. This review will 
only consider the case of employer discrimination as it is more relevant to the TVP 
sector.
In the case of discrimination by employers, some employers may have a special taste 
or dislike for some employees with a particular characteristic, say females.
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Discrimination would cause the wage rate for female employees to be lower than the 
wage rate for males. Becker derived the market discrimination coefficient (MDC) 
between the discriminated and non-discriminated groups as the proportional 
difference between their wage rates:
where Wm and Wj- represent the equilibrium wage rates of men and women, 
respectively.
Arrow (1973) further developed Becker's model by considering an employer who 
seeks to maximise utility instead of profit. The assumptions used in his model are as 
follows3: (1) All firms possess identical utility u(n, M, F) and production functions. 
(2) Males and females are perfect substitutes. (3) Supplies of males and females are 
perfectly inelastic. (4) The economy is in a short-run situation in which capital is 
given, so that output is a function of employment, i.e.f(M+F), where M and F are the 
supply of male and female employees, respectively. (5) The price of output is 
normalised to unity.
Under these assumptions Arrow derived the firm's profit function as: 
n = f ( M  + F ) - W mM - W f F (1)
We can assume the employer equates the marginal productivity of each type of labour 
to the perceived price of labour. But the perceived price of labour is defined as the 
market price of labour Wj- and Wm, plus the price the employer is willing to pay, in 
terms of reduction in profits, for increasing or reducing male or female labour supply. 
The second term is the marginal rate of substitution of profits for male or female 
labour, and is equivalent to Becker’s term of the ’discrimination coefficient'. It is 
defined as dm for males and dj for females. Accordingly:
3 The summary of Arrow's assumptions presented here is drawn heavily from Millward, Sumner and 
Zis (1985).
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MPm=Wm+ dm ( 2 )
MPf = Wf +df (3)
where dm<=0 and df>0. According to the perfect substitution assumption, 
MPm=MPj=MPL. Then, from (2) and (3)
Wm- w f = d f - d m> 0 (4)
which means that at the equilibrium, the wage rate for males exceeds the wage rate 
for females. And from (1) to (3),
7 r = f { L ) - M P LL + dmM + dfF (5)
where L=M+F. If there were no discrimination,
7T0 = f ( L ) - M P LL ,
Therefore, the change in profits is
7T- K0 = d nM - d f F (6)
By assuming:
Arrow concluded that the entire effect of discrimination is that of a transfer from F to 
M (women are paid less than their marginal productivity and men are paid more).
By relaxing the assumption that utility functions are identical among firms, and 
following equations (4) and (7), the following relations can be shown to hold:
If we consider the facts that dp>0, dm< -0 , and then from the above relations
it is obvious that firms with the highest values of dj have the highest ratios of M to L. 
Therefore, the conclusion is
Discrimination is costly to the entrepreneur and acts as a tax on him, 
since it shifts his demand for labour to the more costly component.
Hence, it restricts his scale (Arrow, 1973: pp. 9).
Therefore, competition tends to reduce the degree of discrimination in the market. In 
the long run, only the least discriminatory firms survive. Unless there is universal 
discrimination, discrimination that derives from employers’ personal prejudice cannot
dJM-djF=0, (7)
M df 
L ~ ( W m- W f )
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exist in the long-run under perfect competition.
Imperfect information
The theory of discrimination caused by imperfect information was developed by 
McCall (1972, 1973), Phelps (1972), and Arrow (1972, 1973). This kind of 
discrimination "can be thought of as reflecting not tastes but perception of reality" 
(Arrow, 1972: pp. 23). It occurs when employers do not have enough information 
about an individual's productivity. Consequently, they use personal characteristics as 
a productivity screening device on the basis of their pre-conceived idea that, say, 
female workers have lower productivity than male workers. There are three pre­
conditions for this kind of discrimination to exist: (1) The cost of information used as 
a source for distinguishing different types of labour is reasonably low, such as sex or 
race; (2) The cost of information for determining the employee's true productivity is 
higher than the cost of the screening device; (3) The employer must have some pre­
conception about the distribution of productivity within each of the different types of 
worker groups.
Even under these assumptions, in the long-run the employer will observe each 
employee's productivity on the job, and the employee's wage will be adjusted to 
reflect his/her actual productivity, and therefore the wage difference between the male 
and female groups of workers due to non-productivity reasons will disappear.
To sum up the above review, one might conclude that the personal taste and imperfect 
information hypotheses cannot explain large, persistent wage discrimination under 
conditions of perfect competition.
Imperfect competition
The way to explain persistent wage discrimination is imperfect competition. When 
monopoly exists in the product market, and monopolistic employers have a special
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taste for some groups of employees, long-run wage discrimination may exist. The 
main point is the removal of the force of competition. However, if monopolies with 
special tastes do not exist in all product markets in an economy, then the final 
outcome will be segregation of the workforce rather than discrimination.
Along with the development of models of discrimination under conditions of perfect 
competition, neo-classical theory developed a model of monopsonistic discrimination 
(Robinson, 1934; Krueger, 1963; Madden, 1975; Gordon and Morton, 1974; and 
Cardwell and Rosenzweig, 1980).
Following Madden (1975), the basic assumptions of the model are:
(1) Monopsony power exists. That is, the buyer faces an upward sloping supply 
curve. This means his/her buying decision significantly affects the level of market 
demand and labour is not supplied at constant cost or wages.
(2) Labour supply can be separated into different labour pools.
(3) The separated labour pools have different wage elasticities of supply.
Under these assumptions, the monopsonistic model of discrimination can be specified 
as follows. Assume the production function for the monopsonistic firm is:
Q -  f ( F , M)  (8)
where Q is the firm’s output, and F and M are, respectively, the female and male 
labour forces employed in the firm. The labour supply functions for females and 
males are:
F = h(Wf ) (9)
M = h{Wm) (10)
where Wj- and Wm are the female wage and male wage, respectively.
The discriminating monopsonistic employer will equate the marginal rate of technical 
substitution between F and M with the ratio of the marginal costs of hiring F and M, 
which is expressed as:
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( 11)
where 0m and 0y represent, respectively, the wage elasticities of male and female 
labour supplies. It is obvious from equation (11) that discrimination against women 
requires the condition of 0m>6^.
The final way of explaining wage discrimination that is reviewed in this chapter 
focuses on imperfect labour mobility. In the literature it is called the "crowding 
hypothesis" (Zellner, 1972; Bergmann, 1971, 1974). The basic idea is that women or 
blacks are excluded from higher-paying occupations and are therefore crowded into 
other occupations, where the enforced abundance of supply lowers marginal 
productivity and hence wages. An interesting aspect of this hypothesis is that it ties 
together the elements of occupational segregation and wage discrimination. The 
importance of occupational segregation to the explanation of the gender pay gap in 
China's TVP sector is examined in Chapter 10.
4.4 Empirical evidence for the human capital model
Empirical evidence in some industrial and developing economies
The human capital model has been tested in many Western economies and the results 
show that both schooling and labour force experience are significant determinants of 
wages.
In the United States, schooling alone is typically found to explain about 6 or 7 per 
cent of the total variance in hourly earnings. When the effects of experience are added 
to the model, the proportion of the variance in earnings explained rises to about 30 
pre cent. Adding in a variable for the number of weeks worked during the year 
increases the explanatory power to over 50 per cent (Mincer, 1970, 1974, 1976).
Similar results were found for many other industrial and developing economies.
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George Psacharopoulos (1973, 1980, 1985) gives very detailed information in his 
review articles. The evidence presented in his 1985 paper can be summarised as 
follows:
(1) The rates of return to education for all 56 countries included in his study are 
positive;
(2) There is a pattern of declining rate of return by level of education in general. 
Primary education is the most profitable educational investment opportunity, 
followed by secondary education. Psacharopoulos explains this pattem as the result of 
the interaction between the low cost of primary education and the substantial 
productivity differential between primary school graduates and those who are 
illiterate.
(3) The rates of return for developing countries are normally higher than those for 
developed countries. Psacharopoulos suggests that this is a result of scarcity of human 
capital in developing countries.
(4) In all cases, the private rate of return is higher than the social rate of return 
because education is publicly subsidised in almost all countries.
(5) The returns in the private sector are higher than that in the public sector because 
of the equalisation policy implemented in the public sector in most countries.
(6) In developing countries the rate of return for women exceeds that for men. This 
may be explained by the fact that the labour force participation rate for educated 
women is much higher than for uneducated women.
(7) Rate-of-retum estimates show relative stability over time which may be explained 
by the fact that the demand for educated manpower has kept increasing along with the 
supply of educated manpower.
One interesting aspect of the empirical studies is the different structures of return to
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the general labour market experience and firm-specific skill found in Japan and the 
United States.
In the industrial economies there are two different employment systems: lifetime 
employment (normally represented by Japan4) and the so called flexible market 
employment system. According to the empirical evidence human capital variables, 
especially labour market skills, have different effects on wage determination in these 
employment systems. In the Japanese labour market, firm-specific tenure is especially 
significant in wage determination while in the United States general labour market 
experience is more important than firm-specific tenure (see Hashimoto and Raisian, 
1985 and Mincer and Higuchi, 1988). When comparing the firm specific tenure- 
earnings profiles, the Japanese profile has a steeper slope than the United States 
profile.
The human capital theory’s explanation of the above phenomenon is as follows (see 
Mincer and Higuchi, 1988):
(1) In the past decade Japan has had more rapid economic growth and technological 
change than in the United States. This has required greater and more continuous 
training and retraining.
(2) Because of the continuous investment in firm-specific skill, employers seek to 
hold their specialised employees to minimise training costs, and employees stay with 
the specific firm to maximise benefit from their specialised skill.
(3) Lifetime employment is an institution which enables both employer and employee
4 There are some arguments which suggest that the lifetime employment system applies to only about 
30 per cent of the male labour force, and employment tenure in small Japanese firms is very short. 
Therefore, the prevalence of lifetime employment in Japan is usually exaggerated. However, 
according to Hashimoto and Raisian (1985), the reality is contrary to the impression created by the 
literature. Their research concluded "long-term employment is more prevalent in Japan than in the 
United States. Also, eamings-tenure profiles are more steeply sloped in Japan than in the United 
States. Finally, employment tenure in small Japanese firms is not universally short as popular 
discussions suggest."
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to maximise their benefit from firm-specific skill.
(4) A steep and quadratic tenure-earnings profile is a tool which ensures that lifetime 
employment exists.
From the above explanation, lifetime employment is an endogenous variable for the 
Japanese economy which is encouraged by the wage determination system.
Empirical evidence for China
There are two empirical studies available which apply the human capital model to 
Chinese wage determination.
Byron and Manaloto (1990) employed a human capital model as well as a production 
function approach to examine returns to education in China. Their data were taken 
from a survey of 800 adults in Nanjing city in Jiangsu province. The specification of 
the human capital model they used in their study is as follows: 
lnY=b0+bjS+b2E+b3S2+b4(Sx E)+b5E2+u 
where y is monthly income, S is years of schooling, E is experience, and Sx £  is a 
schooling-experience interaction variable. Apart from these independent variables, a 
female dummy was also included in their regression. They find: (1) there is an 
astonishingly low rate of return of income to education, about 4 per cent for each 
additional year of schooling; (2) experience is a more important variable than 
education; (3) females with the same qualifications and experience tend to be paid 
around 9 per cent less than males.
The results estimated from the production function are about the same as those 
presented above. In addition, they report that education and experience are highly 
substitutable.
Gelb (1990) analysed wage determination in China's TVP sector using models 
combining both human capital variables and characteristics of the firm in which
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individuals worked. The data set used is the same as that analysed in this study. The 
results of his models are shown in Appendix A. The five models reported are: model 
1 which uses only county dummies; model 2 which adds occupation dummies to the 
county dummies; model 3 adds ownership dummies, other firm characteristics, and 
age, sex, and days worked to the variables included in model 2; model 4 only contains 
48 firm dummies; model 5 includes the individual variables and the firm dummies. 
The dependent variable is annual income.
In Gelb's study the most important findings for the human capital variables can be 
summarised as below:
(1) Occupational dummies have expected signs and are mostly significant 
determinants of an individual's wage level.
(2) Age, as a proxy for work experience, is a significant determinant of an 
individual's wage level. The estimated impact, however, is quite low (a 1 per cent 
increase in annual earnings for each additional year).
(3) Women in the TVP sector earn 14 per cent less than men.
(4) Education level does not seem to be a significant determinant of earnings, and in
some cases the signs are opposite to that expected. As Gelb remarks:
The effect of adding the education dummy coefficients was more 
surprising. Most of the dummies are small and not significant, but 
those that are significant suggest that people with some college receive 
lower pay than would be expected on the basis of firm, sex, age, and 
occupation. This pattern is most unusual (1990: pp. 294).
Gelb suggested that the unusual results pertaining to the education variables is a 
subject for further research.
4.5 A Model for Wage Determination in the TVP sector
The above theoretical and empirical review of the human capital model gives a
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general idea about the way in which individual characteristics influence wage 
determination. The review suggests that the following factors should have an impact 
on an individual’s wage: (1) education; (2) experience which includes general labour 
market experience and firm-specific experience; (3) gender, (4) occupation; and (5) 
family background.
The human capital model assumes that individuals maximise lifetime income and 
firms maximise profits. The theory is reinforced by the free choice of employers to 
choose workers and the free choice of employees to choose their employer. Labour 
mobility seems to be essential for the applicability of the model (otherwise the wage 
would not be equal to labour productivity).
As indicated in the previous Chapter there was very limited labour mobility in the 
TVP sector until 1985. Most workers were assigned to a firm and once employed 
could not easily leave. Nor could firms easily fire labour. However, in most instances 
firms could control individual wage determination. Under these circumstances the 
question naturally arises as to whether human capital theory applies. A concomitant 
question is whether the observed individual wage pattern in the TVP is similar to that 
of market economies. The rest of this section will focus on building a simplified 
model to present a framework for the subsequent analysis of these questions.
As mentioned in the previous section, there is a difference between the US labour 
market and Japanese labour market. Inter-firm labour mobility is quite frequent in the 
United States, while in Japan it is very limited. Japanese firms, however, can freely 
choose workers and there is no prohibition on the employee leaving the firm. In Japan 
it appears as though the wage determination system has evolved to keep workers with 
the firm, and it plays an important part in the lifetime tenure system. In China there is 
no need for the wage system to play this role. Workers are assigned to firms and in 
general they cannot leave to obtain another job. The wage system does not need to be 
designed to affect job tenure.
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With these differences in mind, we sketch the key features of a different theoretical 
model compared with a standard flexible labour market model and the Japanese 
model to describe the situation of individual wage determination in the TVP sector.
Model 1: Flexible labour market model. This is the case of general skill training 
described by conventional human capital theory, where (1) there is no firm-specific 
skill involved in production; (2) there is full employment; (3) employers have free 
choice over their employment decision making and any employee who shirks will be 
fired; (4) employees have free choice on choosing employers, and if they are not paid 
by their labour productivity there are always better employment opportunities for 
them. Under these circumstances, employees have to be paid their spot labour 
productivity at least after their training period, otherwise they would quit (Becker, 
1962).
Model 2: Japanese labour market model. In this case all the assumptions hold as 
described in the model 1, except for the first one. Here labour market skill involved in 
production is mostly firm-specific skill (see Becker, 1962 and Hashimoto, 1981). In 
this model employers and employees share costs and benefits of investment in firm- 
specific human capital. In other words, during the training period the wage paid to the 
employees will be higher than their labour productivity and lower than their 
alternative wage. During this period, the employees will not choose to quit and the 
employers will not fire them as they both will lose. After the training period, the 
employees will be paid higher than their alternative wage and lower than their labour 
productivity. Therefore, if employees choose to quit, the alternative wage they can get 
from the labour market will be lower than their current earnings, while if employers 
choose to fire employees they will lose the amount of return to their investment which 
is equal to employees' spot labour productivity in excess of the spot wage they earn 
(refer to Figure 4.2). Therefore, although both employer and employees are free to 
choose not to attach to each other, they both have greater incentive to develop a long­
term employment relationship.
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Model 3: The TVP labour market model. The TVP labour market model is based 
on the following assumptions: (1) the firm cannot freely hire or fire employees except 
when they provide zero effort; (2) the firm has a fixed amount of labour L which is 
assigned by the community; (3) the firm has wage setting power; (4) the firm's 
objective is profit maximisation5; (5) individuals are identical in terms of provision of 
effort, and each employee in the firm provides a certain amount of effort, e, where 
e>0. If e < 0, the firm is allowed to fire the employee. If employee is dismissed 
his/her alternative wage (agricultural wage) will be lower than the wage he/she 
obtained from the TVP firm6; (6) the firm takes the market price of capital r as given; 
(7) the opportunity costs for employees are far below their current wages.
Under these circumstances, employees will not choose to quit because the alternative 
earnings are below their current wages. On the other hand, the firm is rarely able to 
fire employees. The attachment of the firm and the employees is exogenous to the 
TVP labour market. Moreover, if the firm does not pay the employees fairly they will 
choose to shirk so long as e>0. However, if shirking is detected, their wage level will 
be decreased. Because of this, monitoring is extremely important for the TVP firms. 
That is why they normally choose piece rate payment when it is possible as it can be
5 Byrd (1987) gives a detailed explanation when he assumes Chinese firms in the state-owned 
enterprises have an objective of profit maximisation. His explanation is even more relevant to the 
TVP case.
6 The question why TVP firms pay their employees more than what they could obtain from the 
agricultural sector is a major and important issue. It requires a specific study. However, this study 
simply takes it as given.
Some simple possible explanations, however, can be provided as follows. (1) Labour productivity in 
the TVP sector is higher than that in the agricultural sector. (2) If workers in the TVP sector are paid 
below their labour productivity they would choose to shirk. (3) There are searching costs incurred 
when an individual moves from the agricultural sector to the TVP sector. For example, to be able to 
be "assigned" to a TVP firm, one might have to have a good relationship with the community leaders, 
this could be costly either financially or psychologically.
One might ask the further question as why marginal productivity of labour in the agricultural sector is 
lower than in the TVP sector. There might be quite a few reasons. One possible explanation is that in 
the TVP sector (1) available capital is very scarce, (2) when technology is chosen there is limited 
substitution between capital and labour. In other word, at its extreme case, it is a fixed proportion of 
input substitution. Under this circumstance, the possibility of further decreasing marginal 
productivity of labour in the TVP sector or absorbing more labour from the agricultural sector to 
increase marginal productivity of labour in the agricultural sector is very limited.
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seen as a perfect monitoring mechanism with the lowest cost.
The firm's problem, therefore, is to choose the wage level in order to encourage the
employees not to shirk and to induce effort from the employees in order to maximise
its profit. This problem can be written as:
Max 7i = pf[e(w)L, K ] - w L - r K  (1)
w
where n  is profit,
p is price of output, 
w is wage rate,
e is effort provided by each individual,
K is capital stock which in the short-run is assumed to be a constant, 
r is rent for capital,
f[e(w)L, K] is the production function.
The first order condition of this problem is:
pfe = weL (2 y
f e is the partial derivative of /  with respect to e or the marginal average product of
effort, we is the partial derivative of w with respect to e or the marginal wage of 
effort. weL represents marginal average cost of effort. The result of equation (2)
means that in order to maximise its profit the firm has to pay each individual at the 
wage level where value of marginal average product of effort is equal to the marginal 
average cost of effort.
Several points are evident from the above analysis. First, it is clear that the role of 
wage in the TVP firm is to encourage individuals not to shirk and to induce effort 
from each individual so as to maximise the firm's profit. Second, in order to do so, the 
firm has to pay individuals at the wage level where the value of their marginal 
product of effort equals their marginal cost of effort. Now, if the assumption of 
homogeneity of individuals with respect to their marginal productivity of effort is 
relaxed, it is obvious that individuals who provide different levels of effort will 
receive different wage rates. Then, if as believed, the individual's productivity can be
7 For detailed derivation, see Appendix 4B.
79
increased by augmentation of human capital, individuals could expect to get the 
market rate of return to their investment in their human capital.
More specifically, the following propositions may be stated: (1) Labour market 
experience should have a significant impact on wage determination as it has a direct 
impact on labour productivity. (2) Because the employees are paid to the level of their 
labour productivity, the experience-earning profile should be similar to that of the 
standard flexible labour market model but not the Japanese labour market model. (3) 
The impact of education on individuals' wage determination depends on whether it 
affects labour productivity. In the case where the level of technology is very low and 
the required skill level is very low, education may not have a significant impact on 
labour productivity. Therefore, it may not affect individual wage determination in the 
TVP.
Although the human capital model is hypothesized to be applicable to the TVP sector, 
the cost of, and return to, on-the-job training should be considered differently from 
the conventional human capital theory with respect to both general training and firm- 
specific training. The reason for this is that in China's rural economy the labour 
productivity in the agricultural sector is so low that it is close to zero and any 
employment opportunity in the TVP sector will bring to a new employee a net gain. 
Thus, his/her forgone earnings will be zero or even negative (his/her previous 
earnings in the agricultural sector are lower than his/her earnings during the on-the- 
job training period). Hence, the only thing which accounts for the cost of on-the-job 
training should be the firm's outlay.
Then who will bear the cost of this outlay? According to Becker's analytical logic it 
should be the firm due to the virtual absence of employee turnover. However, because 
labour productivity in the TVP and the agricultural sector are so different, even if the 
firm pays employees lower than their labour productivity it will still be higher than 
their earnings in the agricultural sector. The difference between employees' labour
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productivity and their wages can be the compensation for the firm's training outlay.
The TVP wage level is normally higher than earnings in the agricultural sector no 
matter whether it be in the developing or the developed regions. However, the 
required skill level in these firms is normally pretty low so the firms' outlays are not 
considerable. Therefore, employees in the TVP firms will be paid slightly lower than 
their marginal productivity of effort during the training period and approximately 
equal to their spot productivity afterwards. The wage-tenure profile for the TVP 
employees should be similar to what has been presented in Figure 4.1 (the general 
training case). In other words, this is the case of a flexible labour market, except that 
the wage profile might be flatter than that during the training period.
The above theoretical analysis suggests that although the labour market situation for 
the TVP sector is quite different from the flexible labour market case, in principal the 
human capital model should be applicable to individual wage determination in the 
TVP sector8.
The following chapters are going to test this hypothesis to determine how these 
human capital variables affect individual wage determination in the TVP sector.
8 Comparing the TVP wage determination model built here to Lazear's efficiency wage model, a 
basic difference is found. Firms in the efficiency wage model are allowed to fire employees so long 
as shirking is detected. In the TVP model firms are rarely able to dismiss employees.
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Appendix 4A________ Alen Gelb's Regression Results
M odel
1 2 3 4 5
C o u n ty :
Jieshou -0.55 -0.47 -0.23
(-11.9) (-12.4) (-4.3)
N anhai 0 .29 0.14 0.22
(5.8) (3.2) (5.8)
Shangrao -0.7 -0.71 -0.37
(-12.1) (-13.8) (-5.6)
O w n e rsh ip :
T ow nsh ip -0.03
(-0.8)
T ow n 0.15
(3.3)
V illage 0.04
(0.5)
P roduction  team 0.18
(2.5)
Jo in t fam ilies 0.23
(3.3)
Fam ily -0.19
(-1.4)
Indiv idual 0 .29
(2.8)
F irm :
W ork fo rce 0.06
(2.1)
Profitab ility 0.05
(3.5)
O c c u p a tio n :
Shift o r g roup  leaders 0.19 0.08 0.11
(3.5) (1.7) (2.7)
O peration  personnel 0.25 0.1 0.2
(3.8) (1.7) (4.1)
T echnical personnel 0.33 0.16 0.18
(5.6) (3.1) (4.0)
O rdinary  sta ff 0 .26 0.1 0.1
(4.1) (1.7) (2.2)
M iddle-level sta ff 0.45 0.28 0.30
(7.1) (5.1) (6.3)
A pprentice -0.32 -0.1 -0.26
(-2.4) (-0.9) (-2.9)
D river 0.74 0.42 0.49
(1.5) (1.0) (1.3)
A ge 0.01 0.01
(7.0) (4.8)
Sex -0.14 -0.14
(-5.0) (-5.7)
D ays w o rk ed 0.02 0.01
(14.2) (13.0)
R 2 0.3 0.34 0.52 0 .57 0.70
Note: (1) Joint venture is the base for the ownership dummies. (2) Model 4 contains only 48 firm 
dummies, and model 5 contains 48 firm dummies and those individual variables represented in 
the table.
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Appendix 4B
Derivation of the first order condition of TVP’s profit maximization problem:
dn df de T T—  = p ----— = •  —  L - L  =0
dw de(w)L dw
. pJ L . i i =r
d e(w) dw 
Pfe = w4L
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PART II
AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF WAGE DETERMINATION IN THE 
TYP MALE LABOUR MARKET
The hypothetical model of the TVP wage determination developed in the previous 
chapter suggests that the human capital model should be applicable to the TVP sector. 
This part of the thesis gives an empirical test of the model by investigating the TVP male 
labour market.
The reasons for separating the male and female labour markets are as follows:
(1) Normally, according to the literature, there are some differences of wage 
determination patterns for male and female labour markets, such as discontinuity of 
female labour market experience, and a higher rate of return to education for females 
than for males.
(2) Females normally earn less than males. In the TVP sector the wage gap is about 20 
per cent.
(3) Because of (1) and (2), the male and female labour markets are conventionally 
analyzed separately. This study will conduct a comparison of the TVP wage 
determination with other market economies. To ensure the comparability of the study, 
the convention has to be followed.
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5CAN INDIVIDUAL WAGES IN THE TVP SECTOR BE EXPLAINED 
BY HUMAN CAPITAL THEORY?
This chapter provides a general investigation of the applicability of the human capital 
model to the TVP male labour market. The chapter is structured as follows. The next 
section briefly describes the data and specifies the models to be used. Section 2 
discusses the empirical results for the total male sample and some differences 
between the wage determination patterns for workers and staff. Section 3 analyses 
whether the TVP's wage determination pattern reflects a labour productivity effect by 
estimating the human capital model for the piece rate group and the time rate group 
separately. The conclusions are presented in Section 4.
5.1 The Data and Model Specification 
Data
The data used to estimate the wage equations in this chapter are from the Workers 
Survey Questionnaire which was undertaken in 49 firms from the total of 121 sample 
firms. There are 1174 observations on individual employees, but due to missing 
values the sample has been reduced to 1060 observations. In this chapter the analysis 
is confined to male workers, a sample of between 400 and 529 depending on the exact 
set of variables chosen for analysis. Among the four regions, Wuxi is used as the base 
for the regional dummies.
As mentioned in Chapter 3, the sample includes township- and/or village-owned 
enterprises as well as a small number of privately-owned enterprises. The extent of
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community (township or village) control varies by region and enterprise. The level of 
economic development of each region also differs. It will be interesting to see 
whether it is possible to establish general results from a sample covering such a 
diversity of political and economic environments and firm structures.
In this chapter only a subset of variables has been used. The more important are the 
classification of employees into workers and staff, the method of payment, (either 
piece rate or time rate payment), the individual characteristics of age and education, 
and a family variable for the number of children. Most of the data are measured in the 
usual way but some variables require comment.
Some of the work experience data are not directly available from the Workers Survey 
Questionnaire. Data exist for age, the length of employment in a given firm (firm- 
specific tenure) and the length of time spent working in non-agricultural jobs. Total 
experience variables are constructed by adopting Mincer's approach (Mincer, 1974) 
which is to measure total experience, j, by
j —A-S-7
where A is age, S the years of schooling and 7 is the number of years before schooling 
begins. Agricultural work experience is obtained by subtracting total non-agricultural 
work experience, which is available in the survey, from total experience. Other non- 
agricultural experience (non-agricultural experience outside the current job) is 
obtained by subtracting firm-specific tenure from the total length of job experience in 
the non-agricultural sector. Because the data quality is sometimes poor, negative 
values of other non-agricultural experience and agricultural experience are sometimes 
obtained. These observations are excluded from the regressions.
Schooling data are defined in 7 levels. Each level of education corresponds to the 
years of schooling indicated in Table 5.1:
86
Table 5.1
Years of schooling corresponding to education level
Level of education Years of schooling
illiteracy 0
4 years primary 4
6 years primary 6
junior middle school 9
senior middle school 12
Television college 15
university and above 16
Statistical characteristics of the variables for the total male sample and for each of the 
four regions are shown in Table 5.2:
Table 5.2
Statistical characteristics of the variables
Total Wuxi Jieshou Nanhai Shangrao
variables mean S.D. mean S.D. mean S.D. mean S.D. mean S.D.
Y W 1455 948.3 1660 749.2 907 .5 407 .7 2499 1447 852.3 266.5
D W 4.5 2.88 4 .8 2.1 3 .2 1.4 7.7 4 .4 2 .8 0.95
L D W 1.35 0 .54 1.5 0.45 1.07 0 .4 1.9 0 .6 0 .99 0.35
E D U 8.8 2 .9 8.5 2.8 9.5 2 .6 7.5 2 .8 8.7 2.8
A G E 30.9 10 33.8 9.5 27 .8 7.8 29.5 10.5 33 .8 11.3
TEXP 15.2 10.6 18.3 10.0 11.3 8.3 15.1 11.5 18.7 12.8
OJ 9.4 9 .6 12.1 9.7 6.9 7 .6 9.3 9 .9 9 .5 9.3
FT 5.8 5.1 6.1 4 .8 4 .4 3.9 5.8 6.3 9 .2 6.8
A EX P 5.6 7.5 7 .6 7.7 3.9 6 .0 6 .2 8.7 5 .2 5.9
ONAJ 3.9 6 .6 4 .5 7.1 3.0 5.1 3.1 5.4 4 .3 6 .6
NC 1.1 1.1 0 .9 0.8 1.3 1.1 0 .9 0.95 2.1 1.4
Note: YW is yearly wage; DW is daily wage; LDW is daily wage in log form; EDU is years of 
schooling; TEXP is total experience; FT is Firm tenure; AEXP is agricultural experience; OJ is 
other labour market experience, excluding firm tenure; ONAJ is other non-agricultural 
experience; NC is number of children in the family. S.D. is standard deviation. Tables below 
will follow these notations
Model Specification
According to many applications of the human capital model the following factors 
have a significant impact on individual wage determination: (i) schooling, (ii) work 
experience, including general labour market and firm-specific skills, (iii) occupation 
and (iv) family background. The basic human capital model is defined as:
Model 1:
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ln(w)=a+b]S+b2TEXP+b3TEXP2+b4FT+b5FT2+b6RE+u
where w is daily wage;
S is years of schooling;
TEXP is total experience;
TEXP2 is total experience squared; 
FT is firm-specific tenure;
FT2 is firm-specific tenure squared; 
RE is a vector of regional dummies.
This model is generalised in a number of ways. When the data were collected most 
TVP firms had existed for less than 10 years and most employees were farmers before 
they were employed by the firm. Model 2 therefore is specified to capture the 
relationship between the wage level and agricultural and non-agricultural experience.
Model 2:
ln(w)=a+b]S+b2FT+b3FT2+b4ONAJ+b5ONAP+b6AEXP+b7AEXP2+b8RE+u
where ONAJ is other non-agricultural experience;
ONAP is other non-agricultural experience squared;
AEXP is agricultural experience;
AEXP2 is agricultural experience squared.
Models 3 and 4 test the impact of occupation and the number of children in the 
family.
5.2 General Empirical Results
Before analysing the empirical results it may be useful to compare the emphasis of 
the models specified in the previous section on schooling and experience to answers 
given to the question "what is the key variable for wage determination in your firm?" 
from the Workers Survey Questionnaire (Table 5.3). It is apparent that employees 
believe that there are four variables which matter most; job tenure in the firm, 
occupation, work volume and skill level. It is also suggested that an individual’s 
relationship to the firm's leaders are not thought to be important variables. These
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results seem a priori to be consistent with a human capital model, in that stress is 
placed on the role of on-the-job training and productivity. But it is interesting that 
education and age, which might be thought to approximate general experience, are 
not important. A significant part of this research will focus on the relationship 
between the employees' judgements and the estimated results that can be derived from 
the data.
Table 5.3
Key variables which affect wage differences in your firm (%):
total workers staff
n=1142 n=708 n=425
age 3.1 3.1 2.9
tenure 25.0 24.2 26.3
education 1.3 1.2 1.4
occupation 24.2 26.3 20.4
work volume 23.8 22.5 26.5
skill 20.2 19.4 21.1
relationship with the leaders 2.4 3.1 1.3
Results for all employees
The ordinary least squares (OLS) results of models 1 to 4 are shown in Appendix A. 
A diagnostic test shows that all the four models have a heteroscedasticity problem 
(see Breusch-Pagan test). This will lead to inefficiency and improper estimation of 
the covariance matrix. To correct for the heteroscedasticity, White's consistent 
estimator of the covariance matrix is used (Greene, 1990).
Apart from the heteroscedasticity problem, a certain degree of multicollinearity 
between total experience and firm tenure is detected for models 1, 3, and 4, where 
none of the coefficients for firm tenure is statistically significant at conventional 
levels. Either firm tenure can be deleted from the equation, without affecting the 
explanatory power, and then the experience coefficients generally become significant, 
or general experience can be deleted with firm tenure performing better. This 
phenomenon, together with the low f-statistics and high adjusted R2 (see Appendix A),
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suggests the problem of multicollinearity between the total experience and the firm 
tenure1.
To overcome the problem of multicollinearity, the total experience variable is divided 
into firm tenure and other job experience. That is in models 1, 3, and 4, instead of 
using total experience and firm tenure, other job experience and firm tenure are used2. 
The results o f the modified version of the models with corrections for both 
heteroscedasticity and multicollinearity are shown in Table 5.4.
1 One of the approaches for correcting multicollinearity suggested by most econometric text books is 
to drop one of the problem variables. However, this solution is at a cost of a potential omitted 
variables bias. To avoid this cost I simply break the total experience variable into other job 
experience and firm tenure.
2 Using other job experience instead of total experience reduced the sample size as for some 
observations other job experience is negative and these data are excluded from the regression.
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Table 5.4
Corrected results of models 1-4
models
1 2 3 4
n=529 n=457 n=525 n=511
Constant 1.016 1.068 1.105 1.113
(10.69) (9.89) (11.50) (11.10)
Schooling 0.011 0.007 -0.002 -0.002
(1.63) (0.85) (-0.25) (-0.30)
Other job experience (OJ)
OJ 0.029 0.025 0.025
(5.48) (4.76) (4.53)
OJ2 -0.0006 -0.0005 -0.0005
(-3.83) (-3.55) (-3.42)
Firm tenure (FT)
FT 0.028 0.032 0.021 0.022
(2.80) (2.91) (2.21) (2.21)
FT2 -0.0007 -0.0009 -0.0007 -0.0007
(1.93) (-2.15) (-1.85) (-1.89)
Other non-agri. exp. (ONAJ)
ONAJ 0.023
(3.76)
ONAJ2 -0.0005
(-2.91)
Agri. experience (AEXP)
AEXP 0.025
(3.18)
AEXP2 -0.0005
(-2.02)
Occupational dummies:
Shift leader 0.095 0.099
(1.52) (1.53)
Operational pers. 0.106 0.124
(1.66) (1.90)
Technical pers. 0.140 0.127
(1.96) (1.78)
Ordinary staff 0.116 0.115
(2.03) (2.01)
Mid. level staff 0.298 0.297
(4.71) (4.66)
No. of childr. in the family (NC):
0.002
NC (0.13)
County dummy
Jieshou -0.274 -0.309 -0.255 -0.266
(-6.28) (-6.36) (-5.90) (-5.86)
Shangrao -0.441 -0.495 -0.406 -0.400
(-8.19) (-8.77) (-7.16) (-6.50)
Nanhai 0.529 0.481 0.536 0.538
(7.70) (6.61) (7.81) (7.50)
Breusch-Pagan Chi-Squared 47.02 (8) 47.64 (10) 54.44 (13) 55 .14(14)
Adjusted R2 0.34 0.34 0.36 0.36
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With corrections for heteroscedasticity and multicollinearity, most r-statistics 
improved in each of the models. The modified models seem to perform well. In terms 
of explanatory power there is not a large difference among them. The adjusted R2 is 
comparable if not better than similar models applied to market economies but some of 
the explanatory power is produced by the regional dummy variables indicating that 
there are significant variations in the wage level across regions. Nanhai has an 
average wage level 50 per cent above, and Shangrao 40 per cent below, that of Wuxi. 
When economic development is proceeding quickly from a low wage level, variations 
of wages tend to increase across areas and industries and in China this phenomenon is 
probably exacerbated by strict control of labour mobility3. These regional differences 
are not affected when additional variables are included in the regression.
The effect of schooling: The coefficient for schooling is not statistically significant 
in any equation. The sign is positive in models 1 and 2 but negative in models 3 and 
4. This result is consistent with that of Gelb (1990) who uses the same data base. It is 
also consistent with the belief of employees (Table 5.3). Only about 2 per cent of 
investigated employees believe that education is an important variable for wage 
determination. The poor performance of the education variable does not seem to be a 
result of the way in which it is measured. Experimentation with education measured 
as a series of dummy variables for different levels of schooling did not make the 
education effect significant. Given the emphasis that so much of the literature places 
on education as a force for economic development this is an interesting result.
There may be a number of explanations for the lack of a relationship between 
education and earnings. First, in the TVP firms many jobs are unskilled and it might 
be expected that education does not matter4 in terms of increasing productivity.
3 To analyse the effect of regional differences on wage determinations in the TVP sector is an 
important and big issue. It needs a specific study. This study, however, will rather focus on the effect 
of human capital variables.
4 The average level of education for workers is under 8 years and for staff it is 9.5 years.
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Second, education may not be used as a screening device for jobs of this level5. It has 
been noted that 40 per cent of workers were assigned to the firm by community 
authorities, often to achieve income distribution objectives across families. The firm 
in general does not freely hire workers and therefore does not need a screening 
device. When the firm obtains a worker, there is time for on-the-job assessment of 
quality to affect future wages and perhaps, in many small villages, worker quality is 
known as most workers have previous agricultural experience. These conjectures will 
be tested later.
The effect of experience variables: The return to each of the labour market 
experience variables in the four models is positive and significant. The usual inverted 
U shaped relationship is evident.
The return to other job experience is about 2.5 to 3 per cent per year over most of the 
first decade of work. However, it is decreasing each year at the rate of about 0.05 to 
0.06 per cent. This causes the wage rate for each individual to increase along with 
his/her work experience for approximately 50 years and to decrease there after.
The return to firm-specific skills is about the same as for the other job experience. 
However, the earnings profile is steeper than for the other job experience (individual's 
earnings increase along with the firm tenure for about 35-40 years). These results 
accord well with the questionnaire response which emphasised firm-specific 
experience.
In model 2 work experience is subdivided into firm-specific tenure, other non- 
agricultural work experience and agricultural experience. In each instance the 
variables are statistically significant and the patterns of coefficient signs are as
5 Education may be important at the university graduate level. For university graduates and above, 
there is a regulation that they should be assigned to jobs as technical or management staff and their 
wage level has to be higher than that of workers. This effect can be detected when we develop a 
model to explain which workers become managers.
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expected. Within each experience category the return to experience is about 2-3 per 
cent per annum during the early years. Firm-specific tenure seems to be the most 
important, followed by agricultural experience. The estimates of the coefficients, 
however, appear very similar across the groups indicating that perhaps the source of 
labour market experience is largely irrelevant6. This result is a little surprising in that 
one might not expect a close relationship between learning experience in agricultural 
and non-agricultural jobs. But one possible explanation is that within a close knit 
community, where workers are being transferred from one sector to another, and jobs 
have been allocated in part to affect the income distribution, it might be expected that 
at least with respect to starting wages, agricultural experience might matter. Wages in 
that sector were determined in part by the age of the worker. This explanation, 
however, needs to be examined further.
The effects of occupational dummies: Models 3 and 4 include occupational 
dummies with non-staff employees as the missing category. The five categories of 
staff employees are: shift leader, operational personnel (those who are dealing with 
marketing problems), technical personnel, ordinary staff (such as ordinary 
accountants and other low level management staff) and middle level staff (higher 
level management staff except the director).
The occupational classification has an independent effect on earnings, especially for 
mid-level staff who are paid 30 per cent more than the average non-staff employees. 
Other occupations seem to be paid about 10 per cent more than the average non-staff 
employees and there are no significant differences between these classifications7. 
These results accord well with those of the responses to the questionnaire listed in
6 By deleting observations with negative values of work experience in the residual categories the 
sample size is reduced by about 15 per cent.
7 An F-test is used to judge whether the occupational dummies make a statistically significant 
contribution to the basic model. The null-hypothesis of no contribution was rejected. The 
occupational classification does make a contribution to the explanation of earnings.
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Table 5.3. Finally, the only social variable included in the regression—the number of 
children of each worker—does not seem to affect wages.
Results for different occupational groups
As indicated in the above analysis, occupational dummies have a significant impact 
on the TVP's individual wage determination. The question which is now addressed is 
whether the patterns of wage determination are the same between different 
occupational groups.
To analyse the impact of human capital variables on wage determination for different 
occupational groups, the total male sample was subdivided into staff and workers. 
The staff category includes the shift leaders, the operational personnel, the technical 
personnel, the ordinary staff, and the middle level staff. The statistical characteristics 
for the two groups are shown in Table 5.5
Table 5.5
Statistical characteristics of the main variables for workers and staff
total w ork ers sta ff
m ean S.D . m ean S.D . m ean S.D .
Y W 1455 948.3 1325 1046 1610 865
DW 4.5 2.88 4 .2 3.2 4 .8 2.4
LD W 1.35 0.54 1.24 0 .6 1.47 0.5
E D U 8.8 2.9 8.0 2.8 9 .7 2.8
AG E 30.9 10 27.8 9.1 34.3 9.7
TE X P 15.2 10.6 12.8 10.1 17.6 10.7
OJ 9.4 9 .6 7.8 8.3 11.0 10.3
FT 5.8 5.1 5.1 4 .8 6 .7 5.5
A E X P 5 .6 7.5 5 .0 6 .7 6 .0 8.1
ONAJ 3.9 6 .6 2.8 5.3 5 .0 7.5
Table 5.5 shows that in general, staff members earn 15 per cent more than workers in 
terms of daily wage and 21 per cent more in terms of yearly wage (staff members 
work more days in the year compared with workers). Staff members are about 7 years 
older than workers and their education level is about 1.7 years higher. The general 
labour market experience of staff is 5 years (38 per cent) longer than that of workers.
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This difference is accounted for as follows: firm-specific experience is 1.6 years (31 
per cent) longer, agricultural experience is 1 year (20 per cent) longer, and other non- 
agricultural experience is 2.2 years (79 per cent) longer for staff than for workers.
Modified models 1 and 2 are estimated for the two groups8. The results of the 
estimations are shown in Table 5.6. In both instances schooling remains an 
insignificant variable with a negative sign but the role of experience changes 
significantly across groups9.
Workers' experience effects. For workers, firm-specific tenure and other job 
experience matter and the sign pattern of coefficients is as expected. Firm tenure 
seems to be more important, increasing earnings at about three times the rate of other 
job experience. When experience is subdivided into the three categories of firm- 
specific skill, non-agricultural and agricultural experience, the sign pattern of the 
coefficients is as expected but the importance of firm-specific tenure increases 
substantially. The return is 5.7 per cent for the first decade and it is double that of 
other non-agricultural experience. Agricultural experience, however, is insignificant 
in its impact. For workers, therefore, knowledge gained by them, or about them, in 
the agricultural sector does not seem to affect earnings. The discussion as to why 
agricultural experience matters for the total male sample is irrelevant for the workers
8 There is a sample selectivity problem for this estimation. By separating the sample using the 
occupational variable, the sample is censored (i.e., is not a random sample). Therefore, OLS 
estimation is biased. To correct this bias, Heckman's two-stage estimation method is adopted (1979). 
This method involves including a correction factor (X) in the wage equation. However, because the 
regressors in the wage equation are the same as in the selection criterion equation used to compute X, 
there is a high degree of multicollinearity between X and the regressors in the wage equation. 
Therefore, it is impossible to obtain precise estimates. A detailed description of Heckman's two-stage 
procedure is presented in Appendix B. The specification of the selection criterion equation and the 
estimated results are shown in Appendix C. From Table Cl it is noted that the general picture of the 
wage determination pattern for the two groups according to the selectivity correction estimation is 
similar to that of OLS estimation. The OLS results, therefore, are presented and discussed here.
9 F-tests are conducted to ascertain whether the structural of the wage determination process for the 
workers and staff groups are the same. For model 1 F(9, 533)=6.53 and for model 2 F (ll, 460)=6.05. 
They are both greater than the critical value of F(9, °°)=1.88 and the critical value of F(11, °o)=i.83, 
so the null hypothesis of no structural change for both models is rejected.
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group. These results seem to accord well with human capital theory and the workers' 
response to the questionnaire.
Table 5.610:
Results of models 1 and 2 by occupation
model 1 model 2
workers staff workers staff
n=271 n=262 n=230 n=230
Constant 0.967 1.466 1.012 1.494
(7.56) (9.96) (7.23) (9.22)
Schooling -0.009 -0.009 -0.014 -0.003
(-0.08) (-0.87) (-1.09) (-0.29)
Other job experience (OJ)
OJ 0.015 0.031
(1.89) (4.66)
OJ2 -0.0002 -0.0007
(-0.77) (-3.96)
Firm specific tenure (FT)
FT 0.049 0.0002 0.057 -0.002
(3.47) ((0.02) (3.86) (-0.13)
FT2 -0.0017 0.0001 -0.002 0.0002
(-2.91) (0.23) (-3.39) (0.32)
Other non-agri. exp. (ONAJ)
ONAJ 0.024 0.014
(2.82) (1.66)
ONAJ2 -0.0005 -0.0004
(-1.92) (-1.20)
Agri. experience (AEXP)
AEXP 0.012 0.026
(1.03) (2.92)
AEXP2 -0.0002 -0.0007
(-0.35) (-2.36)
County dummies:
Jieshou -0.219 -0.299 -0.212 -0.347
(-3.70) (-4.96) (-3.21) (-5.35)
Shangrao -0.222 -0.648 -0.256 -0.694
(-2.87) (-7.80) (-2.96) (-8.07)
Nanhai 0.821 0.211 0.774 0.190
(8.22) (2.93) (7.35) (2.44)
Breusch-Pagan Chi-Squared* 11 36.31 (8) 7.05 (8) 29.96 (10) 9.21 (10)
Adjusted R2 0.41 0.33 0.40 0.35
10 In this table, the results for the workers group (both model 1 and model 2) are corrected for 
heteroscedasticity (using White's consistent covariance matrix). There is no heteroscedasticity 
problem for the staff group. The results presented in the table for the staff group use the OLS 
covariance matrix.
11 The critical Chi-Squared value at the 5 per cent significance level for n=8 is x^lS.51; for n=10, 
XM 8.31.
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Staffs experience effects. For staff the experience outcomes are different12. Other 
job experience dominates firm-specific tenure which is insignificant in its effects. 
Other experience has a strong inverted U effect. When experience is subdivided into 
three categories the most important source of experience seems to be agriculture. 
Other non-agricultural experience ranks second while firm-specific tenure seems 
unimportant. What do these results mean?
There are a number of possible interpretations. One possible reason why agricultural 
experience is most significant and firm tenure does not matter is that the community 
authority normally assigned the leaders of agricultural production teams or the 
brigade to be the management staff of the firm. The rank and starting wages of those 
leaders in the firm reflected the length of time that they led the agricultural 
production team. Once in the firm, pay increases for this group may be related to the 
performance of the firm and not tenure.
Another possibility is that staff is a more mobile group within the community. When 
the community sets up a new firm they assign some management or technical staff in 
the old firm or in the agricultural sector to the new firm. If the wage level set for the 
staff depended on firm tenure they would be unhappy to move. This conjecture can be 
reinforced by the responses to the question: "have you ever been a staff member in 
other TVP firms or township government before you came to this firm?" in the 
Director Survey Questionnaire. Some 64 per cent of the sampled firm directors gave a 
positive answer. This can explain why the other non-agricultural job experience is 
also significant for staff.
12 Not all employees in the firm were sampled. The sampling frame has over-sampled staff which 
account for approximately half o f the sample male employees.
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A third possible explanation is that management skills learned in agriculture and other 
sectors are easily transferred to management in the enterprise in a way that workers' 
agricultural skills are not13.
5.3 Test for Labour Productivity Effect
Our results to this point indicate that the important variables that influence the 
relative wages of workers and staff are all variations of job experience. Why do these 
variables affect an individual's wage level? Do our equations capture productivity 
effects or are they measuring socially determined rules of payment? It is difficult to 
form a judgment on this matter.
It might be possible to learn a little more by considering the form of payment adopted 
by the firm. Among the total sample, 40 per cent of employees are paid by piece rate 
which can be considered as a direct measure of labour productivity. If we group the 
data into those paid by piece rate and those paid by time and compare the results, our 
understanding of the wage payment process may be enriched. We may be able to 
understand better the role of schooling and experience. For example, piece rate 
payments may be closely related to productivity performance and it will be interesting 
to compare these earnings outcomes to those arising from a time rate system.
The mean values of all the variables for piece rate and time rate workers and staff14 
are presented in Tables 5.7 and 5.8. It appears that time rate workers earn less than 
piece rate workers, but within each group staff earn more than workers.
13 One might think that this outcome was a product of the estimation procedure whereby the 
experience relationship was effectively being estimated in three segments, each of which is flatter 
than the one before. Perhaps the same estimation procedure did not produce similar results for 
workers because they were much younger and the agricultural experience was either non existent or 
much shorter. However, the statistical characteristics of the experience variables shown in Table 5.5 
seem to reject this possibility. It is noted there that although workers are much younger (7 years) than 
staff, the mean value of their agricultural experience is only one year less than staff. This will not 
make very much difference.
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Table 5.7
Mean values for male piece rate employees
to tal w o rk ers s ta ff
n=166 n=115 n=52
LDW 1.329 1.3 1.38
EDU 8.066 7.5 9.33
FT 5.55 4.98 6.8
OJ 8.08 8.44 7.3
Table 5.8
Mean values for male time rate employees
to ta l w o rk ers s ta ff
n=363 n=156 n=210
LDW 1.396 1.26 1.5
EDU 8.79 7.7 9.6
FT 5.93 5.1 6.59
OJ 11.08 8.9 12.76
14 Piece rate staff are mostly shift leaders.
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Table 5.915
Human capital models for male piece rate 
and time rate employees separately:
m odel 1 model 2
piece ra te tim e ra te piece ra te tim e ra te
n=166 n=363 n=147 n=310
C onstan t 1.041 1.011 1.038 1.012
(7.12) (8.20) (6.78) (7.42)
Schooling 0.010 0.013 0.009 0.010
(0.91) (1.54) (0.58) (0.91)
O th e r jo b  experience (O J)
OJ 0.026 0.033
(2.53) (5.38)
OJ2 -0.0006 -0.0006
(-2.19) (-3.65)
F irm  specific ten u re  (FT)
FT 0.045 0.019 0.05 0.024
(2.84) (1.42) (3.1) (1.56)
FT2 -0.0012 -0.0004 -0.001 -0.0006
(-1.66) (-0.89) (-2.0) (-1.19)
O th e r non-agri. exp. (O N A J)
ONAJ 0.026 0.025
(2.45) (3.39)
ONAJ2 -0.001 -0.0005
(-2.7) (-2.50)
A gricu ltu ra l expe. (AEXP)
AEXP 0.031 0.027
(2.14) (2.87)
AEXP2 -0.001 -0.0006
(-1.64) (-1.83)
C ounty  dum m ies:
Jieshou -0.339 -0.261 -0.356 -0.287
(-5.01) (-4.60) (-5.30) (-4.60)
Shangrao -0.381 -0.591 -0.441 -0.621
(-5.10) (-8.18) (-5.40) (-8.40)
Nanhai 0.524 0.521 0.488 0.471
(4.01) (6.60) (3.61) (5.57)
B reusch-Pagan C h i-S q u ared 16 44.60 (8) 25.03 (8) 49.3 (10) 27.9 (10)
A djusted  R 2 0.36 0.34 0.36 0.34
15 F-tests are conducted to see whether the wage structures are the same for the piece rate and time 
rate groups. For model 1 F(9,529)= 1.40 and for model 2 F (ll, 457)= 1.22. They are both less than the 
critical value of F(9, <»)=1.88 and the critical value of F (ll, °o)=l.83, so the null hypothesis of no 
structural change for both models cannot be rejected.
16 The critical y} values for n=8 and n=10 at the 5 per cent significance level are the same as shown 
for Table 5.6. In this table the standard errors in all four regressions are corrected for 
heteroscedasticity.
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IThe estimated results of models 1 and 2 for piece rate and time rate male employees 
separately are shown in Table 5.917. Once again schooling is statistically insignificant 
for both groups, a result that holds no matter which specification of experience is 
adopted. As piece rate earnings are a direct measure of productivity it appears that our 
earlier conjecture, that education does not affect labour productivity in the TVP 
sector, may be correct.
F-tests have indicated that the null-hypothesis of no structural change between two 
groups' wage determination patterns cannot be rejected. Some differences, however, 
can still be seen. (1) The effect of the firm tenure variable is significant for the piece 
rate group but insignificant for the time rate group (in model 1). (2) For the piece rate 
group firm tenure is found to play the most important role (in model 2). But it does 
not seem to matter for wage determination for the time rate group.
A comparison of tenure-earning profiles between the piece rate and time rate groups 
are shown in Figure 5.1. One possible explanation for the piece rate group to have a 
steeper profile compared with the time rate group might be that firm-specific training 
is more important for the piece rate than for the time rate. This in turn seems to 
suggest that the underlying technological level for the piece rate is higher than for the 
time rate (see Tan, 1980; Hashimoto and Raisian, 1985; Mincer and Higuchi, 1988).
17 The matter of being in the piece rate or the time rate groups is not a free choice for the employees. 
As labour mobility is restricted, it rather heavily depends on the regions (particular township or 
village) people live and particular firm which established in the region. Therefore, as the variable of 
the form of payment is exogenous, there is no problem in terms on the sample being selected in the 
sense of sample selectivity bias. So the correction of sample selective bias is not considered in this 
part o f analysis.
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Figure 5.1
C om parison o f tenure-earnings profiles between the piece rate and tim e rate
groups
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The pattern of experience variables for the piece rate group is very much like the 
pattern for the workers group, while the pattern for the time rate group is similar to 
that for the staff group. This similarity may come from the different occupational 
distributions of the piece rate and time rate groups. Within the time rate group 57 per 
cent o f employees are staff, while in the piece rate group staff only account for 32 per 
cent. In order to capture the real difference between the patterns of wage 
determination for the two groups, both piece rate and time rate groups are further 
subdivided into staff and workers groups. The estimated results o f models 1 and 2 are 
presented in Tables 5.10 and 5.11, respectively.
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Table 5.10
Model 1 for piece rate and time rate groups by occupation
workers staff
piece rate time rate piece rate time rate
n=l 15 n=156 n=52 n=210
Constant 1.149 0.929 1.240 1.536
(7.20) (5.27) (3.79) (9.01)
Schooling 0.008 -0.007 -0.003 -0.009
Other job experience (OJ)
(0.61) (-0.42) (-0.14) (-0.84)
OJ 0.003 0.021 0.080 0.027
OJ2
(0.02) (2.02) (4.11) (3.57)
0.00003 -0.0003 -0.0024 -0.0007
Firm specific tenure (FT)
(0.07) (-0.90) (-3.38) (-3.15)
FT 0.052 0.047 -0.003 -0.009
FT2
(3.03) (2.23) (-0.11) (-0.59)
-0.0013 -0.0017 0.0008 0.0004
County dummies:
(-1.67) (-2.32) (0.37) (0.68)
Jieshou -0.401 -0.170 -0.291 -0.315
(-5.61) (-2.01) (-2.51) (-4.51)
Shangrao -0.343 -0.368 -0.471 -0.740
(-4.72) (-2.41) (-3.21) (-7.20)
Nanhai 0.651 0.862 -0.32 0.249
(4.50) (6.58) (-0.20) (3.16)
Breusch-Pagan Chi-Squared*® 47.3 (8) 15.4 (8) 8.3 (8) 6.5 (8)
Adjusted 0.454 0.41 0.385 0.33
As was found for the total piece rate and time rate groups, education is insignificant 
for all sub-divided sample groups listed in Table 5.10.
In model 1 the strongest effect of other job experience is found for time rate staff. 
The second strongest effect is for piece rate staff. It is clear, as in our earlier results, 
that general experience affects staff more than ordinary workers. Once again tenure in 
the current firm is not significant for staff and exhibits the wrong sign pattem. For 
workers the sign pattem of other job experience and firm tenure is as expected. As in 
the earlier results, firm tenure matters most for both piece rate and time rate workers
18 The standard errors for workers are corrected for heteroscedasticity, while for staff they are 
derived using the ordinary least squares covariance matrix.
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and other job experience is relatively unimportant for the piece rate workers but 
significant for the time rate workers.
Table 5.11
Model 2 for piece rate and time rate groups by occupation
workers staff
piece rate time rate piece rate time rate
n=100 n=130 n=48 n=182
Constant 1.081 0.967 1.532 1.540
(6.54) (4.66) (4.23) (8.10)
Schooling 0.004 -0.030 -0.011 -0.003
Firm specific tenure (FT)
(0.25) (-1-44) (-0.41) (-0.23)
FT 0.055 0.062 -0.021 -0.012
(3.07) (2.62) (-0.34) (-0.61)
FT2 -0.0014 -0.002 0.001 0.0003
Other non-agr. exper. (ONAJ)
(-2.02) (-2.51) (0.49) (0.72)
ONAJ 0.024 0.025 0.054 0.014
(1.91) (1.60) (1.56) (1.52)
ONAJ2 -0.001 -0.0003 -0.003 -0.0004
Agr. experience (AEXP)
(-2.43) (-0.62) (-1.80) (-1.00)
AEXP 0.004 0.023 0.049 0.024
(0.30) (1.09) (2.02) (2.44)
AEXP2 -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.001 -0.0007
County dummies:
(-0.12) (-0.54) (-1.14) (-2.14)
Jieshou -0.373 -0.130 -0.281 -0.370
(-5.02) (-1.22) (-2.42) (-4.81)
Shangrao -0.341 -0.341 -0.543 -0.772
(-3.60) (-1.93) (-3.32) (-7.30)
Nanhai 0.638 0.841 -0.041 0.232
(4.03) (6.89) (-0.20) (2.61)
Breusch-Pagan Chi-Squared19 48.5 (10) 8.5 (10) 8.6(10) 8.1 (10)
Adjusted R2 0.42 0.40 0.366 0.34
In model 2 the ranking of the significance of the experience variables for the two 
workers groups is the same. Firm tenure ranks first, other non-agricultural experience 
is significant and ranks second, while agricultural experience is not significant. For 
the two staff groups the pattern of the coefficients for the experience variables is the
19 Only the standard errors of the estimates for the piece rate workers are corrected for 
heteroscedasticity.
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same as that reported for the total staff group. Agricultural experience is the most 
important experience variable.
With the exception of the county dummies it appears as though the patterns of the 
coefficients for the staff and workers of both piece rate and time rate groups could be 
the same. F-tests are conducted to see whether the wage determination process is the 
same for the piece rate and time rate groups for both workers and staff. For workers 
F(9, 271)=1.47 and for staff F(9, 262)=1.29. These statistics are both less than the 
critical value of F(9, °o)=1.88. So the null hypothesis that the coefficients are the 
same for both models cannot be rejected. A pooled sample test of whether any 
individual coefficients were the same was also conducted. For workers, none of the 
coefficients for the piece rate intercept and interaction with other variables are 
statistically significant. For staff, other job experience seems to have a significantly 
different effect on wage determination for piece rate and time rate groups. The 
remainder of the pattern of the coefficients is the same. The detailed methodology and 
results of the test briefly described here are reported in Appendix D.
If piece rate payment is a good measure of labour productivity, the similarity of the 
pattern of the coefficients for the two groups of workers20 suggests that time rate 
employees are also paid according to their labour productivity. This result accords 
well with the model of TVP wage determination built in Chapter 4, where it is 
suggested that the TVP firms pay their employees according to their marginal 
productivity of effort.
20 Since there is only a small number of piece rate staff and the form of their payment is not quite 
clear, this part of the analysis will only consider three groups: piece rate workers, time rate workers 
and time rate staff.
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5.4 Concluding Remarks
This chapter tested the applicability of the human capital model to the TVP male 
labour market. The following represents a summary of the results.
(1) Unlike most industrial and developing countries, educational background seems to 
play an insignificant role in individual wage determination.
(2) A number of different relationships between individual wages and the experience 
of the employees have been found. In general, wages increase with experience.
(3) The payment system differs between staff and workers. For staff, experience in 
the firm seems less important than it is for workers. It seems as though payments to 
staff may be related to their position in earlier jobs in both the agricultural and TVP 
sectors and management skills they learned from the agricultural sector and any other 
previous jobs. These relationships may arise from the stage of development of the 
TVP's wage determination system. This system seems to be a mixture of elements of 
the old agricultural leadership system for staff, and how that relates to their seniority 
position in the TVP sector, and a new market oriented payment system which relates 
staffs management skill they learnt previously to their wage level.
(4) For workers, it seems quite clear that their wage determination pattern is generally 
productivity-related, as the wage determination pattem of time rate workers is similar 
to that of piece rate workers.
(5) Except for the impact of education, the human capital model seems to work quite 
well for TVP wage determination. Since education does not play a role in the wage 
determination for piece rate workers, it might be concluded that education is not 
important in determining the TVP employees' labour productivity. If this is the case, 
the results obtained in this chapter seem to confirm the hypothesis proposed in
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Chapter 4 that the pattern of wages in the TVP sector largely reflects productivity 
variations.
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Appendix 5A
Basic human capital models 1-4 with total experience
models
1 2 3 4
n=563 n=453 n=558 n=560
Constant .941 1.062 1.028 1.036
(10.31) (10.10) (10.89) (11.01)
Schooling .009 .007 -.003 -.004
(1.27) (0.84) (-0.44) (-0.51)
Total experience (TEXP)
TEXP 0.038 0.032 0.032
(6.70) (5.53) (5.62)
TEXP2 -0.0006 -0.0005 -0.0006
(-4.86) (-4.10) (-4.22)
Firm tenure (FT)
FT 0.008 0.033 0.006 0.005
(0.67) (2.91) (0.58) (0.43)
FT2 -0.0003 -0.0009 -0.0004 -0.0003
(-0.75) (-2.11) (-0.86) (-0.75)
O th e r  n o n -a g r i. e x p . (O N A J )
ONAJ 0.023
(3.33)
ONAJ2 -.0005
(-1.91)
Agricultural experience (AEXP)
AEXP 0.024
(3.14
AEXP2 -0.0005
(-2.04)
Occupational dummies:
Shift leader 0.112 0.123
(1.80) (1.86)
Operational pers. 0.114 0.108
(1.52) (1.53)
Technical pers. 0.134 0.114
(2.20) (2.04)
Ordinary staff 0.120 0.095
(1.46) (1.40)
M id. level staff 0.291 0.280
(4.10) (4.01)
N u m b e r  o f  c h ild r e n  in  th e  fa m ily  ( N Q :
NC 0.0001
(0.87)
County dummy
Jieshou -0.268 -0.311 -0.253 -0.251
(-6.01) (-6.02) (-5.64) (-5.61)
Shangrao -0.426 -0.489 -0.401 -0.412
(-6.90) (-7.21) (-6.36) (-6.41)
Nanhai 0.515 0.521 0.530 0.522
(9.61 (7.89) (9.81) (9.68)
Breusch-Pagan Chi-Squared 46.8 (8) 46.8 (10) 53 .3(13) 55.92 (14)
Adjusted R2 .37 .35 .39 .38
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Appendix 5B
Heckman's Two-Stage Approach for Correction of Sample Selection Bias21
Consider a two equation model. The first equation is the determination equation that 
is of primary interest (for example, wage determination). The second equation is a 
selector equation that determines whether data are observed for the first equation (for 
example, an equation for labour force participation). There is a random sample of / 
observations. Equations for individual i are:
Yn=X„f,1+U„ (la)
Y2i=X2fi2+U2i <i=l,...J) (lb),
where Xji is a \xK} vector of exogenous regressors, ßj is a A^xl vector of parameters, 
and
E(Uß) = 0,
E(UjJJy r ) = cr.., i =
= 0, i * i".
Yli is observed only when Y2i >0. When estimating equation (la) with missing data 
on Y]i for Y2i<0, the regression equation for the selected sample may be expressed as 
E{Y1^ Xli, sample selection ni\Q)=XIfi1+E(U]i\ Xri sample selection rule)
=Xlß ]+E(UIß llJ ll > 0)
^Xjßj+EiUjPCjj, U2t > - X 2f i 2)
From the above relation, Heckman (1979) derived
£((/„|X„,(/2, > - X J 2) = - ^ V X ,
(an )'
E i U ^ U ^ - X ^ )
( Ö 2 2  y
■K
where x  <KZ,-) <l>(z,)
■ l-<t>(Z,) <D(-Z,)
where (j) and O are, respectively, the density and distribution function for a standard 
normal variable,
21 The derivation outlined is based on Heckman (1979).
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and M i
X is the inverse of Mill's ratio.
Thus the model for the selected sample may be expressed as:
>',.=X„ß,+7 £a^ ,+ v„ 
(^22 ) (2a)
Y l . = M 2 + - ^ ü K + V 2 ,  
(<^22 ) (2b)
where E(vli)=E(v2i)=0.
Application of ordinary least squares to equation (2a) will yield consistent estimates, 
whereas the estimation of equation (la) using the subset of data for which Y2i > 0 will
yield biased estimates due to the problem of omitted variables, that is X, would have 
been left out of the estimating equation.
Heckman's two-stage procedure may be implemented as follows. First, using the full 
sample estimate X from probit analysis of the probability of being included in the 
selected sub-sample. Second, include X as a regressor in equation (2a) fit on the 
selected subsample for which Y2i > 0.
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Appendix 5C
A probit model is estimated to determine the probability of sample inclusion ( the 
probability of being a staff member). The following variables were entered into the 
model: education, firm tenure, other job experience, and county dummies. This 
specification is based largely upon the occupational choice model developed by 
Brown, Moon, and Zoloth (1980). The estimated results with sample selectivity 
correction are shown in Table Cl. The results show that with the selectivity 
correction the patterns of wage determination for both workers and staff groups are 
similar to those without correction. However, the high degree of correlation between 
X  and other regressors may cause the r-statistics to decrease. The regression results of 
X  on other regressors in the wage equation are shown in Table C2. From the adjusted 
R 2s in Table C2, it is obvious that X  is highly correlated with the other regressors.
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Table Cl
Results of models 1 and 2 with sample selectivity correction
m odel 1 m odel 2
workers staff workers staff
n=267 n=258 n=227 n=227
Constant 0.758 2.01 0.841 1.899
(2.30) (3.50) (2.41) (2.70)
Schooling 0.036 -0.042 0.021 -0.032
(0.67) (-1.19) (0.32) (-0.61)
O ther job  experience (OJ)
OJ 0.022 0.027
(1.56) (3.14)
OJ2 -0.0002 -0.0008
(-0.57) (-4.12)
Firm specific tenure (FT)
FT 0.058 -0.012 0.062 -0.008
(2.81) (-0.63) (2.89) (-0.42)
FT2 -0.0016 0.0001 -0.002 0.0002
(-2.78) (0.29) (-3.01) (0.31)
O ther non-agri. exp. (ONAJ)
ONAJ 0.029 0.010
(2.04) (1.01)
ONAJ2 -0.0005 -0.0004
(-1.38) (-1.27)
Agri. experience (AEXP)
AEXP 0.021 0.023
(1.01) (1.98)
AEXP2 -0.0001 -0.0007
(-0.34) (-2.37)
County dum m ies:
Jieshou -0.248 -0.279 -0.252 -0.321
(-2.90) (-4.01) (-2.32) (-4.14)
Shangrao -0.256 -0.621 -0.290 -0.672
(-2.19) (-6.46) (-2.23) (-6.65)
Nanhai 0.831 0.212 0.787 0.187
(10.00) (2.71) (8.71) (-2.38)
X -0.281 -0.252 -0.244 -0.172
(-0.68) (-1.02) (-0.62) (-0.61)
Adjusted R 2 0.41 0.34 0.40 0.35
113
Table C2
Test of correlations between X  and other regressors
dependent v a r ia b le ^ m odel 1 m odel 2
workers staff workers staff
n=267 n=258 n=227 n=227
Constant -0.769 2.289 -0.752 2.297
(-35.51) (58.40) (-32.44) (60.60)
Schooling 0.131 -0.122 0.141 -0.132
(72.21) (-46.41) (68.13) (-47.50)
O ther job  experience (OJ)
OJ 0.027 -0.021
(18.20) (-11.49)
OJ2 0.00001 -0.0001
(0.12) (-1.58)
Firm specific tenure (FT)
FT 0.036 -0.042 0.031 -0.032
(14.12) (-11.59) (12.19) (-9.68)
FT2 0.0001 0.0003 0.00005 0.00004
(0.11) (1.73) (0.52) (0.30)
O ther non-agri. exp. (O NAJ)
ONAJ 0.024 -0.024
(13.89) (-12.01)
ONAJ2 0.00009 0.00002
(1.40) (0.21)
Agri. experience (AEXP)
AEXP 0.031 -0.022
(16.12) (-10.47)
AEXP2 -0.0002 -0.00004
(-2.59) (-0.56)
County dum m ies:
Jieshou -0.141 0.110 -0.179 0.149
(-13.31) (6.50) (-15.72) (10.24)
Shangrao -0.160 0.154 -0.191 0.170
(-10.32) (6.89) (-11.58) (8.67)
Nanhai 0.032 -0.019 0.022 -0.001
(2.30) (-1.12) (1.36) (-0.08)
A djusted R 2 0.96 0.91 0.97 0.93
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Appendix 5D
The test for the difference between the coefficients for piece rate and time rate groups 
for staff and workers separately is done by estimating the original model (in this case 
it is model 1) including a piece rate dummy and piece rate interaction terms on all 
other variables on data pooled across piece rate and time rate observations. The model 
is specified as:
ln(w)i = £ ß jXtj+ f j r jX ' + U l
j=J j=l
where are the variables in the original model. The superscript p refers to piece 
rate. The coefficients for the time rate group are the ß^ s and for the piece rate group 
they are ( f ij+j j) .  Ui is an error term. The results are shown in Table Dl.
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Table Dl
Pooled sample test for the difference between coefficients for piece rate and time 
rate groups for staff and workers separately
staff w orkers
n=261 n=271
C onstan t 1.489 0.930
(9.19) (5.38)
Schooling -0.812 -0.010
(-0.71) (-0.50)
O th e r jo b  experience (O J)
OJ 0.028 0.021
(3.79) (1.68)
OJ2 -0.0007 -0.0002
(-3.30) (-0.71)
F irm  specific tenu re  (FT)
FT -0.010 0.047
(-0.70) (2.26)
FT2 0.0004 -0.002
(0.74) (-2.33)
C ounty dum m ies:
Jieshou -0.321 -0.163
(-4.60) (-1.90)
Shangrao -0.734 -0.363
(-7.39) (-2.19)
Nanhai 0.262 0.861
(3.30) (8.54)
Piece ra te  dum m y (DP) -0.287 0.220
(-0.71) (0.82)
PEDU 0.005 0.020
(0.161) (0.68)
POJ 0.054 -0.023
(2.10) (-1.04)
PSOJ -0.002 0.0003
(-2.12) (0.43)
PFT 0.007 0.005
(0.13) (0.22)
PS FT 0.0004 0.0004
(0.18) (0.34)
PJS 0.331 -0.234
(0.22) (-1.66)
PSR 0.289 0.022
(1.32) (0.13)
PNH -0.287 -0.216
(-1-25) (-1.28)
A djusted R2 0.34 0.42
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6INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, EDUCATION AND WAGE 
DETERMINATION
The TVP is a newly developed sector. Compared with the state-owned sector, it is 
more market oriented, and has progressively become more so along with the process 
of economic reform. It can be seen as a sector which is in a period of transformation 
moving from a planned economy to a market economy.
Since 1978 China's rural labour market had undergone a great change. As mentioned 
in Chapter 2, starting from a mixed working-point system for both the agricultural 
and manufacturing sectors, the wage determination system had gone through the 
"within-firm-working-point" system, the fixed wage system, to the "wage-link-up- 
with-the-profit" system. Similarly, starting from a fully controlled recruitment 
system, up to 1985, one third of the sampled employees obtained employment 
through a more market oriented mechanism.
The issue discussed in this chapter is whether the institutional change leading to a 
greater freedom in hiring labour has impacted on the TVP wage determination 
procedure. In particular, we examine whether human capital variables have changed 
their significance in TVP wage determination along with the transformation from a 
more controlled sector to a more market-oriented sector. In addition, we examine in 
further depth the relationship between education, wages and occupation.
6.1 Institutional change and its impact on wage determination
Although the data are drawn from a 1985 cross-section, it is still possible to see the 
institutional transformation in the TVP labour market. Figure 6.1 shows the
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correlation between the years of tenure and the proportion of employees assigned to 
their jobs by local governments, and the proportion of those who obtained 
employment through their own effort. The two groups are referred to as the non- 
market and market groups, respectively. The figure shows that among people with 
tenure of one year, about 17 per cent were assigned to their jobs, while among those 
with tenure of eight years, about 70 per cent were assigned to their jobs. The 
proportion of those who found their jobs through their own effort is 48 per cent 
among the one-year tenure group and 20 per cent among the eight-year tenure group.1
Figure 6.1
Institutional change of the TVP employment system
Assigned by the authorities
Through owp^effort
Introduced by relatives
Years of tenure
There is a third group of employees who found their jobs by being "introduced by 
relatives or friends". Gelb (1990) comments that this group is similar to those who 
obtained their job by a free market recruitment procedure as they got their jobs 
voluntarily. In my opinion this is not the case for a developing country with abundant
1 There might be an alternative explanation for the correlation between employees' tenure and the 
way they got their jobs. It is that tenure of staff is greater than tenure of workers and that those staff 
are more likely to have been assigned to their positions by community authorities. However, this 
alternative can be ruled out by the fact that the staff/workers ratios for both the market and non- 
market groups are about the same (86.6 per cent for the market group and 83.5 per cent for the non- 
market group).
118
surplus labour. In most developing regions of rural China, like Jieshou and Shangrao, 
positions in the TVP sector are very scarce compared with the large amount of 
surplus labour, and income in the agricultural sector is lower than in the TVP sector. 
Everyone would rather be employed by the TVP sector than stay in the fields. But 
only those whose relatives or friends have power (high position in the local 
government) would be able to be "voluntarily" introduced into the TVP sector. In 
some developed regions, like Nanhai and Wuxi, where positions in the TVP sector are 
not very scarce, it might be reasonable to treat this category as a component of a 
market-oriented recruitment system. However, even there the possibility of nepotism 
in appointment still cannot be ruled out. Therefore, in general, this group is 
ambiguous in terms of which system it belongs to. In order to make the analysis 
accurate, I would rather exclude it from the analysis in this chapter.
The basic statistical characteristics for the market and non-market groups are shown 
in Table 6.1. It is clear from this table that, on average, people in the market group 
earn about 20 per cent less than those in the non-market group (daily wage). They 
have about 1 year more schooling, 3.5 years less total experience, 2 years less firm 
tenure and 1 year less agricultural experience compared with those in the non-market 
group.
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Table 6.1
Statistical characteristics for market and non-market groups
m ark et n on -m ark et
mean S.D . mean S.D .
YW 1305 675 1745 1151
DW 4.2 2 .0 5.1 3.4
LD W 1.3 0.5 1.5 0 .6
E D U 9.0 3.0 8.1 2.7
A ge 30 9 .0 33 10
TEX P 14.4 9 .7 18 10.5
OJ 9.3 8.8 10.8 9.5
FT 5.2 4 .6 7.2 5.8
ONAJ 3.6 6 .6 4.1 5.9
A EX P 5.8 7.3 6.8 7.9
The question to be addressed is whether the change in the recruitment system has an 
impact on wage determination. Here the difference between employment for the 
market group and the non-market group is a two-fold issue. From the employees' 
point of view (supply side), it is a matter of whether they are allowed to choose jobs. 
While from the employers' point of view (demand side) it is a matter of whether they 
are allowed to choose employees on the basis of their qualities. Whatever the 
selection method used the local authorities still control employment quantity.
According to the model developed in Chapter 4, where both quantity and quality of 
employment are controlled by local authorities (the non-market group), firms will still 
try to pay employees according to their labour productivity in order to avoid the 
shirking problem and to maximize profit. However, these non-market firms are 
unable to choose employees of given quality and they will experience difficulty 
matching worker's skill with the firms’ technological requirements. Reform in the 
TVP employment system that allows firms to choose the quality of their employees 
will create the preconditions for a better matching of workers' attributes and the job to 
be done.
Accordingly, therefore, on the demand side it is a two dimensional issue. On one side, 
firms have different recruitment systems. On the other side, firms have different 
levels of technology. Under the condition that TVP firms generally pay their
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employees according to labour productivity, firms with no freedom to choose the 
quality of labour will probably choose a more simple technology compared to those 
who are able to choose their employees. The reason for this is that the skill to operate 
a simple technology is easy to gain from work experience rather than formal 
education, so that a lack of freedom to choose the quality of labour will not have a 
significant impact on these firms' efficiency. Where the technology is more 
sophisticated it is more important to have the right quality of labour, and it might be 
expected, therefore, that the freedom to choose labour will go hand in hand with a 
higher level of technology. Theoretically, therefore, education should have stronger 
explanatory power for wage determination of the market group than for the non- 
market oriented group.
On the supply side people with more educational investment would try to find jobs 
with higher payment if they are allowed to choose their jobs. From this perspective 
the market oriented recruitment procedure should also produce a higher correlation 
between wage and education.
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Table 6.2
Regression results of model 1 and model 2 for market oriented and non-market
oriented groups separately
Model 1 Model 2
M a r k e t N o n -M a r k e t M a r k e t N o n - M a r k e t
(1 ) (2 ) (3 ) ( 4 )
n=182 n=229 n=153 n=206
C onstan t 0.689 1.910 0.634 1.416
(4.24) (8.90) (3.23) (9.15)
Schooling 0.039 -0.007 0.041 -0.007
(3.13) (-0 .6 8 ) (2.64) (-0.61)
O th e r jo b  experience (O J)
OJ 0.038 0.029
(3.13) (3.56)
O J2 -0.0007 -0.0008
(-1.79) (-3.20)
F irm  ten u re  (FT)
FT 0.039 0.007 0.046 -0.005
(2.05) (0.51) (2.04) (-0.29)
FT2 -0.0007 -0.0003 -0.0008 0.0001
( -0 .8 6 ) (-0.47) (-0.94) (0.17)
O th e r non-agri. exp. (ON AJ)
O N A J 0.057 0 .0 2 0
(3.47) (1.62)
O N A J 2 -0 .0 0 2 -0.0009
(-2.30) (-1-59)
Agri. experience (AEXP)
A E X P 0.029 0 .0 2 2
(2.14) (2.23)
A E X P 2 -0.0003 -0.0007
(-0.63) (-2.23)
C ounty dum m y
JS -0.263 -0.185 -0.300 -0.234
(-3.61) (-3.12) (-3.64) (-3.92)
SR -0.382 -0.496 -0.465 -0.524
(-3.12) (-6.97) (-3.96) (-7.33)
NH 0.323 0.690 0.169 0.671
(2.78) (6.72) (1.27) (6.35)
B reusch-P agan C hi-Squared 6.93 (8) 23.9 (8) 18.52(10) 22.1 (10)
A djusted R2 0.30 0.39 0.35 0.40
In order to test the hypothesis that the association between education and earnings is 
closer for the market recruitment system, the two basic human capital models 
specified in Chapter 5 (modified version of model l 2 and model 2) are applied to data
2 A certain degree of multicollinearity between total experience and firm tenure is also found for the 
market and non-market groups (see Appendix A for the regression results with total experience), so 
the modified version of model 1, which is to substitute total experience by other job experience (OJ), 
is used.
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which are sub-divided into market oriented and non-market oriented groups. The 
results are presented in Table 6.2.
A set of F-tests is conducted to help to form a judgment as to whether the wage 
determination pattern for the two groups are different. F-tests are given by the 
following formulae:
, . , „ v (76.834 -30.815-41.344)/9Modell: F( 9,oo) = ---------------------------------—  = 2.82 > 1.88
(30.815+ 41.344)/(411-18)
w  (72.159-25.081 -37.336)/11Model 2: F(ll,oo) = -------------------------------- ------= 4.789 >1.83
(25.081 + 37.336)/(359-22)
The results suggest that there is a difference in the wage determination process 
between the market and non-market groups. However, these tests do not inform as to 
which particular variable has a different impact. According to the results presented in 
Table 6.2, education has a positive and significant impact on wage determination of 
the market group, but a negative and insignificant impact on the non-market group's 
wage determination. Firm tenure and other non-agricultural job experience also seem 
to have different impacts in the market and non-market groups.
To determine which individual coefficient differences are statistically significant, 
pooled sample tests were conducted3. The results are presented in Appendix 6B. They 
suggest that: (1) For both models, education has a significantly different impact on 
the market and non-market groups' wage determination. (2) For model 1, the effect on 
wages of each of the experience variables appears to be the same for the two groups. 
(3) For model 2, the difference between impacts of firm tenure and other non- 
agricultural experience on the two groups' wage determination are marginally 
significant (at 10% level).
3 For a detailed description of the test methodology see Chapter 5, Appendix D.
123
The above suggest that the major difference between wage determination in the 
market and non-market groups is the impact of education4.
As reported in Chapter 5, the most unusual result of the human capital model 
estimated for TVP male employees is that education does not have a significant 
impact on wage determination5. To explain this unusual result, several hypotheses 
were proposed and partially examined in Chapter 5. They are: (1) In the TVP sector 
many jobs are unskilled for which it might be expected that education does not matter 
in terms of increasing labour productivity. (2) The TVP firms may not use education 
as a screening device to assign employees to a certain position. The speculation that 
education does not affect labour productivity is based on the regression results for the 
piece rate employees. Thus it was reported that education is insignificant in 
determining the wage rate of the piece rate employees. Hence by assuming piece rate 
payment is a good measure of labour productivity, it might be concluded that 
education is insignificant in determining labour productivity.
However, the significant impact of education on the market oriented group's wage 
determination raises a concern about the conclusions drawn from previous analysis in 
this study. Thus the issue of why education has a major impact on the market group's 
labour productivity but not on that of the non-market group must be considered.
To examine this question, both the market and non-market groups are sub-divided 
into the piece rate and time rate groups. Modified model 1 is estimated using the sub­
divided samples, and the results are presented in Table 6.3
4 It is also noticed that the impacts of firm tenure and other non-agricultural experience on the wage 
determination of the market and non-market groups are different at a marginally significant level. 
These differences might be attributed to the fact that firms in the non-market group are unable to 
choose employees in terms of their quality. It is also possible that the underlying technology is very 
simple for the non-market group so that the rate of return to experience is not as high as for the 
market group.
5 See also Gelb (1990).
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Table 6.3
Results of model 1 for piece rate and time rate in market oriented group
m arket non-m arket
Piece Rate T im e Rate Piece Rate Tim e Rate
n=60 n=126 n=58 n=171
C onstant 0.966 0.531 1.380 1.248
(3.47) (2.51) (4.95) (7.51)
Schooling 0.034 0.047 -0.013 -0.504
(1.73) (2.91) (-0.55) (-0.37)
O ther jo b  experience (O J)
OJ 0.027 0.045 0.047 0.035
(1.17) (3.03) (2.15) (3.34)
OJ2 -0.0004 -0.0009 -0.002 -0.0009
(-0.56) (-1.86) (-2.28) (-2.76)
Firm  tenure (FT )
FT 0.014 0.044 -0.0008 -0.00009
(0.28) (1.94) (-0.03) (-0.005)
FT2 0.0001 -0.0008 0.00009 0.00004
(0.03) (-0.94) (0.08) (0.06)
C ounty dum m y
JS -0.426 -0.210 -0.03 -0.25
(-3.27) (-2.41) (-0.18) (-1.50)
SR -0.337 -0.581 -0.29 -0.591
(-1.91) (-2.51) (-1.93) (-5.48)
NH 0.202 0.350 0.96 0.56
(0.77) (2.57) (7.18) (5-69)
B reusch-P agan  C hi-Squared 8.98 (8) 5.41 (8) 12.08 (8) 16.13 (8)
A djusted  R 2 0.22 0.30 0.64 0.35
Table 6.3 shows that the wage determination patterns for the piece rate and time rate 
groups in both the market and non-market cases are quite similar6. If it is believed 
that piece rate payment is a good measure of labour productivity, the impact of each 
regressor on the daily wage in log form can be interpreted as the impact of each 
independent variable on labour productivity. Based on this belief, the similarity of the 
regression results for the education variable across the disaggregation within both
6 Both F-tests and pooled sample tests are conducted to see whether there are structural differences 
between the two sub-groups, and whether individual coefficients are significantly different between 
the piece rate and the time rate groups for both the market and the non-market groups. The F-test for 
the market group is: F(9,186)=0.564, which is less than the critical value F(9,186)= 1.88. So the null 
hypothesis of no structural change cannot be rejected. The F-test for the non-market group is that 
F(9,229)=2.04. So the null hypothesis of no structural change is rejected. The pooled sample tests 
confirm that the impacts of each of the three main variables (education, firm tenure and other job 
experience) on wage determination for the piece rate and the time rate groups are similar in each of 
the two cases (see Appendix C). The structural change for the non-market group is caused by two of 
the three county dummies.
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market and non-market groups suggests that education might have a significant 
impact on labour productivity for the market group but not for the non-market group. 
The reason for this might be that the underlying technological processes of the work 
undertaken by each group is different. Because of these technological differences, 
people involved in higher technological production need to be more educated 
compared with those who undertake more simple jobs. The gradual liberalization of 
the TVP labour market has allowed those firms with higher technology to hire 
employees according to their education level. Education has a significant impact on 
these firms’ labour productivity, and productivity is rewarded. However, firms whose 
technology is relatively low remain with the old recruitment system. Although they 
pay their employees according to labour productivity, education does not matter in 
terms of increasing their labour productivity7.
The speculation of different underlying technologies had been employed in the 
market and non-market groups may be reinforced by a comparison of tenure-earnings 
profile between the two groups. In Chapter 4 it is explained that the steeper tenure- 
earnings profile for the Japanese firms compared with the firms in the United States is 
caused by using high technology and rapid technological change in Japan (Hashimoto 
and Raisian, 1985; Mincer and Higuchi, 1988). The following tenure-earnings 
profiles are drawn based on the estimated results revealed in Table 6.2. The much 
steeper tenure-earnings profile for the market group compared with the profile for the 
non-market group suggests that firm-specific training in this group is much greater
7 We know that if we estimate a human capital earnings equation within various age-groups, we tend 
to find that the return to education declines as we move into older age groups. This is attributed to the 
obsolescence of human capital skills. Therefore, one might argue that the significant impact of 
education on wage determination of the market group is because those who were in the market group 
had obtained their education more recently. However, the statistical characteristics of the two groups 
shown in Table 6.1 suggest that, on average people in the market group have 3 years less experience 
compared with those in the non-market group, and one more year education compared with those in 
the non-market group. In total they obtained their education about 4 years later than those in the non- 
market group. This will not be able to create a 4.8 per cent difference between the return to education 
for the market and non-market groups (see Table 6.2).
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than in the non-market group, which in turn suggests that the underlying 
technological level in this group should be higher than in the non-market group.
Figure 6.2
Comparison of tenure-earnings profiles between the market and non-market
groups
Markergroup0.4 -
0.3 - -
0.2 - -
Npn-market group
0.1 - -
0
19 20
- 0.1 -
- 0.2 1
Years of firm tenure
6.2 Education: job assignment?
Does education, therefore, play no role for the non-market group? Although 
education does not seem to affect earnings for the non-market group, perhaps it brings 
with it other rewards. This issue is discussed in this and the next sections.
In the literature on human capital, there is a controversy about whether education 
affects wage via its impact on labour productivity or only as a screening device. The 
conventional view is that schooling enhances earnings via the production of 
marketable skills. One aspect of the screening argument suggests that schooling 
serves to identify those individuals who are more productive in the market, which 
determines the individual's job assignment; in turn individual's occupational level 
determines earnings. Therefore, more capable people will seek more education to 
increase their income level. The extreme form of the screening hypothesis is that an 
individual's productivity is not affected by the formal schooling process (Wolpin,
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1977). However, empirically it is hard to disentangle the human capital and extreme 
screening perspectives, in the sense that it is hard to know if it is education enhancing 
labour productivity or more inherently capable people having experienced higher 
education.
Nevertheless, it is possible to test whether education is used as job assignment and 
whether people's job levels are rewarded. Through the adoption of an occupational 
attainment model this section examines whether the TVP firms use schooling as a 
signal for individuals' job assignment for both the market and non-market groups.
According to economic theory, an individual's occupational attainment is a function 
of the employers' willingness to hire that person (labour demand) and the individual's 
desire to work in a particular occupation (labour supply). Labour demand is 
determined by the individual's human capital, and the labour supply is expressed as a 
utility function which includes at least three components: income of occupations, taste 
for the work involved and family size (Brown, Moon and Zoloth, 1980). In the 
Chinese rural labour market, supply side determinants are not very important due to 
the scarcity of employment positions in the TVP sector and the widespread use of 
assignment during most of the period. Therefore, the model adopted for this study can 
be seen as a job assignment model.
Brown, Moon and Zoloth specified a multinomial logit model to capture how the
variables which affect demand decisions for an occupation and an individual's
occupational supply decisions affect the probability of individual i working in
occupation j. This model which is given as:
ex[ßkPij = prob(y. = ocj) = —-------  i - 1 , ..., N, j - l , ..., J.
2>’;A
k = i
where V=sample size,
/=number of occupational groups
a:,—a vector of exogenous variables affecting supply and demand 
factors
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is used in this study to test whether education plays a significant role in occupational 
assignment. The independent variables used to estimate the occupational assignment 
equation include education, other job experience, firm tenure and three regional 
dummies.
As a first step the role of education in the assignment to the workers and staff groups 
is investigated for the market and non-market groups. Then the staff group is further 
disaggregated into five categories (shift leaders, operational personnel, technical 
personnel, ordinary staff and middle level staff).
The results of the binomial logit model for the total sample and for the market 
oriented and non-market oriented groups separately are reported in Table 6.4. The 
workers group is used as a reference category.
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Table 6.4
Binomial logit estimates of male occupational attainment:
(0=workers, l=staff)
Variables Total Sample Market Non-Market
Constant -5.359 -5.599 -5.125
(-8.17) (-5.26) (-6.11)
EDU 0.470 0.503 0.43
(8.29) (5.58) (5.94)
OJ 0.093 0.12 0.085
(6.02) (4.26) (4.47)
FT 0.098 0.154 0.086
(4.28) (3.22) (3.16)
JS -0.288 -0.721 -0.697
(-1.03) (-1.77) (-1.15)
SR -0.166 -1.992 0.641
(-0.45) (-2.75) (1.41)
NH 0.428 0.252 0.337
0.19) (0.37) (0.80)
Note*: (1) For total sample,
n=420, maximum likelihood=231.05, x2=H9.2, pseudo R^O.205.
(2) For the market oriented group,
n=192, maximum likelihood=96.06, x2=72.36, pseudo R2=0.274.
(3) For the non-market oriented group,
n=228, maximum likelihood= 132.32, x2=62.5, pseudo R^O.19
According to the results presented in Table 6.48 9, three main human capital variables 
(education, other job experience and firm tenure) are significant determinants of 
occupational assignment for the total sample of employees. Education is the most 
important variable affecting the probability of becoming a staff member. Other job 
experience and firm tenure rank second and third, respectively. The other variables do 
not seem to be important in determining an individual's occupation. Similar results
8 The formula for the Chi-squared measure is y?=-2(lnLr-lnL), where lnLr and InL are the log- 
likelihood at the maximized value with the constant term only and the log-likelihood at the 
maximized value with all regressors in the model, respectively (Greene, 1990). The formula for the 
pseudo -squared measure: R2=l-(lnLrJlnL) (McFadden, 1974).
9 A likelihood ratio test of the hypothesis that the coefficient vector is zero indicates that for all three 
regressions the estimated model is highly significant.
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are obtained for the market and non-market-oriented groups. It is of interest that in 
the non-market group education plays an important role on occupational attainment 
but not on earnings.
For the binomial logit model, the marginal effect of each independent variable can be 
written as:
cP(y = l ) e x'ß ß  
dH ~ ( l  + ex'ß f
The estimated marginal effects for each variables are shown in Table 6.5. These show 
the impact of a small change in each of the variables on the probability of being a 
staff member.
Table 6.5
Marginal effects of three main variables on the probability of occupational 
assignment for binomial regressions
Total Sample Market Non-Market
a P(y)ld EDU 0.0085 0.0055 0.012
a P(y)/d OJ 0.019 0.022 0.018
a P(y)/d FT 0.022 0.032 0.02
Table 6.5 shows that the marginal effect of education in determining whether a person 
is likely to be a staff member is larger in the non-market group than in the market 
group. For the latter, firm tenure and other job experience are more important.
A multinomial logit model is adopted to ascertain the impact of education on each 
particular level of staff. The six levels of occupations used in Chapter 5 are employed 
here. They are: workers, shift leaders, operational personnel, technical personnel, 
ordinary staff and middle level staff. Operational personnel are those who deal with 
marketing problems and technical personnel deal with technical problems. The other 
categories (shift leaders, ordinary staff and middle level staff) are management staff.
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The results for the total sample and the market and non-market oriented groups are 
shown in Table 6.6:
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Table 6.6
Multinomial logit result for males
__________ (workers =0)__________
T otal S.L O.P. T.P. 0 3 . M 3 .
Constant -4.803 -6.65 -8.845 -7.430 -7.765
(-5.26) (-6.00) (-8.26) (-7.25) (-7.49)
Edu 0 3 3 9 0.405 0.646 0.451 031 9
(430) (436) (7.66) (5.49) (6-23)
OJ 0.033 0.13 0.084 0.121 0.105
(1.43) (5.65) (3.8) (5.55) (4.71)
FT 0.043 -0.012 0.095 0.134 0.171
(1.18) (-0.23) (2.56) (3.97) (5.17)
Jieshou -0.629 -1.444 0.508 0.148 -0.691
(-1.37) (-1.83) (1.22) (0.34) (-1.48)
Shangrao -0.147 1.230 0.180 -0.554 -2.517
(-0.26) (2.38) (0.30) (-0.85) (-2.30)
Nanhai 0.761 -0.346 1.354 0.058 -0.456
(1-57) (-0.47) (2.53) (0.10) (-0.72)
M ark et S.L O.P. T.P . 0 3 . M 3 .
Constant -4.665 -7.556 -8.561 -8.797 -7.898
(-3.52) (-4.21) (-5.57) (-5.06) (-4.63)
Edu 0 3 4 7 030 5 0.637 0 3 3 2 0 3 3 8
(3.10) (3.71) (536) (4.09) (4.01)
OJ 0.088 0.155 0.117 0.160 0.112
(2.49) (3.88) (3.43) (4.19) (2.88)
FT 0.098 0.071 0.136 0.238 0.219
(1.42) (0.69) (2.02) (3.53) (3.30)
Jieshou -1.501 -2.477 0.116 -0.035 -0.647
(-2.57) (-2.17) (0.20) (-0.06) (-1.06)
Shangrao -2.297 -1.195 -0.926 -2.087 -17.445
(-1.95) (-0.94) (-0.92) (-1.64) (-0.009)
Nanhai -0.089 0.498 1.008 -0.652 -0.009
(-0.104) (0.50) (1.13) (-0.51) (-0.009)
N on-M kt. S.L O.P. T.P . 0 3 . M 3 .
Constant -4.897 -5.735 -9.342 -6.565 -8.363
(-3.78) (-4.72) (-5.71) (-5.06) (-5.71)
Edu 0 3 3 4 0 386 0.681 0.402 0 346
(239) (2.16) (5.18) (3.63) (4.64)
OJ -0.006 0.127 0.062 0.102 0.113
(-0.16) (3.97) (1.87) (3.76) (3.85)
FT 0.032 -0.038 0.105 0.089 0.185
(0.71) (-0.60) (2.18) (2.12) (4.23)
Jieshou -0.003 -0.017 -0.952 -00209 -17.779
(-0.004) (-0.02) (-0.79) (-0.23) (-0.007)
Shangrao 0.785 2.278 0.539 0.161 -1.972
(1.11) (3.37) (0.67) (0.21) (-1.63)
Nanhai 1.230 -15.914 1.523 0.214 -0.899
(1.93) (-0.01) (2.15) (0.31) (-1.03)
Note: (1) S.L.=Shift Leaders; O.P.=Operational Personnel; T.P.=Technical Personnel; 
O.S=Ordinary Staff; M.S.=Middle Level Staff.
(2) For the total sample, n=421; maximum likelihood=543.81, 198.08, pseudo R^O.154
(3) For the market oriented group, n=192; maximum likelihood=243.58, x^ lO S.2 , pseudo- 
R^O.178
(4) For the non-market oriented group, n=229; maximum likelihood=278.23,.x2=129.12, 
pseudo-R^O.188
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The above table shows that education is a significant determinant of each group's job 
assignment, and by and large, the higher the position, the more important is the role 
that education plays in the job assignment within the management staff.
The coefficients for the multinomial logit model are difficult to interpret. However, 
according to Greene (1990), the following relationship between relative probability 
and coefficients exists:
Since &  = ex:,ß‘-ß‘>
in-*- = X U ß . - ß k)
dln(Ptj ! P&)
ax: = ß , - ß t
Therefore, as X\  increases, the likelihood that the individual is in occupation j  rather 
than occupation k increases if ß^ß*, and decreases if ß7<ß*. Thus, following Brown, 
Moon and Zoloth (1980), by ranking the coefficients on a certain variable by 
magnitude, the relative impact of that variable on the probability of belonging in 
specific occupations can be identified.
In our case, the rankings of the magnitude of coefficients on education, other job 
experience and firm tenure for total observations and for the market and non-market 
oriented groups are shown in Table 6.7.
Table 6.7
Occupational rankings by size of coefficient on the three main variables
Total S.L. O.P. T .P . O.S. M .S.
EDU 5 4 1 3 2
OJ 5 1 4 2 3
FT 4 5 3 2 1
M arket S.L. O.P. T.P. O.S. M .S.
EDU 5 4 1 3 2
OJ 5 2 3 1 4
FT 4 5 3 1 2
N on-M arket S.L. O.P. T.P. O.S. M .S.
EDU 4 5 1 3 2
OJ 5 1 4 3 2
FT 4 5 2 3 1
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Some implications can be identified from the table above: (1) Not surprisingly, 
education plays the most important role in determining whether a person can be a 
technical staff member, while other job experience and firm tenure do not seem to 
matter very much for this position. (2) People with more education are more likely to 
be in a higher level of management staff group, and the ranking in this regard seems 
to be: middle level staff, ordinary staff and shift leader. (3) The longer the other job 
experience, the more likely it is for a person to be a marketing staff (operational 
personnel). The reason for this is probably that those who have longer other job 
experience have more widespread relationships, at least within the local area, which 
are very useful for marketing business.
The above implications seem to be consistent with both the total sample results and 
the results for the market oriented and non-market oriented groups. Therefore, it 
might be concluded that the job assignment procedure in the TVP has not changed 
very much during the economic reform. And the most important conclusion up to this 
point should be that, from the outset, the TVP sector has used education as a signal 
for job assignment. Moreover, education does play a role in the non-market group: it 
is an important determinant of an individual being appointed to a higher position.
6.3. Education, occupation and non-wage benefits
Human capital theory is based on the premise that the cost of investment in human 
capital has to be equal to the present value of the income stream yielded by the 
investment. In other words, an individual makes a decision to invest in his/her human 
capital (education or training) based on his/her own lifetime cost-benefit analysis of 
investment in human capital. If it is believed that education is used as a signal, 
through which an individual is assigned to a certain job, then it has to be true that 
there is a positive relation between the level of a job and earnings.
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This study up to this point seems to suggest that for the market group the effect of 
education seems consistent with the logic of the theory. More education brings more 
earnings and a higher occupational level. For the non-market group, however, 
education brings no increase in earnings but a higher occupation. This puzzle is now 
looked at more closely.
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Table 6.8
The regression results of model 3 for market and non-market groups
M ark et
n=190
N o n -M ark et
n=226
C onstan t 0.834 1.385
(5.39) (9.29)
S ch oo lin g 0.0158 -0.020
(1.28) (-1.52)
O th er jo b  ex p er ien ce  (O J)
OJ 0.0244 0.0249
(2.00) (2.74)
OJ2 -0.0004 -0.0007
(-0.89) (-2.71)
F irm  ten u re  (F T )
FT 0.034 0.002
(1.95) (0.13)
FT2 -0.0007 -0.0002
(-1.02) (-0.39)
O ccu p ation a l D u m m ies
SL 0.196 0.040
(1.95) (0.37)
OP 0.257 0.051
(1.88) (0.44)
TP 0.261 0.042
(2.81) (0.37)
OS 0.100 0.175
(0.86) (1.72)
MS 0.423 0.313
(3.61) (3.09)
C ou n ty  D um m ies
JS -0.227 -0.139
(-3.26) (-1.20)
SR -0.278 -0.457
(-2.31) (-4.89)
NH 0.275 0.704
(2.54) (8.45)
B reu sch -P agan  C h i-S q u ared 9.71 (13) 26.21 (13)
A d justed  R 2 0.35 0.41
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The results of an estimated wage equation with five occupational dummies for the 
market and non-market oriented groups are presented in Table 6.810. For the market 
oriented group, except for the ordinary staff, all the other four occupational dummies 
weigh heavily on wage determination. However, with the occupational dummies in 
the model, education becomes insignificant in determining an individual's wage. This 
confirms the results of the job assignment model that education and occupation have a 
positive significant correlation. This part of the results is consistent with human 
capital theory: the cost of an individual’s investment in education can be compensated 
by the rate of return to education directly or through the rate of return to occupation 
indirectly.
The results for the non-market oriented group are different. They suggest that 
although the TVP uses education as a criterion for job assignment, three out of the 
five occupational dummies do not have a significant impact on wage determination. 
The r-ratio for the ordinary staff dummy is marginally significant. Only the middle 
level staff dummy has a significant effect on wage determination under the old 
system. Education is insignificant and of negative sign.
This is indeed a puzzle. If education had neither a direct nor indirect (through 
occupation) effect on wage determination under the old system, why did some people 
still invest in education? Furthermore, if occupation did not have an impact on wage 
determination, what was the motivation for people to seek to be promoted?
In the literature on wage determination, there is a theory of status developed by Frank 
(1984) which is used to explain why, in reality, individual wage differences within a
10 The results for the total sample (Model 3 of Table 5.4 in Chapter 5) show that three of the five 
different staff levels have a significant positive relation with earnings. The other two do not have a 
significant impact on wage determination. This result seems quite consistent with the screening 
hypothesis. Although, in general, education does not affect an individual's earnings, the TVP use 
education as a criterion for job assignment, and the level of a position has a positive impact on wage 
determination.
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firm understate individual differences in marginal productivity. This theory can be 
summarised as follows:
Because individuals care a great deal about their status in the income hierarchies of 
the groups to which they belong, there is a trade off between the wage and status. The 
difference between wage and marginal productivity of labour for each individual 
depends on his/her preference between wage and status.
Figure 6.3
W >MP
W =MP
W <MP
Suppose there is a group of people who have the same marginal productivity of 
labour, say MP0 in Figure 6.3. Person A cares about status very much; he/she would 
rather give up a certain amount of his/her wage Pa=Wa-MP0 in order to get to the top 
position in group A in its income hierarchy (the top of the A 'A' wage curve, which is 
flatter than W=MPL curve). Person B does not care about status at all. So he/she 
would rather be in the bottom position of group B (presented by B'B' curve) in order 
to get his/her wage Wb higher than his/her marginal productivity MP0 by the amount 
of Pb (Pb=Wb-MP0). Anyone who is in between A and B in terms of their preference 
between wage and status will be allocated to the subgroups in between group A and B 
in which they either pay a lower premium than A or receive a smaller premium than B 
in return for a less extreme status in each sub-group. However, on average the firm 
will still pay the employees according to their labour productivity.
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The concept of status used in Frank's model can be borrowed to solve the puzzle 
raised above. Why did people invest in education under the situation where there is 
neither a direct nor indirect positive relationship between education and earnings? 
And what motivation is there for people in the TVP firms to seek promotion when 
there is no significant correlation between occupation and wage determination under 
the old system?
Perhaps people invested in education because this is necessary to achieve a high level 
occupation which delivers status. Individuals cared about the status because in the 
TVP firms this might be correlated with non-wage benefits. For example, being a 
staff member means he/she normally does not need to undertake heavy labour; can 
gain a good reputation; and might have priority when attempting to establish 
employment opportunities for their children and relatives. In other words, payment in 
the TVP firms contains both wage and implicit benefits. If we consider these non­
wage benefits as part of income (in addition to wage), we might be able to find a 
significant effect of these occupational dummies on income determination. 
Unfortunately, it is impossible for us to measure these non-wage benefits and 
incorporate them into the regression.
However, one survey question in the Enterprise Director Questionnaire can partly 
provide support for the relationship between high status and non-wage benefit. The 
question asks: "How many of your family members are there in your firm". The 
survey results show that on average each of 115 directors in the sample have 2.65 
family members employed in his/her own firm. If we consider the fact that as a 
director he/she must have a business relationship with many other firms, and it might 
be easier for him/her to arrange a position for his/her relatives in these other firms, 
the figure of his/her relatives being employed because of his/her status would be 
greatly enlarged.
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Thus, there is a market for status. This suggests that the market price for status may 
be equal to the value of the non-wage benefits. If it were possible to measure these 
non-wage benefits we might be able to find a normal relationship between education 
and wage and occupational status and wage.
To sum up, it is clear that in the new system, education, occupation and wage are 
directly correlated, just like the case in a market economy. In the old system the 
correlation between these variables is implicit to some extent: while high position of 
occupation does not directly relate to wage it may relate to some kinds of non-wage 
benefits.
6.4. Conclusion
This chapter has investigated the impact of institutional differences on wage 
determination, in particular the impact of education on wage determination in the old 
and new systems. Several interesting findings lead to the following conclusions:
(1) In contrast to wage determination in the total male sample (see Chapter 5), 
education plays an important role in the wage determination of the group of people 
who get their jobs through their own effort. For those who get their jobs through 
arrangement by the community authority, education is an insignificant determinant of 
the wage level. And, more interestingly, the different roles of education on the market 
and non-market groups wage determination both reflect labour productivity effects.
(2) The system of recruitment in the TVP sector has changed along with the economic 
reform. Most of the people who got their jobs through their own effort were 
employed in the middle of the 1980s, while most of the people who got their jobs 
through community's arrangement were employed in the late 1970s and early 1980s. 
Therefore, the differences between the wage determination patterns for the two 
groups of people reflect the impact of economic reform.
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(3) Although the old recruitment system was non-market oriented, the firms' profit 
maximizing objective function still leads the firms to pay their employees according 
to their labour productivity. The different impact of education on wage determination 
of the market and non-market groups, therefore, is more likely to reflect the 
differences in the underlying technological processes. One view is that because of 
these technological differences, people involved in higher technological production 
need to be more educated compared with those who undertake more simple jobs. The 
gradual liberalization of the TVP labour market has led to these technological 
differences being reflected in the way that workers are allocated to firms.
(4) Although in the old system education did not play an important role in wage 
determination, the TVP firms used it as a criterion for job assignment. Education had 
an important impact on job assignment both in the old and the new systems.
(5) In the new system, it is clear that education is an important determinant of job 
assignment, which in turn determines an individual's wage level. Therefore, 
individuals who invest in education can directly get a return on their investment11. In 
the old system, this relationship is somewhat indirect. The rate of return to education 
could be argued to be more likely to be reflected by implicit benefits.
(6) Therefore, in general we can say that education is a significant determinant of an 
individual's benefit both in the new and the old system. The difference is that for the 
latter it cannot be directly observed from the estimation of a wage equation, and it is 
not productivity oriented.
11 This conclusion does not mean that in the new system there is no side-payment for the staff 
members. It is rather saying that there is a direct correlation between status and wage.
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Appendix 6A
Regression results of model 1 with total experience for market and non-market
groups separately
M arket
n=196
N on-M arket
n=357
C onstant 0.650 1.082
(4.05) (9.25)
Schooling 0.036 -0.007
T otal experience (TEXP)
(3.08) (-0.82)
Texp 0.046 0.036
(3.9) (5.06)
Texp2 -0.0008 -0.0006
Firm  tenure (FT)
(-2.47) (-3.93)
FT 0.011 0.006
(0.56) (0.47)
FT2 -0.0002 -0.0004
C ounty dum m y
(-0.20) (-0.77)
JS -0.265 -0.299
(-3.9) (-4.7)
SR -0.386 -0.435
(-3.39) (-5.7)
NH 0.320 0.571
(2.90) (9.00)
Ad justed R 2 0.316 0.402
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Appendix 6B
Pooled sample tests for the differences of the coefficients between the market 
____________________ and non-market groups:___________________
M odel 1 
n=411
M odel 2
n=359
C onstant 1.291 1.416
(8.90) (9.15)
Schooling -0.007 -0.007
(-0.68) (-0.61)
O ther jo b  experience (OJ)
OJ 0.029
OJ2
(3.56)
-0.0008
(-3.20)
Firm  tenu re  (FT)
FT 0.007 -0.005
(0.51) (-0.29)
FT2 -0.0003 0.0001
(-0.47) (0.16)
O ther non-agri. exp. (ONAJ)
ONAJ 0.020
ONAJ2
(1.62)
-0.0009
(-1.59)
Agri. experience (AEXP)
AEXP 0.022
AEXP2
(2.23)
-0.0007
(-2.23)
C ounty dum m y
JS -0.185 -0.234
(-3.12) (-3.92)
SR -0.50 -0.524
(-6-97) (-7.33)
NH 0.690 0.671
(6.72) (6.35)
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(continued overleaf)
Mkt. group dummy (DAP) -0.603 -0.782
(-2.69) (-3.13)
AEDU 0.046 0.048
(2.80) (2.46)
AOJ 0.009
(0.63)
AOJ2 0.0003
(0.08)
AFT 0.031 0.051
(1.31) (1.83)
AFT2 -0.0004 -0.0009
(-0.45) (-0.86)
AONAJ 0.036
(1.76)
AONAJ2 -0.0009
(-0.94)
AAEXP 0.006
(0.39)
AAEXP2 0.0005
(0.89)
AJS -0.078 -0.067
(-0.84) (-0.66)
ASR 0.113 0.059
(0.89) (0.43)
ANH -0.368 -0.503
(-2.28) (-2.96)
B reu sch -P agan  y} 31.91(17) 40.93(21)
A d ju sted  R 2 0.368 0.39
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Appendix 6C
Pooled sample tests for the differences of the coefficients between the piece rate 
and time rate groups in the market and non-market groups:
M a r k e t  G ro u p
n= 186
N o n -M a rk e t  G ro u p
n= 229
C o n s ta n t 0.531 1.248
(2 .57) (7 .70)
S c h o o lin g 0 .047 -0 .005
O th e r  jo b  e x p e r ie n c e  (O J )
(2 .98) (-0 .43 )
O J 0.045 0 .035
(3 .11) (3 .73)
O J2 -0 .0009 -0 .0008
F irm  te n u r e  (F T )
(-1 .92) (3 .07 )
F T 0.045 -0 .0001
(1 .99) (-0 .005)
F T 2 -0.0008 0 .00004
C o u n ty  d u m m y
(-0 .96) (0 .06)
JS -0 .210 -0 .249
(-2 .47) (-3 .12 )
SR -0.581 -0.591
(-2 .58) (-7 .90 )
N H 0 .350 0.561
(2 .64) (4 .83)
(continued overleaf)
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Piece R ate D um m y (DP) 0.436 0.132
(1.21) (0.38)
PE D U -0.013 -0.008
(-0.49) (-0.31)
POJ -0.18 0.012
(-0.65) (0.49)
POJ2 0.0005 -0.001
(0.49) (-1.33)
PFT -0.030 -0.0007
(-0.52) (-0.02)
PFT2 0.0009 0.00005
(0.30) (0.04)
PJS -0.216 0.221
(-1.33) (1.56)
PSR 0.243 0.313
(0.83) (2.04)
PNH -0.148 0.415
(-0.48) (2.08)
B reusch-Pagan y} 13.797 (17) 32.53 (17)
A djusted R 2 0.28 0.42
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7TVP WAGE DETERMINATION: COMPARISON
The previous two chapters investigated the applicability of the human capital model 
to TVP wage determination. The study roughly confirmed the hypothetical model 
about TVP wage determination built in Chapter 4. It was shown that the wage 
determination procedure in the TVP sector, by and large, can be explained by the 
human capital model, and that the TVP firms pay employees according to labour 
productivity. The insignificance of the impact of education on wage determination for 
the non-market oriented group may be due to the simplicity of the underlying 
technological processes these firms used.
In this chapter, two issues are investigated. First, are the results obtained by this study 
consistent with the other studies on Chinese wage determination? If so or not, what 
are the reasons? Second, is the explanatory power of the human capital model for the 
TVP wage determination as good as for the other industrial countries? Are there any 
detectable and systematic differences between our results and those of the other 
industrial countries? With reference to the industrial countries, is the TVP wage 
determination pattern more like the free market one or the life-time employment one?
7.1 Comparison with other studies on Chinese wage determination
In Chapter 4, two studies on Chinese wage determination, Gelb (1990) and Byron and 
Manaloto (1990), were reviewed.
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Comparison with Gelb (1990)
Gelb used the same data set as is used in this study to analyse wage determination in 
the TVP sector. However, his methodology is slightly different. His model combines 
both human capital variables and the characteristics of the firm in which individuals 
work. His sample set also combines men and women1.
The main differences between the findings reported in Gelb (1990) and those listed in 
the previous chapters can be summarised as follows:
(1) The rate of return to labour market experience is much lower in Gelb's work than 
is found in this study. His estimation shows that for each additional year of 
experience, an individual's wage increases by 1 per cent2. In this study it is found that 
for total male employees, the rate of return is 2.8 per cent per annum to firm tenure 
and 3 per cent to other job experience.
As age is used as a proxy for total experience in Gelb's analysis, his model can be 
written as follow (model 1):
Model 1: ln(w)=al + p>]X+u (1)
where X is the variable of age and it can be decomposed as:
X=S+7+X1+X2 (2)
where 5=years of schooling
X;=other job experience 
X2=firm tenure.
If we substitute equation (2) into (1), model 1 becomes:
ln(w)=(aj+ 7ß;)+ß;S+ ß,X,+ß7X2+u (3)
Equation (3) is the model estimated in this study. Therefore, it is possible to compare 
Gelb's result for total experience to the results for firm tenure and other job 
experience in this study. If, instead of the variable of age, both firm tenure and other
1 Gelb's main findings for the human capital variables are reported in Section 4 of Chapter 4.
2 See Gelb's model 5 in Appendix A of Chapter 4.
149
job experience were included in his study, it is likely that the rate of return to both 
other job experience and firm tenure would be about 1 per cent. They are, obviously, 
lower than what have been found in this study.
The reasons for this difference might be:
(a) In Gelb's regression, 48 firm dummies are included instead of the 3 county 
dummies used in this study. These firm dummies not only capture the regional 
differences but the characteristics of firms which cannot be captured in this study. 
Therefore, a certain amount of the impact of experience on wage determination 
presented in this study might be taken over by the firm dummies in his study.
(b) Gelb’s regression is estimated for the total sample. Although a female dummy is 
included, it can only grasp the difference in the intercept between the two gender 
groups. The differences in slopes are ignored. This study estimates wage equations 
for the two gender groups separately.
Moreover as mentioned in Chapter 4, if Mincer's measurement j  as a proxy for total 
experience is used, the estimated coefficient for total experience for female tends to 
be biased downward. As shown in the above, Gelb's model can be rewritten as 
equation (3), in which X2+X2 is equivalent to j. In this case, if both men and women 
are included in the regression, the combined coefficient tends to be biased downward 
compared with the result for male employees only.
(2) Education seems to be an insignificant determinant of earnings in Gelb’s study for 
the total sample. This result is also found in this study at the same level of 
aggregation. However, by using age as measurement of total experience, his 
estimation for education is more biased. Suppose instead of equation (1), his 
estimated equation is:
ln(w)=a]+p]X+P2S+u (4)
Then, if we substitute equation (2) into (4), his estimated equation becomes:
W »vM a,+7ß,W ß/+ß2)S+ß,X,+ßA+M (5).
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This implies the coefficient for X  (age) has captured a part of the effect of education, 
while in Gelb's estimation only ß2 is reported as the effect of education.
Apart from this measurement problem, the level of aggregation used by Gelb is also a 
cause of concern. In this study it is found that education is not a significant 
determinant for the wage determination of the total male sample. But the results in 
Chapter 6 show that education matters for the earnings of the market-oriented group 
but not for the non-market group. This study also provides a possible explanation for 
this difference through the study of the piece rate and time rate groups separately. It is 
most likely that the difference in the role of education arises because of the 
underlying technological processes between the two groups.
To conclude, when applying similar models to Gelb's we obtained similar results. It is 
shown in this study, however, that many of his results are misleading and are changed 
when variables and data are disaggregated. These changes are important and 
contribute significantly to our understanding of the TVP labour market.
Comparison with Byron and Manaloto (1990)
Byron and Manaloto analysed wage determination in China's urban sector3. The 
differences of findings between their study and those reported in Chapters 5 and 6 can 
be attributed to the different wage determination patterns in the rural and urban 
industrial sectors.
The data set used in the study by Byron and Manaloto includes both men and women. 
Differences between the two groups are captured by a female dummy variable. The 
main differences between their findings and those reported above are: (1) Education 
is more important in determining earnings for the urban sector than for the rural
3In urban China, most people are employed in either state-owned or "big-collective" sectors, the 
lauer is more like the state-owned sector.
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sector. A rate of return of 4 per cent for each additional year of schooling was found 
in Byron and Manaloto's study. This is similar to what has been found for the market 
group in this study but much higher than for the total male sample in the TVP sector 
(1 per cent for the total male sample)4. (2) The male/female wage gap is bigger in the 
TVP sector than in the urban sector (20 per cent difference in the TVP sector5 
compared with 9 per cent in the urban sector).
One finding is common to the two sectors: the labour market experience is a more 
important variable than education.
7.2 Comparison of the earnings distribution in the TVP, Japan and the 
United States
As mentioned in Chapter 4, employment systems in the industrial economies may be 
grouped into two different types: lifetime employment (normally represented by 
Japan) and the relatively flexible employment system (as in the United States). 
Empirical studies have shown that human capital theory can readily explain wage 
determination in each of the two cases. However, the rates of return to education, 
total labour market experience, and especially to firm-specific training are higher for 
Japan than for the United States. It is usually agreed that the reason for this difference 
is the different underlying technological processes in the two countries (Mincer and 
Higuchi, 1988). Japan has had more rapid economic growth and technological change 
in the past decades compared with the United States. This high rate of technological 
change requires greater and more continuous training and retraining than in the 
United States.
In the hypothetical model (see Chapter 4) for the TVP wage determination it was 
suggested that the experience-earnings profile for the TVP employees should be
4 See model 1 of Table 5.4 in Chapter 5 and Table 6.2 in Chapter 6.
5 See Chapter 8.
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closer to that of a flexible labour market than Japan. This section examines this 
proposition.
The return to education
The rate of return to education seems very different for the TVP total male 
observations to that of the industrial economies. First, the t-ratios for the schooling 
variable in all four models for the total male sample (see Table 5.4 in Chapter 5) are 
insignificant, and for models 3 and 4 the sign is even negative. If there is a positive 
rate of return to schooling the best estimate would be quite low, about 0.8 to 0.9 per 
cent. However, when the total male sample is sub-divided into the market and non- 
market groups, it is found that education has a statistically significant impact on wage 
determination among the market group. The rate of return is about 4 per cent.
In the United States the rate of return to schooling is about 2 to 5 per cent6 and in 
Japan it is normally 10 to 20 per cent (see Hashimoto and Raisian, 1985; Mincer and 
Higuchi, 1988). The return to education for the TVP market group, therefore, is 
similar to that for the United States.
The experience-earnings profile
Mincer and Higuchi (1988) estimate earnings equations for both the United States and 
Japan. The simple version of their estimated model is:
ln(w) = a 0 +a tE + a 2E2 +a 3X + a 4X 2 + a sT + a 6T 2 +u 
where £=years of schooling, X=total experience, and r=finn tenure.
In Hashimoto and Raisian's study on the United States and Japanese wage 
determination, total experience (Mincer's definition, j) and firm tenure are used as 
proxies for general training and firm-specific training. Their estimated model is about
6 The rates of return to education are reported to be close to 7 to 10 in U.S. in some other studies 
(see, for example, Psacharopoulos, 1985).
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the same as the one Mincer and Higuchi used. Two minor differences are: (1) instead 
of years of schooling they used dummies for each level of education; (2) in addition 
to the experience variables and their squared terms, they have a total experience and a 
firm tenure interaction term. Apart from these differences, Hashimoto and Raisian 
estimated their earnings equations using data disaggregated by size of firms (small, 
medium and large).
The coefficients for total experience and firm tenure estimated in Mincer and 
Higuchi's and in Hashimoto and Raisian’s studies are shown in Table 7.1 and Table 
7.2, respectively.
Table 7.1
The rate of return to experience in the United States and Japan
( M in c e r  a n d  H ig u c h i)
T E X P T E X P 2 FT F T 2
Japan 0 .039 -0 .0007 0.063 -0 .0008
(8 .87) (-6 .85) (14 .80) (-5 .89)
United States 0.024 -0 .0004 0.023 -0 .0004
(14 .33) (-10 .96) (14 .16) (-7 .24 )
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Table l.V
The rate of return to experience in the United States and Japan
____________________(Hashimoto and Raisian)___________________
United States Japan
small firm large firm small firm large firm
TEXP 0.050 0.037 0.038 0.021
(22.2) (16.4) (15.4) (4.9)
TEXP2 -0.001 -0.0007 -0.0005 -0.0003
(-21.5) (-13.0) (-12.4) (-4.1)
FT 0.020 0.012 0.061 0.069
(4.8) (4.3) (9.1) (11.7)
FT2 -0.0006 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0013
(-4.0) (-3.6) (-0.8) (-5.6)
TEXPxFT 0.0003 0.0003 -0.0012 -0.00001
(1.8) (2.3) (-6.1) (-0.1)
Unfortunately, it has been found in the previous chapters that total experience and 
firm tenure are highly correlated in the TVP wage equation. To circumvent the 
problem of multicollinearity, other job experience was used in the earnings equation 
instead of total experience.
To compare the rate of return to experience in the United States and Japan to that in 
the TVP firms, the earnings equation for the TVP sector is re-estimated using total 
experience and firm tenure7 8. The rates of return to total experience and firm tenure
7 In this table, only the results for small and large firms are reported. The reason for choosing these 
two categories is that the small firms are similar to the TVP firms in terms of firm size, while the 
large firms in Japan are commonly regarded as representative of the lifetime employment system. 
The similar results found for these two types of firms seem to reinforce the suggestion that even in 
the small Japanese firms, long-term employment relationships are pursued (for a detailed analysis 
about the steeper tenure-earnings profile in Japan, see Chapter 4).
8 OLS estimates are still BLUE in the presence of the problem of multicollinearity. The only 
consequence of this is that the variances of the coefficients will be large so that the observed r-ratios 
will be low (see Stewart and Wallis, 1986). Furthermore, according to Koutsoyiannis (1977), "if the 
purpose of the estimation is to forecast the values of the dependent variable, then we may include the 
intercorrelated variables and ignore the problems of multicollinearity, provided that we are certain 
that the same pattern of intercorrelation of the explanatory variables will continue in the period of 
prediction." Therefore, comparing the results for the TVP sector with the problem of 
multicollinearity to the other studies will still give us sensible insights.
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for the TVP total male employees and for the staff and workers separately are shown 
in Table 7.39.
Table 7.3
The rate of return to experience in the TVP sector
total workers staff
T E X P 0.038 0.020 0.045
(6.7) (3.07) (5.71)
T E X P 2 -0.0006 -0.0002 -0.0009
(-4.86) (-1.73) (-5.05)
F T 0.008 0.033 -0.015
(0.67 (2.23) (-1.17)
F T 2 -0.0003 -0.0014 0.0004
(-0.75) (-2.21) (0.76)
The comparison of the effects of total experience and firm tenure on wage 
determination in Japan and the United States to that in the TVP sector can be shown 
by the total experience-earnings and tenure-earnings profiles. The usual way of 
deriving the experience-earnings profile is as follows: (1) Evaluate the starting wage 
at the mean values of all variables. (2) Compute the effect of change in total 
experience or firm tenure on wage by setting the variables of experience at various 
years while keeping the other variables at their mean values and computing the new 
wage level.
However, it is impossible to derive the profiles for the United States and Japan in this 
normal way as the whole set of mean values of the explanatory variables in the 
regression were not reported. In this study, therefore, the profiles are derived by 
ignoring the effect of the other variables and simply looking at the effect of total 
experience or firm tenure on wage determination. In other words, when the total
9 The estimated results for the total male sample with total experience and firm tenure have been 
reported in Appendix A in Chapter 5. The results for the male staff and workers separately are 
presented in Appendix A in this chapter.
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experience-earnings profile is derived, the estimated earnings equation is assumed to 
be:
ln(w)=fijTEXP+ P2TEXP2
Similarly, the equation for the firm tenure profile is assumed to be: 
ln(w)=$1FT+f>2FT2
The comparison of the total experience-earnings and firm tenure-earnings profiles for 
the United States, Japan and the TVP sector are shown in Figures 7.1 and 7.2, 
respectively10.
10 Mincer and Higuchi's estimations are used for Figures 7.1 and 7.2.
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Figure 7.1
Comparison of total experience-earnings profiles
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Figure 7.2
Comparison of firm tenure-earnings profiles
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The total experience-earnings profile for the TVP sector, aggregating both staff and 
workers, is virtually the same as that for Japan and much steeper than that for the 
United States. For staff alone the relationship is steeper than that for Japan. For 
workers the profile is similar to that of the United States (see Table 7.1). The return 
to firm tenure for the TVP staff is negative, and for the total sample is very low.
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Figure 7.2 only compares the profile for the TVP workers to those for Japan and the 
United States. The relationship for the TVP workers is similar to that for the United 
States but far away from the Japanese one. Therefore, it can be concluded that the 
effect of experience on wage determination for the TVP workers is more like the 
United States case than the Japanese one11.
This result accords well with the proposition drawn from the hypothetical model of 
TVP wage determination. The reason why the TVP workers' profiles more closely 
resemble that of the United States rather than that of Japan might be because the TVP 
firms pay their workers according to their spot labour productivity. Compared with 
Japan, the United States employment model is closer to that of the general training 
case, where employees are paid according to their spot labour productivity.
As Japan is characterised by rapid technological change, more investment in firm- 
specific training and retraining are required. This in turn requires that employers hold 
their specialized employees to minimize training costs. Similarly, employees prefer to 
stay with the specific firm so they can maximize the benefit from their specialized 
skill. This process generates a steep tenure-earnings profile to ensure that the 
employees and employers attach to each other. This tenure-earnings profile is higher 
than the tenure-productivity profile during the training period and lower than that 
afterwards. Therefore, lifetime employment is an endogenous variable for the 
Japanese economy which has been created by the wage determination system.
Lifetime employment is also an important feature of the TVP sector, but the outcome 
is generated by a different process. The community authority controls the firms' 
employment levels and the only alternative jobs for the employees are in the 
agricultural sector. Although lifetime employment is similar to that of Japan, the
11 The profiles for the TVP staff seem to be an anomaly. However, they are consistent with the 
conclusion drawn in Chapter 5 that the wage determination system for the TVP staff group seems, to 
a certain extent, to carry on the rewards gained under the old agricultural leadership system.
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relationship with the wage determination process is different. In the TVP sector, the 
wage is not used as an instrument to ensure that the employees stay with the firm but 
as a tool to induce effort from individuals. If this is true then the payment system 
must be more similar to that of the flexible market one, where it reflects labour 
productivity.
7.3 Conclusions
The findings from the above comparisons can be summarised as follows:
(1) The main differences between Gelb's study and the analyses reported in Chapters 
5 and 6 seem to come from the differences in the underlying methodology.
(2) The wage determination patterns for urban China and the TVP sector are quite 
similar.
(3) The wage determination pattem of TVP workers is closer to that of the United 
States rather than that of Japan.
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Appendix 7A
Results of model 1 with total experience for workers and staff separately
w orkers staff
n=289 n=270
C onstant 0.946 1.343
(7.40) (9.15)
Schooling -0.005 -0.011
(-0.47) (-1.12)
T otal experience (TEXP)
TEXP 0.020 0.045
(3.07) (5.71)
TEXP2 -0.0002 -0.0009
(-1.73) (-5.05)
F irm  specific tenu re  (FT)
FT 0.033 -0.015
(2.23) (-1.17)
FT2 -0.014 0.0004
(-2.21) (0.76)
C ounty dum m ies:
J iesh o u -0.209 -0.291
(-3.74) (-5.02)
Shangrao -0.214 -0.658
(-2.287) (-8.35)
Nanhai 0.799 0.207
(8.44) (2.97)
B reusch-Pagan C hi-Squared 36.02 (8) 4.40 (8)
A djusted R 2 0.43 0.37
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PART m
FEM ALE W AGE DETERM INATIO N AND  
THE GENDER W AGE DIFFERENTIAL
There is a significant gender wage differential in both industrial and developing 
economies. This is evidenced by the following table:
Female/male wage ratio in some of the industrial and developing countries
wage ratio date definition
Industrial countries
US 64.7 1987
Britain 69.5 1984 hourly wage
Australia 78.2 1985 hourly wage
Japan 51.8 1985 monthly wage
Developing countries
Hong Kong 76.8 1985 daily wage
Korea 47.8 1985 monthly wage
Singapore 68.6 1985 hourly wage
China: TVP 77.8 1985 daily wage
Note: Data for Britain, Australia, Japan, Hong Kong, Korea and Singapore are calculated 
according to Table 16 of ILO Statistical Yearbook, 1986; data for the United States are from 
Hawke (1991) and is from the 1987 Current Population Survey.
Part II has examined wage determination in the TVP male labour market. This part of 
the thesis intends to analyse female wage determination. In particular, the structural 
difference of wage determination between male and female labour markets (Chapter 8), 
and the impact of gender wage discrimination on individual wage determination, both 
in terms of within occupational wage discrimination (Chapter 9) and discrimination of 
occupational distribution (Chapter 10), are examined.
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8DIFFERENCES IN THE STRUCTURE OF WAGE DETERMINATION
BETWEEN MEN AND WOMEN
Female employees account for about 45 per cent of the total sample. The mean values 
and standard deviations of the wage, schooling, total experience, firm tenure and 
some other variables for the gender groups are shown in Table 8.1.
Table 8.1
Statistical characteristics of the variables by gender
total workers staff
men women men women men women
YW 1455 1125 1325 1083 1610 1286
(948.3) (692.2) (1046) (686.06) (865) (695.9)
DW 4.5 3.5 4.2 3.4 4.8 3.8
(2.88) (1.88) (3.2) (1.89) (2.4) (1.84)
LDW 1.35 1.15 1.24 1.13 1.47 1.23
(0.54) (0.46) (0.6) (0.45) (0.5) (0.51)
EDU 8.8 8.09 8.0 7.8 9.7 9.0
(2.9) (2.83) (2.8) (2.80) (2.8) (2.74)
AGE 30.9 27.3 27.8 26.3 34.3 31.2
(10) (7.88) (9.1) (7.53) (9.7) (8.00)
TEXP 15.2 12.2 12.8 11.4 17.6 15.1
(10.6) (8.36) (10.1) (8.21) (10.7) (8.30)
OJ 9.4 7.8 7.8 7.4 11.0 9.2
(9.6) (7.12) (8.3) (6.97) (10.3) (7.55)
FT 5.8 4.4 5.1 4.0 6.7 6.0
(5.1) (3.83) (4.8) (3.38) (5.5) (4.92)
AEXP 5.6 5.5 5.0 5.3 6.0 6.1
(7.5) (6.54) (6.7) (6.54) (8.1) (6.51)
ONAJ 3.9 2.2 2.8 1.9 5.0 3.2
(6.6) (4.01) (5.3) (3.38) (7.5) (5.75)
Note: (1) Standard deviations are in parentheses;
(2) All the variable notations follow those used in Table 5.2 of Chapter 5.
The female-male daily wage ratio is calculated from the data in Table 8.1 to be 77.8 
per cent (85 per cent in logarithm of the daily wage) for the total sample, and the 
average male wage is 28.6 per cent higher than that of women. The female-male
163
earnings ratio for workers is slightly higher than for staff. These ratios are 81 per cent 
and 79.2 per cent, respectively.
In general, women are about 3 years younger than men in the sample. However, they 
have approximately the same years of schooling as their male co-employees (8.8 vs. 
8.1). Hence, their total experience is about 3 years less than men. While the other job 
experience, other non-agricultural experience and firm tenure of women are shorter 
than for men, women have about the same years of agricultural experience as men.
There are several features which have been discovered when the male wage 
determination is investigated (refer to Part II):
(1) Education seems to play an insignificant role in total male employees' wage 
determination. However, it has a significant impact on the earnings of the market 
group.
(2) Agricultural experience is very significant in staff wage determination, while firm 
tenure plays an important role in workers' wage determination.
(3) The time rate workers' wage structure is similar to that of the piece rate workers 
and differs from the time rate staffs wage structure.
This Chapter investigates whether the same wage determination structure applies to 
the female labour market in the TVP sector.
8.1 A comparison of the structure of wage determination between total 
male and female employees
To understand whether the structure of wage determination for women is similar to 
that for men, separate regressions are estimated for the total male and female 
observations. The results are shown in Table 8.2.
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Table 8.2
Regression results of models 1 to 4 for men and women separately
models
1 2 3 4
female male female male female male female male
n=427 n=529 n=346 n=457 n=423 n=525 n=411 n=511
Constant 0.719 1.016 0.716 1.068 0.754 1.105 0.741 1.113
(8.28) (10.69 (7-73) (9.89) (8.53) (11.50) (8.13) (11.10)
Schooling 0.022 0.011 0.018 0.007 0.018 -0.002 0.018 -0.002
(3.10) (1.63) (2.22) (0.85) (2.51) (-0.25) (2.51) (-0.30)
O ther job experience (OJ)
OJ 0.018 0.029 0.019 0.025 0.022 0.025
(2.02) (5.48) (2.09) (4.76) (2.46) (4.53)
OJ2 -0.0003 -0.0006 -0.0003 -0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0005
(-0.75) (-3.83) (-0.83) (-3.55) (-1.15) (-3.42)
Firm  tenure (FT)
FT 0.058 0.028 0.058 0.032 0.055 0.022 0.054 0.022
(4.52) (2.80) (3.98) (2.91) (4.23) (2.21) (4.11) (2.21)
FT2 -0.002 -0.0007 -0.002 -0.0009 -0.0017 -0.0007 -0.0017 -0.0007
(-2.84) (-1.93) (-2.43) (-2.14) (-2.89) (-1.85) (-2.85) (-1.89)
Oth. non-agri. exp. (ONAJ)
ONAJ 0.028 0.023
(2.40) (3.76)
ONAJ2 -0.0008 -0.0005
(-1.35) (-2.91)
Agri. experience (AEXP)
AEXP 0.017 0.025
(1.52) (3.18)
AEXP2 -0.0001 -0.0005
(-0.12) (-2.21)
Occupational dummies:
Shift leader -0.110 0.095 -0.136 0.100
(-1.62) (1.52) (-1-91) (1-53)
Operational personnel -0.048 0.106 -0.059 0.124
(-0.66) (1.66) (-0.80) (1.90)
Technical personnel 0.243 0.140 0.248 0.127
(2.45) (1-96) (2.44) (1.78)
Ordinary staff -0.075 0.116 -0.043 0.115
(-0.76) (2.03) (-0.42) (2-01)
Middle level staff 0.197 0.298 0.211 0.297
(1.95) (4.71) (2.10) (4.66)
Number of children (NC)
NC -0.017 0.002
(-0.75) (0.13)
County dummies:
JS -0.254 -0.274 -0.214 -0.309 -0.247 -0.255 -0.228 -0.266
(-5.92) (-6.28) (-4.55) (-6.36) (-5.74) (-5.90) (-5-05) (-5.86)
SR -0.467 -0.441 -0.459 -0.495 -0.443 -0.406 -0.415 -0.400
(-6.07) (-8.19) (-5.10) (-8.77) (-5.81) (-7.16) (-5.34) (-6.49)
NH 0.235 0.529 0.197 0.481 0.253 0.536 0.260 0.538
(4.47) (7.70) (3.29) (6.61) (4.79) (7.81) (4.74) (7.50)
Breusch-Pagan x 2 37.9 (81 47.0 (8) 38.8(10) 47.6(10) 51.2(13) 54.4(13) 52.3 (14) 55.1 (14)
Adjusted R 2 0.35 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.37 0.36 0.36 0.36
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In addition to these separate regressions, a set of F-tests is conducted. The results 
suggest that for all four models, wage determination patterns for women are different 
from those for men. Pooled data tests are also applied and provide detailed 
information on coefficient differences for each particular variable for men and 
women. The results are displayed in Appendix A1. They suggest that:
(1) The coefficient for schooling in all the models is statistically significant and 
positive for women. As indicated earlier, education is not significant for men. The 
rate of return to education for women is approximately 2 per cent for each additional 
year of schooling2. Pooled data tests indicate that the coefficient for education has 
statistically different effects on male and female wage determination for two of the 
four models (see Appendix A).
(2) Other job experience is important for both men and women, but the nature of the 
relationship appears to be different. For women the relationship is a positive linear 
one (the coefficient of the quadratic term is insignificant), but for men it is quadratic. 
The profile appears steeper for men than for women. This pattern is consistent across 
all models. However, pooled data tests suggest that these difference are not 
significant.
(3) The coefficients for firm tenure are statistically significant for both men and 
women, and both relationships appear to be quadratic. The slope of the profile is 
steeper for women than for men. And this difference is statistically significant.
(4) The results for model 2 indicate that, in comparison with wage determination in 
the male labour market, firm tenure is a more important experience variable than
1 F-tests are: for model 1 F(9, o°)=9.82>1.88, for model 2 F (ll, °°)=6.2>1.75, for model 3 F(14, °° 
)=5.95>1.67, and for model 4 F(15, °°)=5.62>1.67. As for all four models the test statistics are 
greater than the critical values, the null-hypotheses of no structural change can be rejected.
2 Although the coefficient of schooling for women is still very low, the difference between rate of 
return to education for men and women is statistically significant so that it is worthwhile to analyse.
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either other non-agricultural job experience or agricultural experience in the female 
labour market. But the difference is not statistically significant.
(5) The occupational dummies for shift leader, operational personnel and ordinary 
staff for women have negative (but insignificant) effects on wage determination 
which is contrary to that for men.
In summary, the most important structural difference of wage determination between 
total men and women is the impact of education on wages.
It is usual for returns to education to be higher for women than for men. Camoy and 
Marenbach (1975) found that the rates of return to education have often been higher 
for women than for men in the United States. The same result was also found by 
Gwartney and Long (1978). Psacharopoulos' (1985) review of the rate of return to 
education for 56 countries shows that in developing countries the rate of return for 
women exceeds that for men. Chua (1984) found similar results in Malaysia.
Three reasons can be advanced to explain this phenomenon. First, when Mincer’s 
definition of total experience j  is used as a proxy for work experience, it ignores the 
discontinuity of women's labour market experience. Therefore the coefficient of 
schooling tends to be overestimated for women (see Chapter 4 for detailed analysis).
In industrial countries, women normally have a long layoff period when they have 
children. However, this is not usual in developing countries, especially in rural areas. 
Moreover, China has had a "one family one child" policy for about ten years. This 
would reduce the female time out of the labour market. Furthermore, before 1985 in 
urban China, women normally only had 56 days away from work when they bore a 
child. The period of layoff in rural China is shorter than in urban areas. The 
discontinuity of total labour market experience3, therefore, is quite minor for women
3 In our case it is other job experience, which is obtained by subtracting firm tenure from total 
experience.
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in the TVP sector. This suggests that the upward bias of the schooling coefficient for 
women cannot be the main reason for the higher rate of return to education to women. 
The empirical results support this view. There are a number of methods suggested to 
overcome the problem of inaccuracies resulting from the use of the Mincer 
experience proxy in the female earnings equation. Unfortunately, actual labour 
market experience is not available in the data set used in this study. However, it is 
possible to adjust female other job experience by considering their possible marital 
status4, the number of children and other relevant issues. The estimated results with 
an adjusted labour market experience variable compared with those with the 
unadjusted data are shown in Appendix B. With an adjusted other job experience 
proxy the rate of return to education for women is even higher than that estimated 
with the unadjusted other job experience proxy.
A second reason why women earn a higher return to education has been suggested by 
Psacharopoulos (1985) who explains the higher rate of return to education for women 
by the fact that educated women tend to work more weeks per year and a greater 
number of hours than uneducated women5.
This is unlikely to be an important explanation for the higher rate of return to 
education for women compared with men in the TVP sector. The dependent variable 
used in the wage equation in this study is the daily wage in log form. Compared with 
either the weekly or yearly wage, it provides relatively accurate information for 
computing the rate of return to education. Besides, according to the data, there is no
4 As marital status is not available in the data set, it is captured by the variable of age. For details on 
the adjustment, see Appendix B.
5 The basic idea behind Psacharopoulos’ explanation can be presented using the following example. 
Suppose there are two education levels, primary school and high school. The wage level for both men 
and women for high school graduates is $2.00 per hour, while for the primary school graduates it is 
$1.50 per hour. However, women high school graduates work 52 weeks a year and 40 hours per week 
and women primary school graduates work 40 weeks per year and 35 hours per week. For men of 
both high school and primary school graduates the labour market participation is the same. Under this 
situation, the estimated rate o f return to education will be higher for women than for men as the 
opportunity cost o f education for women is lower than that for men ($2100 for women and $3120 for 
men). But if hourly wage data are available, this will not be a serious problem.
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real difference in labour market participation between highly-educated women and 
less-educated women6
A third reason for the higher rate of return to education for women may be derived 
from differences in the demand for and supply of education between men and women 
(Sloane, 1985). As illustrated in Figure 8.2, in the education market, there are 
upward-sloping supply curves for education showing that as individuals increase their 
investment in education, the costs of funds increase. The downward-sloping demand 
curves indicate that, as individuals increase their investment in education, there will 
be deceasing rates of return. It is reasonable to suppose that in the developing 
countries women have a lower demand for education, say in Figure 8.2, than men 
(Dm). With identical supply curves, the rate of return to education should be higher 
for men than for women. However, it is also possible that the supply of education for 
women is less than that for men. In these circumstances, the rate of return to 
education for women might be lower, equal to, or even higher than that for men, 
depending upon the relative positions of the supply curves for women.
Figure 8.2
Demand for and supply of education
Return to Education
Quantity of Education
6 The average days worked per week for those who have 9 years or less than 9 years education is very 
close to that of those who have 12 years or more than 12 years education. For the former it is 6.46 
and for the latter it is 6.49.
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The different situations of demand for and supply of education for men and women 
may be a more suitable explanation for the fact that the rate of return to education is 
higher for women than for men. In this regard the most telling fact is that men are 
given preference over women for education in rural China. According to Knight and 
Li (1991), on average, men received more years of education than women in China. 
The national mean difference of the years of education between men and women is 
2.3 years. This gender difference is larger in the rural (2.5 years) than in the urban 
areas (1.8 years). Although the years of education is about the same for men and 
women in our sample, the rate of return to education is determined by the entire 
situation of supply of and demand for education for women in rural China.
This explanation, however, does not seem to be strong enough. There might be some 
other reasons at this stage, for example, firms' demand for male and female education 
might be different, and this will bring different rate of return to education for men 
and women.. Further research is needed to establish the relative importance of these 
explanations.
Further research is needed to enrich our knowledge about the difference between the 
role of education on male and female wage determinations.
8.2 A comparison of wage structure for male and female workers and staff 
separately
The second important difference between male and female wage determination is that 
the coefficient for firm tenure is much higher for women than for men. This 
difference is statistically significant (see Appendix A). This result may be caused by 
the difference between men and women in the staff-workers ratio. Table 8.1 indicates 
that the staff-workers ratio is much higher for men than for women. The results 
presented in Chapter 5 suggest that firm tenure is more important for the worker 
group.
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However, by comparing the regression results for male and female workers and staff 
separately it is shown that there are differences in the wage determination patterns of 
male and female staff. First, firm tenure is an insignificant determinant of male staff 
wage determination but is significant for the female staff group (see Table 8.3). 
Second, the ranks of the various labour market experience variables in male and 
female staff wage determination are slightly different. For the male staff group, 
agricultural experience is the most significant determinant of their wage structure, 
other non-agricultural experience ranks second, and firm tenure is insignificant. For 
the female staff group, other non-agricultural experience is the most important 
determinant. Agricultural experience is marginally significant (Table 8.4). Although a 
F-test shows that there is a structural change between the male and female workers, a 
pooled data test reveals that the difference is mostly attributable to one of the county 
dummies. For the staff group the F-test indicates that there is a structural change 
between the wage determination patterns for male and female staff and the pooled 
data analysis suggests that the significant difference is attributable to two main 
variables: firm tenure and other non-agricultural experience (see Appendix C)7.
7 F-tests are conducted which show that, in general, within each of the workers and staff groups, there 
is a structural change between men and women for both model 1 and model 2. For the staff group, 
F(9,°°)=4.17 for model 1 and F(ll,°o)=3.03 for model 2. For the workers group, F(9,°°)=9.39 for 
model 1 and F(ll,<»)=5.62 for model 2.
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Table 8.3
Model 1 for male and female workers and staff separately
w ork ers sta ff
m ale fem ale m ale fem ale
n=271 n=339 n=262 n=92
C onstan t 0.967 0.716 1.466 0.714
(7.56) (7.26) (9.96) (2.99)
S ch oo lin g -0.001 0.023 -0.009 0.018
(-0.08) (2.81) (-0.87) (1.07)
O th er jo b  ex p er ien ce  (O J)
OJ 0.015 0.016 0.031 0.027
(1.89) (1.48) (4.66) (1.48)
OJ2 -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0007 -0.0005
(-0.77) (-0.58) (-3.96) (-0.74)
F irm  ten u re  (F T )
FT 0.049 0.055 0.0002 0.063
(3.47) (3.86) (0.02) (2.08)
FT2 -0.002 -0.0017 0.0001 -0.002
(-2.91) (-2.51) (0.23) (-1.28)
C oun ty  d u m m ies
Jieshou -0.219 -0.230 -0.300 -0.352
(-3.70) (-4.94) (-4.96) (-3.01)
Shangrao -0.222 -0.401 -0.648 -0.650
(-2.87) (-4.42) (-7.80) (-4.30)
Nanhai 0.821 0.252 0.211 0.192
(8.22) (4.39) (2.93) (1.36)
B reu sch -P agan  C h i-S q u ared 36.31 (8) 54.09(8) 7.05 (8) 3.26 (8)
A d justed  R 2 0.41 0.31 0.33 0.39
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Table 8.4
Model 2 for male and female staff and workers separately
w orkers staff
male female male female
n=230 n=274 n=230 n=74
C onstant 1.012 0.742 1.494 0.770
(7.23) (6.91) (9.22) (3.14)
Schooling -0.014 0.016 -0.003 0.009
(-1.09) (1.72) (-0.29) (0.45)
F irm  tenu re  (FT)
FT 0.057 0.059 -0.002 0.053
(3.86) (3.62) (-0.13) (1.61)
FT2 -0.002 -0.002 0.0002 -0.0014
(-3.39) (-2.34) (0.32) (-0.88)
O ther non-agri. exp. (ON AJ)
ONAJ 0.024 0.012 0.014 0.062
(2.82) (0.92) (1.66) (2.74)
ONAJ2 -0.0005 0.0001 -0.0004 -0.002
(-1.92) (0.17) (-1.20) (-2.32)
A gri. experience (AEXP)
AEXP 0.012 0.010 0.026 0.036
(1.03) (0.26) (2.92) (1.75)
AEXP2 -0.0002 0.0002 -0.0007 -0.0009
(-0.35) (0.26) (-2.36) (-1.02)
County dum m ies
Jieshou -0.212 -0.195 -0.347 -0.305
(-3.21) (-3.73) (-5.35) (-2.50)
Shangrao -0.256 -0.385 -0.694 -0.686
(-2.96) (-3.44) (-8.07) (-4.33)
Nanhai 0.774 0.235 0.189 -0.027
(7.35) (3.61) (2.44) (-0.15)
B reusch-Pagan C hi-Squared 29.96(10) 50.54(10) 9.21 (10) 2.76(10)
A djusted R 2 0.40 0.30 0.35 0.40
These results have ruled out the possibility that the reason for the experience variables 
having different impacts on wage determination within the total sample of men and
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women is that the staff/workers ratio is higher for men than for women. More 
specifically, it might be concluded that the major difference of wage determination 
between men and women is attributable to the difference between the two staff 
groups. Female staffs wage structure is similar to that of both male and female 
workers but is different from that of male staff.
8.3 A comparison of male and female wage structures for the piece rate 
and time rate groups separately
In the male labour market, the wage structure for time rate workers is similar to that 
for piece rate workers rather than similar to that for time rate staff. It is important to 
know whether this pattern carries across to the female labour market.
Table 8.5 shows the regression results for female piece rate and time rate staff and 
workers separately, from which the following facts are observed:
(1) Firm tenure is a statistically significant determinant of wages for both female 
piece rate and time rate workers. Although the rate of return to firm tenure is quite 
high for female time rate staff, its t-ratio is not significant.
(2) Similar to the male labour market, other job experience is not statistically 
significant in piece rate and time rate workers’ wage determination, while it is quite 
important for time rate staffs wage determination.
(3) Education has a significant effect on the wages of both female piece rate workers 
and time rate workers, while it is insignificant for the wage determination of time rate 
staff.
To sum up, it seems that as was reported for the male labour market, the pattern of 
wage determination for female time rate workers is also close to that of piece rate 
workers. However, F-tests for structural change between piece rate and time rate 
workers, and between the time rate staff and time rate workers, indicate that the null-
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hypothesis of no structural change cannot be rejected in either case8 9. This suggests 
that, unlike in the male labour market, the wage determination pattern for the female 
time rate workers is not statistically different from that for the female time rate staff, 
and it is also similar to that for the female piece rate workers.
Table 8.5
Model 1 for female piece rate and time rate workers and staff separately9
piece rate time rate
workers workers staff
n=180 n=l55 n=62
Constant 0.485 0.810 0.846
(2.91) (6.81) (2.93)
Schooling 0.029 0.021 0.004
Other job  experience (OJ)
(2.37) (1.86) (0.19)
OJ 0.019 0.017 0.050
(1.10) (1.59) (2.26)
OJ2 -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0013
Firm tenure (FT)
(-0.50) (-0.81) (-1.65)
FT 0.128 0.038 0.062
(3.56) (2.40) (1.49)
FT2 -0.0078 -0..0007 -0.0027
County dummies:
(-3.11) (-1.03) (-1.24)
Jieshou -0.220 -0.251 -0.397
(-2.77) (-4.51) (-2.79)
Shangrao -0.292 -0.738 -0.871
(-2.59) (-8.08) (-3.90)
Nanhai 0.320 0.196 0.308
(3.71) (2.42) (1.63)
Breusch-Pagan Chi- 
Squared
30.22 (8) 25.07 (8) 8.52 (8)
Adjusted R 2 0.26 0.45 0.45
8 The F-test for structural change between the female piece rate and time rate workers is F(9,°° 
)=1.55. The result for the time rate workers and staff is F(9,«0=1.02. These test statistics are both less 
than the critical value of 1.88. Therefore, in both cases, the null-hypothesis of no structural change 
can not be rejected.
9 In this table, the results for piece rate staff are not reported. The reason is that the sample size is too 
small (26 observations) to get sensible results.
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8.4 The market and non-market groups separately
According to Chapter 6, the major differences in the structure of wage determination 
between the market and non-market male groups are the impacts of education and 
firm tenure. Education is significant in determining the earnings of the market group, 
as is firm tenure. For the non-market group, neither education nor firm tenure are 
significant. However, other job experience is very important in determining wages.
To understand whether the comparison of the wage structures of the market and non- 
market groups in the female labour market yields conclusions similar to the same 
pair-wise comparison in the male labour market, the results of separate estimations 
for the male and female market and non-market groups are reported in Table 8.6.
Table 8.6
Model 1 for male and female market and non-market groups separately
m arket non-m arket
women
n=137
men 
n= l 82
women
n=174
men
n=229
C onstan t 0.601 0.689 1.067 1.91
(3.50) (4.24) (7.07) (8.90)
Schooling 0.032 0.039 0.015 -0.007
O th e r jo b  experience (O J)
(2.19) (3.13) (151) (-0.68)
OJ 0.006 0.038 0.025 0.029
(0.30) (3.13) (2.29) (3.56)
OJ2 0.0002 -0.0007 -0.0005 -0.0008
F irm  ten u re  (FT)
(0.21) (-1.79) (-1.26) (-3.20)
FT 0.083 0.039 -0.029 0.007
(2.96) (2.05) (-1-62) (0.51)
FT2 -0.0027 -0.0007 0.002 -0.0003
C ounty dum m ies:
(-2.19) (-0.86) (2.50) (-0.47)
Jieshou -0.287 -0.263 -0.211 -0.185
(-3.95) (-3.61) (-2.92) (-3.12)
Shangrao -0.381 -0.382 -0.594 -0.496
(-2.39) (-3.12) (-8.81) (-6.97)
Nanhai 0.175 0.323 0.428 0.690
(1-82) (2.78) (4.78) (6.72)
B reusch-P agan C hi-Squared 24 .13(8) 6.93 (8) 32.93 (8) 23.92 (8)
A djusted R2 0.32 0.30 0.42 0.39
176
Comparing the results for the female market group to those for the female non-market 
group, it is noted that: (1) Similar to the situation in the male labour market, 
education plays an important role in wage determination for the female market group 
but is insignificant in the wage equation estimated for the non-market group in the 
female labour market. (2) Other job experience is insignificant in determining 
earnings for the female market group but is significant for the female non-market 
group. (3) Firm tenure is significant for the female market group's wage 
determination but insignificant for that of the non-market group. An F-test shows that 
there is a structural change of wage determination between the female market and 
non-market groups10. However, a pooled data test indicates that apart from firm 
tenure, the differences presented above are not statistically significant (see Appendix 
D for a pooled data test).
8.5 Conclusion
In this chapter we investigated the level of the gender wage differential and the 
differences in the structure of wage determination between men and women. The 
results are remarkably consistent with conjectures that may be made on the basis of 
knowledge of the male labour market in the TVP sector. The above analysis indicates 
that:
(1) In the TVP sector, female employees earn approximately 20 per cent less than 
men. This wage differential is higher for staff than that for workers.
(2) In general both the return to education and the returns to labour market 
experiences are higher for women than for men.
(3) The structure of wage determination for women is slightly different from that for 
men, that is, education has a significant effect on female wage determination but its 
effect is insignificant in total male wage determination. Apart from this difference,
10 F(9,°°)=3.31, which is greater than the critical value of 1.88.
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the impacts of the different experience variables on wage determination for the 
female staff group are different from those for male staff.
(4) The situation for the piece rate and time rate wage determination in the female 
labour market is similar to that in the male labour market. That is, in the female 
labour market, the wage structure for the time rate workers group is also close to that 
for the piece rate workers group. However, the disparity of the wage determination 
patterns for the time rate workers and staff is not statistically significant in the female 
labour market.
(5) The difference of wage determination patterns between the female market and 
non-market groups is similar to that in the male labour market.
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Appendix 8A
Pooled sample test for the differences of the coefficients for the two gender
groups
models
1 2 3 4
n=952 n=799 n=944 n=918
Constant 1.017 1.069 1.108 1.115
(10.69) (9.89) (11-51) (11.11)
Schooling 0.011 0.007 -0.002 -0.002
(1.66) (0.88) (-0.24) (-0.29)
O ther job  experience (O J)
OJ 0.029 0.025 0.025
(5.45) (4.75) (4.52)
OJ2 -0.0006 -0.0005 -0.0005
(-3.81) (-3.55) (-3.42)
Firm  tenure (FT)
FT 0.027 0.032 0.021 0.021
(2.74) (2.83) (2.12) (2.12)
FT2 -0.0007 -0.0009 -0.0006 -0.0007
(-1.89) (-2.09) (-1.79) (-1.82)
O ther non-agri. exp. (ONAJ)
ONAJ 0.023
(3.75)
ONAJ2 -0.0005
(-2.91)
Agri. experience (AEXP)
AEXP 0.025
(3.17)
AEXP2 -0.0005
(-2.01)
Occupational dummies:
Shift leader (SL) 0.096 0.101
(1.53) (1.55)
Operational personnel (OP) 0.107 0.125
(1.66) (190)
Technical personnel (TP) 0.141 0.128
(1.97) (1.80)
Ordinary staff (OS) 0.118 0.117
(2.06) (2.04)
Middle level staff (MS) 0.300 0.299
(4.73) (4.68)
No. of children in the family (N Q
NC 0.002
(0.10)
(continued overleaf)
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C ounty dum m ies:
Jieshou -0.277 -0.311 -0.258 -0.268
(-6.30) (-6.37) (-5.95) (-5.90)
Shangrao -0.437 -0.491 -0.403 -0.395
(-8.02) (-8.58) (-7.00) (-6.34)
Nanhai 0.529 0.481 0.536 0.538
(7.71) (6.61) (7.81) (7.50)
Fem ale dum m y -0.299 -0.353 -0.353 -0.373
(-2.32) (-2.48) (-2.70) (-2.75)
FEDU 0.011 0.011 0.020 0.021
(1.13) (0.98) (1.92) (1.95)
F O J -0.011 -0.007 -0.002
(-1.04) (-0.62) (-0.22)
F O J2 0.0003 0.0002 0.0001
(0.71) (0.50) (0.16)
FF T 0.030 0.026 0.033 0.033
(1.86) (1.40) (2.04) (1.96)
F F T 2 -0.001 -0.0009 -0.001 -0.001
(-1-42) (-1.06) (-1.51) (-1-47)
FO N A J 0.005
(0.35)
F O N A J2 -0.0003
(-0.48)
FA EX P -0.008
(-0.55)
FA EX P2 0.0005
(0.82)
FSL -0.206 -0.237
(-2.22) (-2.45)
FO P -0.155 -0.183
(-1.59) (-1.85)
FT P 0.103 0.120
(0.84) (0.97)
FO S -0.193 -0.161
(-1.70) (-1.37)
FM S -0.101 -0.086
(-0.85) (-0.72)
FN C -0.019
(-0.65)
FJS 0.019 0.094 0.008 0.037
(0.32) (1.38) (0.14) (0.58)
FSR -0.025 0.036 -0.036 -0.016
(-0.27) (0.33) (-0.37) (-0.16)
FN H -0.293 -0.284 -0.282 -0.277
(-3.39) (-3.02) (-3.26) (-3.07)
B reusch-Pagan C hi-Squared 96.2 (17) 95.2 (21) 115.9(27) 117.4 (29)
A djusted R2 0.37 0.37 0.39 0.39
Note: All the terms with F in front are the female interaction terms on the other variables.
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Appendix 8B
Comparison of regression results for the model with adjusted and unadjusted
other job experience for model 1
unadjusted adjusted
n=427 n=427
C onstant 0 .719 0.713
(8.28) (8.07)
Schooling 0.022 0.023
(3.10) (3.19)
O ther jo b  experience (O J)
OJ 0.018 0.018
(2.02) (1.93)
OJ2 -0.0003 -0.0003
(-0.75) (-0.62)
F irm  tenure (FT)
FT 0.058 0.060
(4.52) (4.69)
FT2 -0 .002 -0 .0018
(-2 .84) (-2.90)
C ounty dum m ies:
Jieshou -0.254 -0.256
(-5.92) (-5.97)
Shangrao -0.467 -0.468
(-6.07) (-6.08)
Nanhai 0 .235 0.234
(4.47) (4.45)
B reusch-P agan  C hi-Squared 37.91 (8) 38 .85 (8)
Ad justed R2 0.35 0.35
Note: The other job experience is adjusted as follows:
(1) for women aged less than 20, the adjusted total experience is equal to the unadjusted 
total experience because by China’s Marriage Law, women cannot marry until 20 years old;
(2) for women aged between 20 and 26, the adjusted total experience is calculated as 
unadjusted total experience minus 0.5 year. This is because the policy of "one family one child” was 
implemented towards the end of the 1970s. Women married after that until 1985 were aged 20 to 26. 
I assume that women in this age group have 1 or 2 children, so the maximum layoff is about half of 
one year;
(3) for women aged between 26 and 35, the adjusted total experience is calculated as 
unadjusted total experience minus 1 year, and for women older than 35 it is calculated as unadjusted 
total experience minus 2 years.
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Appendix 8C
Model 1 and 2 for data pooled across men and women
models
1 2
workers
n=606
staff
n=354
workers
n=504
staff
n=304
Constant 0.968 1.466 1.015 1.494
C7-55) (9.87) (7.24) (9.26)
Schooling -0.0002 -0.009 -0.013 -0.003
(-0.02) (-0.86) (-1.03) (-0.29)
Other job experience (O J)
OJ 0.014 0.031
(1.84) (4.62)
OJ2 -0.0002 -0.0007
(-0.72) (-3.92)
Firm tenure (FT)
FT 0.048 0.0002 0.055 -0.002
(3.36) (0.02) (3.71) (-0.13)
FT2 -0.0017 0.0001 -0.0019 0.0002
(-2.86) (0.23) (-3.31) (0.32)
Other non-agri. exp. (ONAJ)
ONAJ 0.024 0.014
(2.81) (1.67)
ONAJ2 -0.0005 -0.0004
(-1.92) (-1.21)
Agri. experience (AEXP)
AEXP 0.011 0.026
(1.00) (2.93)
AEXP2 -0.0001 -0.0007
(-0.32) (-2.37)
County dummies:
Jieshou -0.223 -0.299 -0.218 -0.347
(-3.75) (-4.91) (-3.26) (-5.37)
Shanrao -0.208 -0.648 -0.244 -0.694
(-2.64) (-7.73) (-2.74) (-8.10)
Nanhai 0.820 0.211 0.774 0.190
(8.22) (2.90) (7.34) (2.45)
Female dummy -0.253 -0.75 -0.274 -0.724
(-1.56) (-2.72) (-1.55) (-2.45)
FEDU 0.024 0.027 0.030 0.013
(1.68) (1.39) (1.89) (0.53)
FOJ 0.0018 -0.004
(0.13) (-0.20)
FOJ2 -0.0001 0.0002
(-0.20) (0.31)
(continued overleaf)
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FFT 0.006 0.063 0.003 0.055
(0.32) (1.93) (0.14) (1.50)
FFT2 0.00001 -0.002 0.0001 -0.0015
(0.02) (-1.30) (0.09) (-0.92)
FONAJ -0.012 0.047
(-0.74) (1.93)
FONAJ2 0.0006 -0.0019
(0.75) (-1.82)
FAEXP -0.0018 0.010
(-0.10) (0.43)
FAEXP2 0.0003 -0.0002
(0.43) (-0.24)
FJS -0.010 -0.053 0.019 0.042
(-0.14) (-0.41) (0.22) (0.30)
FSR -0.185 -0.001 -0.130 0.008
(-1.52) (-0.01) (-0.89) (0.04)
FNH -0.568 -0.019 -0.538 -0.217
(-4.94) (-0.12) (-4.34) (-1.09)
Breusch-Pagan Chi-Squared 97.84 (17) 10.31 (17) 83.44 (21) 12.60(21)
Adjusted R2 0.38 0.38 0.37 0.40 •
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Appendix 8D
Pooled data test for female market and non-market groups
(n=311)
v a r ia b le s co e ffic ien ts v a r ia b le s c o e ff ic ien ts
C o n s ta n t 1.067 M a r k e t  d u m m y -0 .466
(7 .82) (-2 .12 )
S c h o o lin g 0.015 MEDU 0 .168
(1 .51) (0 .95 )
O th e r  jo b  e x p e r ie n c e  (O J )
OJ 0.025 MOJ -0 .018
(2 .29) (-0 .80 )
OJ2 -0 .0005 MOJ2 0 .0007
(-1 .26) (0 .77 )
F i r m  te n u r e  (F T )
FT -0 .029 MPT 0.111
(-1 .62) (3 .37 )
FT2 0 .002 MFT2 -0 .0047  .
(2 .50) (-3 .21 )
C o u n ty  D u m m ie s :
Jieshou -0.211 MJS -0 .076
(-2 .92) (-0 .74 )
Shangrao -0 .594 MSR 0 .213
(-8 .81) (1 .23 )
Nanhai 0 .428 MNH -0 .253
(4 .78) (-1 .93 )
B re u s c h -P a g a n  C h i-S q u a re d 5 8 .2 7 (1 7 )
A d ju s te d  R 2 0.43
Note: All the terms with M in front are the market interaction terms on the other variables.
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9DECOMPOSITION OF GENDER WAGE DIFFERENTIALS WITHOUT 
CONSIDERING OCCUPATIONAL SEGREGATION
The wage differential between gender groups may be caused by two different factors: 
(1) a difference in productivity, and (2) discrimination. Within the second category 
there are two potential sources of discrimination-wage discrimination within the same 
occupation, that is unequal pay for equal work, and discrimination in the distribution of 
the male and female work forces across occupations.
This chapter assesses the influence of gender wage discrimination (without considering 
gender occupational segregation) on individual wage determination in the TVP sector.
9.1 Methodologies for estimating wage discrimination without considering 
gender occupational segregation
Estimating wage discrimination within an occupation
Gary Becker (1957), in The Economics o f Discrimination, first defmed the 
"discrimination coefficient" to measure the pure discrimination effect. His definition for 
the market discrimination coefficient is presented as:
M DC=(W JW f)-(W JW fp
where Wm and Wj are the equilibrium wage rates of men and women, respectively, 
and Wm° and W f  are the equilibrium wage rates without discrimination for males and 
females, respectively.
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In the extreme case, where men and women are perfect substitutes, Wm0=Wß and so 
the market discrimination coefficient becomes:
MDC=(Wm-Wf)/Wf
The main problem for estimating Becker's MDC is to estimate (WJWßP. This is 
unobservable. Blinder (1973), however, developed a simple approach to enable the 
female/male wage differential to be decomposed into the portion due to differing 
individual characteristics, such as the differences in education and experience, and the 
portion due to discrimination.
Assume that the wage equations for the male (m) and female (f) groups are as 
follows:
inw r = ß 0m+ j ] ß Jmx ; + u r  a )
M
l n W ' = ß ' + ± ß ( X ' + u {  (2)
7=1
where X is a vector of human capital variables and the ßs are coefficients.
From equations 1 and 2, the estimated difference in the mean logarithms of male and 
female wages can be derived as:
R = (ßom- ß o ' )  + ( Z  ß ; x r  -  2  ß f x f ) (3)
j=i j=i
where the intercept term is typically attributed to discrimination (Thurow, 1969), and 
the slope term is further decomposed as:
Z P7*7 - 1  ß ß l = Z ß7 <*7 ~ */ >+t,*f <ß7 ~ ßf > <4>
j - i  j ~ i  j = i  j - i
The first term in the above equation evaluates the impact of endowment differences 
between men and women on their wage differential. The second term captures a 
portion of the differential attributable to differing coefficients.
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In summary, Blinder's decomposition of the wage differential may be written as 
follows:
R = (ßo -  ß i ) + z X f  ( ß ” -  ß f ) + £ ß ? (XJ- - X f  ) (5)
V.______________ _______________/  j = l  j= lTT
v ^  '  (i) *v  £ *  '
where the terms U and C are the portions of the differential attributable to 
discrimination, and the term E is the portion of the differential attributable to 
differing endowments.
Problems in estimating wage discrimination by using Blinder's approach
Several problems are associated with the estimation of wage discrimination using 
Blinder's (and also Oaxaca's) approach:
First, according to Oaxaca (1973), Mincer (1974), Blinder (1976) and Rosenzweig 
and Morgan (1976), the proxy of labour market experience (Mincer's approach: 
j=age-5-S) used in the estimating equation for women tends to over-estimate actual 
labour market experience. Therefore, the regression results for women will be biased 
and cannot represent their true wage structure. However, a number of methods have 
been used to eliminate this problem. Rummery (1989) summarized three of these 
methods. They are:
(i) Partitioning the female sample and focusing on single women who 
have more continuous labour force participation (e.g. Rosenzweig and 
Morgan, 1976).
(ii) Using worker characteristics such as marital status as crude 
measures of time out of the labour force (e.g. Fuchs, 1971; Oaxaca,
1973).
(iii) Imputing actual experience measures, either by ad hoc means or
on the basis of behavioural models of labour force participation (e.g.
Chapman and Miller, 1983; Zabalza and Arrufat, 1985).
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The method to be used in a study depends on data availability.
Second, there is an index number problem. Blinder's method implicitly (Oaxaca in his 
paper actually explicitly) assumes that if there was no discrimination either (1) the 
wage structure currently faced by women would also apply to men, or (2) the wage 
structure currently faced by men would also apply to women. Following Sloane's 
(1985) explanation, in the former case, the predicted male average earnings in the 
absence of discrimination (female structure as non-discriminatory norm) will be given 
by:
I n W ” = l n W r ( X " )  = f}> + £ / j / X
;'= i
where InWf is the female wage equation and X m is a vector of mean values of 
regressors of men. The second case involves predicting female average earnings 
assuming that the wage function for males would be the one that prevails in the 
absence of discrimination (male structure as non-discriminatory norm). In this 
instance the predicted female wage will be given by:
InW/  = l n W m( X f )= ß 0m + Y j ß p X f
j=i
where lnWm represents the male wage equation and X f  is a vector of mean values of 
independent variables of women.
Using Blinder's notation for the case of the female structure as the non-discriminatory
norm, the above relationship can be written as:
U + Cf  = In Wem -  In W m
E f = InW f -  In Wem
where the superscript /  in 0  and Ef represents the female weighted estimation. 
Similarly, when a male wage structure is used as a non-discriminatory norm, the 
decomposition of the wage differential between men and women can be presented as:
U + C m = InW/  -  l n W f 
E m -  l n W m -  InW/
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and the superscript m in Cm and Em represents the male weighted estimation.
The differences between these two estimations can be illustrated using the following 
diagram from Sloane (1985):
Figure 9.1
The Index Number Problem
Wage
"Men's wage
'omen's wage
characteristics
As Sloane points out, provided the male earnings function lies above the female 
function and is of steeper slope, for which there is generally some empirical evidence, 
the female weighted estimation of discrimination will always be larger than the male 
weighted estimation.
Thus, the question of which estimation should be used arises. Blinder's and Oaxaca's 
assumptions suggest two possible answers: (1) Assuming the male wage structure 
prevails in the absence of discrimination, discrimination implies an aversion to the 
female group but no favouritism towards the male group. In this case, men will be paid 
according to their labour productivity and women will be paid less than their labour 
productivity. Therefore, the male weighted estimation should be used. (2) Assuming 
the female wage structure would prevail in the absence of discrimination, 
discrimination implies favouritism towards men while women will be paid according to
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their labour productivity. In this case, the elimination of discrimination implies that 
female weighted estimations should be used.
However, the basic assumptions of Blinder's and Oaxaca's approach have been 
criticized. Cotton (1988) points out that the main flaw in their decomposition 
procedure is the failure to portray adequately the most critical of Becker’s original 
conditions, that is, the wage structure that would prevail in the absence of 
discrimination. He argued that if it is assumed that women would receive the same 
wage in the absence of discrimination, women would have no particular economic 
reason for desiring an end to such discrimination since their wages would be unaffected 
by the change and the only other effect would be to lower male wages. On the other 
hand, if it is assumed that the male wage structure would prevail in the absence of 
discrimination, men would have no motivation to end discrimination since their own 
wage would not be affected thereby. Hence, Cotton suggested that in reality, not only 
is the group discriminated against undervalued, but the preferred group is overvalued, 
and the undervaluation of the one subsidizes the overvaluation of the other. Thus, the 
male and female wage structures are both functions of discrimination and we would 
not expect either to prevail in the absence of discrimination1.
He then suggested a new approach to decompose the gender wage differential which is 
shown in the following formula:
inWm - i n W  = £ .  ß ]  (x ; - x ' ) + ' £ j x ” ( ß ; - ß j > + 2 .  x ;  < ß ]  -  ß f )
where ß* represents the non discriminatory wage structure. However, ß* is still 
unobservable. Hence, Cotton made three strong assumptions: (1) in the absence of
11 am not quite convinced of Cotton's argument about Oaxaca's and Blinder’s assumptions. In the case 
of employee discrimination, when the female wage is undervalued, then although males have no 
motivation to end discrimination, females do. The market clearing level of the female wage will be 
determined by the demand situation for females. In the case of employer discrimination, the end of 
discrimination depends on neither men nor women. Therefore, Cotton's argument is irrelevant here. 
When the male wage is overvalued, females might also have a motivation to end discrimination if 
psychological effects are important In this case the market clearing level of the female wage is also 
determined by the demand for female labour.
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discrimination men would receive a lower average wage than they currently receive 
and women would receive a higher average wage. That means:
(2) ß* is specified as a linear function of ßm and ß7; (3) it is assumed that the non- 
discriminatory wage structure will be closer to the one which accounts for the 
majority rather than the minority.
According to these assumptions Cotton estimates ß* as
P* = /"P"+/,P/
where f m and f f are the proportions of men and women in total employees.
Most authors provide both male weighted and female weighted estimations so as to 
show the range of the discrimination effect. Some take a simple average of male and 
female weighted estimations to give a single measure (Sloane, 1985), while Cotton 
(1988) suggests that a weighted average of male and female weighted estimations will 
be more accurate than the other estimations2.
2 In my view, Oaxaca's assumptions seem reasonable in terms of mathematical relativity. When we 
compare the wage differential between men and women, one of them has to be the standard to which 
the other can be compared. In this case both statements of overvaluation of the male wage and of 
undervaluation of the female wage are acceptable, depending on which is chosen to be the standard. 
However, when the estimation concerns economics, one of Oaxaca's assumptions is impossible in a 
competitive setting. With employer discrimination, if the female wage reflects female labour 
productivity and the male wage is overvalued, employers have to pay something more than the value 
of marginal productivity to men. In this case it is only possible for an employer to employ men (who 
are the employees he favours) if women (the group of employees he is averse to) are paid less than 
their labour productivity. In this case the gap between female labour productivity and the female 
wage can subsidize the overvaluation of male wage. This is the case described by Cotton (1988). In 
the case of employee discrimination where women and men are not fully substitutable, employers 
will also undervalue the female wage in order to subsidize the male wage. However, in both cases, 
the numbers of women and men employed have to be equal or the former greater than latter, 
otherwise employers will lose.
The assumption that the male wage structure is that which would prevail in the absence of 
discrimination is reasonable both in terms of mathematics and economics.
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9.2 Wage discrimination without considering differences in occupational 
distribution
The above analysis gives a qualitative view about how the pay of women and men 
differs. However, it does not tell how much of the difference in their pay is due to 
different labour productivity and how much of it is due to discrimination. In this 
section the question is answered by adopting the approaches proposed by Blinder 
(both male and female weighted estimations) and Cotton.
One of the weaknesses of Blinder's approach is that if important explanatory variables 
are omitted from the wage regression, the decomposition of the wage differential will 
be biased (Sloane, 1985). To avoid the possibility of over- or under-estimation of 
discrimination, both models 1 and 3 are used.
Discrimination for total employees. According to Table 8.1 in Chapter 8, the 
overall differential in the mean value of the natural logarithm of the daily wage 
between men and women is 1.35-1.15=0.20. However, as the data size used for each 
particular model is different, the overall wage differentials are not the same for 
different models. For model 1, ln(W)m= l.375, ln (W /= l.149, and therefore the overall 
wage differential for the gender groups is 1.375-1.149=0.226. For model 3, 
ln(W)T=l .374, ln (W /= l.150, and the overall wage differential is 0.224. The mean 
values and coefficients for models 1 and 3 are presented in Appendix A, Tables A1 
and A2, respectively.
Tables 9.1 and 9.2 summarize the earnings differential attributable to endowments and 
that attributable to coefficients.
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Table 9.13
Structural analysis of the male/female wage differential (model 1)
male female Cotton
$m(Xm-Xf) x/(ßm-ßO $(Xm-Xf) Xm(ßm-ßO $*(Xm-Xf) Xm(ßm-ß*j
Schooling 0.005348 -0.09049 0.010744 -0.09589 0.007758 -0.04283 -0.05007
OJ 0.06867 0.085759 0.04289 0.11154 0.057154 0.049825 0.047451
OJ2 -0.04616 -0.03232 -0.02308 -0.0554 -0.03585 -0.02475 -0.01788
FT 0.03824 -0.13419 0.080069 -0.17602 0.056925 -0.07863 -0.07425
FT2 -0.01953 0.035177 -0.04708 0.062729 -0.03184 0.028021 0.019463
Jieshou -0.00521 -0.00529 -0.00483 -0.00567 -0.00504 -0.00253 -0.00293
Shangrao -0.00393 0.002558 -0.00415 0.002784 -0.00403 0.001244 0.001415
Nanhai -0.04158 0.070816 -0.0185 0.047739 -0.03127 0.021325 0.039183
Sub-total -0.00415 -0.06798 0.036052 -0.10818 0.013807 -0.04832 -0.03761
U 0.2977 0.2977 0.2977
c -0.06798 -0.10818 -0.08594
D=U+C 0.22972 0.18952 0.211763
E -0.00415 0.036052 0.013807
Total 0.22557 0.225572 0.22557
D/Total 1.018 0.840175 0.938791
E/Total -0.018 0.159825 0.061209
Note: E represents the amount attributable to the endowment differential; C represents the amount 
attributable to the coefficient differential; D represents the total differential attributed to 
discrimination; and D+E is the total gender wage differential.
3 Total wage differentials calculated in Table 8.10 and 8.11 are slightly different from the actual total 
differentials (0.22557 vs 0.226 for model 1 and 0.2242 vs 0.224 for model 3). The difference derives 
from rounding errors. This explanation is also applicable for the case of Appendix B, where the total 
wage differentials are calculated for workers and staff separately.
193
Table 9.2
male female Cotton
$m (Xm -Xf) $f(Xm -Xf) Xm(ßm-ßO $*(Xm -Xf) X m ($r-$*)
Schooling -0.00091 -0.16332 0.00876 -0.17299 0.003405 -0.07719 -0.09045
O J 0.059341 0.050586 0.044095 0.065832 0.052538 0.029374 0.028015
O J2 -0.0417 -0.02223 -0.02566 -0.03827 -0.03455 -0.01707 -0.01231
FT 0.02904 -0.14709 0.073883 -0.19193 0.049049 -0.08564 -0.08146
F T 2 -0.01761 0.035973 -0.04521 0.063574 -0.02993 0.028367 0.019922
SL 0.002669 0.014556 -0.00311 0.020335 8.99E-05 0.009073 0.008061
OP 0.004438 0.006227 -0.00202 0.012688 0.001555 0.005661 0.003449
TP 0.013506 -0.00244 0.023464 -0.0124 0.017949 -0.00553 -0.00135
OS 0.008245 0.004976 -0.00537 0.018593 0.00217 0.008296 0.002756
MS 0.013735 0.004791 0.009073 0.009454 0.011655 0.004219 0.002654
Jieshou -0.00475 -0.0023 -0.00459 -0.00246 -0.00468 -0.0011 -0.00127
Shangrao -0.00357 0.003743 -0.0039 0.004066 -0.00372 0.001814 0.002073
N anhai -0.04146 0.068231 -0.01958 0.046355 -0.03169 0.020684 0.037786
Sub-total 0.020973 -0.14828 0.04983 -0.17714 0.033849 -0.07904 -0.08212
U 0.3515 0.3515 0.3515
c -0.14828 -0.17714 -0.16116
D=U+C 0.20322 0.17436 0.190342
E 0.020973 0.04983 0.033849
Total 0.224193 0.22419 0.224191
D/Total 0.906451 0.777733 0.849017
FYTotal 0.093549 0.222267 0.150983
The above estimates obtained using Blinder’s approach indicate that without 
occupational dummies, the proportion of the wage differential due to discrimination is 
84 per cent ( female weighted estimation) and 102 per cent (male weighted estimation) 
and the endowment differential accounts for 16 per cent and -2 per cent for female and 
male weighted estimations, respectively. If occupational dummies are included in the 
regression, the endowment differential accounts for 22 per cent and 9 per cent for 
female and male weighted estimations, respectively. Discrimination accounts for 78 per 
cent (female weighted) and 91 per cent (male weighted) of the total wage differential.
The proportion of the wage differential which is attributable to coefficient differences 
and the proportion due to endowment differences using different approaches can be 
summarized as follows:
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Table 9.3
Summary of decomposed wage differential for total employees
model 1 model 3
discrimination endowments discrimination endowments
Blinder (M) 101.8% -1.8% 90.65% 9.35%
Blinder (F) 84.02% 15.98% 77.77% 22.23%
Simple average 92.91% 7.09% 84.21% 15.79%
Cotton 93.88% 6.12% 84.90% 15.10%
The ratios of discrimination to endowments wage effects estimated using various 
methods are all much higher than the ratio for US white men and women (66 per cent) 
obtained by Blinder (1973) and the ratio for Malaysia (50 per cent to 70 per cent) 
obtained by Chua (1984)4 .
For workers and staff separately. As reported in Chapter 8, the wage gap between 
men and women for the staff group is larger than that for the workers group. It is 
worth noting whether the differences in the wage gap for the workers and staff groups 
mostly comes from the endowment differential or the coefficient differential. These 
calculations are based on the basic human capital model 1. The wage differential 
between male and female staff is ln(W)r-ln(W)f-1.475-1217-0258. For workers, 
ln(W)m-ln(Wy=l 281-1.129=0.152. The results of the structural analysis of the 
gender wage differential for workers and staff separately are displayed in Appendix 
B. The proportions due to discrimination and endowment differentials calculated 
using various methods are summarized in Table 9.4.
44 Chua calculated Malaysian wage discrimination by adopting Oaxaca's approach which is similar to 
Blinder’s approach.
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Table 9.4
Sum m ary of decomposed wage differential for workers and staff separately
w ork ers sta ff
discrim ination endowm ents discrim ination endowm ents
B lin d er  (M ) 140.31% -40.31% 105.88% -5.88%
B lin d er  (F ) 107.11% -7.11% 91.27% 8.73%
S im p le  avera g e 123.71% -23.71% 98.54% 1.46%
C otton 121.86% -21.86% 102.08% -2.08%
The analysis for staff and workers separately shows that although the gender wage gap 
for the workers group is smaller than that for the staff group, wage discrimination for 
the workers is more serious than that for staff.
For piece rate  workers. It is interesting to know whether wage discrimination is 
serious in determining the wage differential between male and female piece rate 
workers. The total log wage differential between male and female piece rate workers 
is 1.31-1.129=0 .181. The calculated decomposition of the wage differential is 
presented in Table 9.5.
Table 9.5
Sum m ary of decomposed wage differential between male and female piece rate
workers
discrim ination endowm ents
B in d er  (M ) 210.4% -110.4%
B lin d er (F) 288.9% -188.9%
S im p le  average 249.7% -149.7%
C otton 258.3% -158.3%
Surprisingly, the estimated portion which can be attributed to discrimination is 
extremely high among male and female piece rate workers. This suggests that the TVP 
firms might set a different wage rate for each piece produced by men and women. It is 
similar to the case of the old work-point system, where there was a well-known 
unwritten rule for evaluation of working-points between men and women. The rule
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was that women would receive one or two points less than men even if they did the 
same job and made the same contribution.
9.3 Conclusion
In this chapter we investigated the degree of wage discrimination (without considering 
the difference in occupational attainment between men and women which will be 
analysed in the next chapter) in the TVP sector. The main findings can be summarized 
as follows:
(1) Ignoring any difference in occupational attainment between men and women, wage 
discrimination in the TVP sector is greater than that found in the United States and 
Malaysia.
(2) Within the TVP sector, wage discrimination is more serious for workers than for 
staff, though the wage differential is larger for the staff group than that for the workers 
group.
(3) Wage discrimination is extremely serious for the piece rate workers. This suggests 
that TVP firms pay a different rate for each piece produced by men and women.
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Appendix 9A
Table Al
Mean values and coefficients for men and women separately (model 1)
ßm y ß* ßw-ß/‘ ßOT-ß* p * - y X m x f X m-X f
C onstant
Schooling
1.0164
0.0111
0.7187
0.0223
0.883417
0.016103
0.2977
-0.0112
0.132983
-0.005
0.164717
-0.0062 8.5614 8.0796 0.4818
O J 0.0293 0.0183 0.024386 0.011 0.004914 0.006086 10.14 7.7963 2.3437
O J2 -0.00058 -0.00029 -0.00045 -0.00029 -0.00013 -0.00016 191.03 111.44 79.59
FT 0.0277 0.058 0.041235 -0.0303 -0.01354 -0.01676 5.8091 4.4286 1.3805
FT2 -0.00073 -0.00176 -0.00119 0.00103 0.00046 0.00057 60.902 34.152 26.75
Jieshou -0.2744 -0.2544 -0.26547 -0.02 -0.00893 -0.01107 0.2836 0.2646 0.019
Shangrao -0.4413 -0.4667 -0.45265 0.0254 0.011346 0.014054 0.1096 0.1007 0.0089
N anhai 0.529 0.2354 0.397849 0.2936 0.131151 0.162449 0.1626 0.2412 -0.0786
Table A2
Mean values and coefficients for men and women separately (model 3)
ßm
_ J L ß* ßm-ß/r ß m-ß* ß * -y X m x f x m- x f
C onstant
Schooling
1.1054
-0.0019
0.7539
0.0183
0.948561
0.007113
0.3515
-0.0202
0.156839
-0.00901
0.194661
-0.01119 8.5638 8.0851 0.4787
O J 0.0253 0.0188 0.0224 0.0065 0.0029 0.0036 10.128 7.7825 2.3455
O J2 -0.00052 -0.00032 -0.00043 -0.0002 -8.9E-05 -0.00011 191.33 111.13 80.2
FT 0.0215 0.0547 0.036314 -0.0332 -0.01481 -0.01839 5.781 4.4303 1.3507
FT2 -0.00067 -0.00172 -0.00114 0.00105 0.000469 0.000581 60.547 34.26 26.287
SL 0.0948 -0.1105 0.003195 0.2053 0.091605 0.113695 0.09905 0.0709 0.02815
OP 0.1064 -0.0485 0.037284 0.1549 0.069116 0.085784 0.08191 0.0402 0.04171
TP 0.1401 0.2434 0.186192 -0.1033 -0.04609 -0.05721 0.12 0.0236 0.0964
OS 0.1159 -0.0755 0.030497 0.1914 0.085403 0.105997 0.09714 0.026 0.07114
MS 0.2984 0.1971 0.2532 0.1013 0.0452 0.0561 0.09333 0.0473 0.04603
Jieshou -0.2552 -0.2466 -0.25136 -0.0086 -0.00384 -0.00476 0.2857 0.2671 0.0186
Shangrao -0.4059 -0.4427 -0.42232 0.0368 0.01642 0.02038 0.1105 0.1017 0.0088
N anhai 0.5363 0.2533 0.410025 0.283 0.126275 0.156725 0.1638 0.2411 -0.0773
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Appendix 9B
Table Bl
Mean values and coefficients for male and female workers and staff separately
W orkers ßm V ß* ßm-ß /‘ ßm-ß* X m x f x m-x1
C onstant 0.9673 0.71566 0.827464 0.25164 0.139836 0.111804
Schooling -0.00087 0.02317 0.012489 -0.02404 -0.01336 -0.01068 7.631 7.8289 -0.1979
O J 0.01469 0.01638 0.015629 -0.00169 -0.00094 -0.00075 8.679 7.4336 1.2454
O J2 -0.00018 -0.00028 -0.00024 0.0001 5.56E-05 4.44E-05 142.78 103.79 38.99
FT 0.04928 0.055 0.052459 -0.00572 -0.00318 -0.00254 5.07 4.0324 1.0376
F T 2 -0.0017 -0.00166 -0.00168 -4E-05 -2.2E-05 -1.8E-05 48.613 27.602 21.011
Jieshou -0.2186 -0.23 -0.22493 0.0114 0.006335 0.005065 0.31365 0.28319 0.03046
Shangrao -0.222 -0.401 -0.32147 0.179 0.09947 0.07953 0.11808 0.10029 0.01779
Nanhai 0.8206 0.2516 0.504407 0.569 0.316193 0.252807 0.17712 0.27139 -0.09427
Staff ßm V ß* ßOT-ß/' ßm-ß* ß * - y X m x f x m-x f
C onstant 1.466 0.71393 1.270537 0.75207 0.195463 0.556607
Schooling -0.00867 0.01847 -0.00162 -0.02714 -0.00705 -0.02009 9.519 8.978 0.541
O J 0.031335 0.02742 0.030317 0.003915 0.001018 0.002897 11.676 9.1957 2.4803
O J2 -0.00074 -0.00052 -0.00068 -0.00023 -5.8E-05 -0.00017 240.33 141.09 99.24
FT 0.00024 0.062947 0.016538 -0.06271 -0.0163 -0.04641 6.6298 5.88 0.7498
F T 2 0.000114 -0.00189 -0.00041 0.002005 0.000521 0.001484 74.324 57.793 16.531
Jieshou -0.2991 -0.3519 -0.31282 0.0528 0.013723 0.039077 0.2481 0.18478 0.06332
Shangrao -0.6484 -0.64966 -0.64873 0.00126 0.000327 0.000933 0.0992 0.0978 0.0014
N anhai 0.21068 0.19179 0.20577 0.01889 0.00491 0.01398 0.145 0.1304 0.0146
Table B2
Structural analysis of the male/female wage differential for workers and staff
male female Cotton
W orkers $ m ( X m -X f) X'/(ßm-ßO $ f ( X m -X f) x m( ßm-ßO ß*(X m -X f) X m ( $ m - $ * ) ^cß * -ß 0
Schooling 0.000172 -0.18821 -0.00459 -0.18345 -0.00247 -0.10194 -0.08362
O J 0.018295 -0.01256 0.0204 -0.01467 0.019465 -0.00815 -0.00558
O J2 -0.00702 0.010379 -0.01092 0.014278 -0.00918 0.007934 0.004611
FT 0.051133 -0.02307 0.057068 -0.029 0.054431 -0.01612 -0.01025
F T 2 -0.03572 -0.0011 -0.03488 -0.00194 -0.03525 -0.00108 -0.00049
Jieshou -0.00666 0.003228 -0.00701 0.003576 -0.00685 0.001987 0.001434
Shangrao -0.00395 0.017952 -0.00713 0.021136 -0.00572 0.011745 0.007976
N anhai -0.07736 0.154421 -0.02372 0.100781 -0.04755 0.056004 0.068609
Subtotal -0.0611 -0.03896 -0.01077 -0.08929 -0.03313 -0.04962 -0.01731
U 0.25164 0.25164 0.25164
C -0.03896 -0.08929 -0.06693
D=U+C 0.21268 0.16235 0.184712
E -0.0611 -0.01077 -0.03313
Total 0.15158 0.15158 0.151582
D/Total 1.403087 1.071052 1.218562
E/Total -0.40309 -0.07105 -0.21856
(continued overleaf)
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Staff $ m (X m -X f) x/(ßm-ß0 § f (X m -X f) X"Yßm-ßO $ * ( X m -X f) X m(  ßm-ß*) tfrß'-ßO
Schooling -0.00469 -0.24366 0.009992 -0.25835 -0.00087 -0.06714 -0.18033
O J 0.07772 0.036001 0.06801 0.045712 0.075196 0.01188 0.026644
O J2 -0.07344 -0.03175 -0.05111 -0.05407 -0.06763 -0.01405 -0.02349
FT 0.00018 -0.36872 0.047198 -0.41573 0.0124 -0.10805 -0.27289
FT2 0.001885 0.115875 -0.03126 0.14902 -0.00673 0.03873 0.085759
Jieshou -0.01894 0.009756 -0.02228 0.0131 -0.01981 0.003405 0.007221
Shangrao -0.00091 0.000123 -0.00091 0.000125 -0.00091 3.25E-05 9.12E-05
N anhai 0.003076 0.002463 0.0028 0.002739 0.003004 0.000712 0.001823
Subtotal -0.01511 -0.47991 0.022439 -0.51746 -0.00535 -0.13449 -0.35518
U 0.75207 0.75207 0.75207
c -0.47991 -0.51746 -0.48967
D=U+C 0.27216 0.23461 0.262403
E -0.01511 0.022439 -0.00535
Total 0.25705 0.257049 0.257053
D/Total 1.058782 0.912705 1.020813
FTTotal -0.05878 0.087295 -0.02081
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10
THE DETERMINANTS AND ROLE OF OCCUPATIONAL
SEGREGATION
The gender wage differential and the differences between the wage determination 
patterns of men and women (without considering the difference in occupational 
attainments) were analysed in Chapters 8 and 9. However, economic theory claims 
that differences in occupational attainment play an important role in the explanation 
of gender wage differentials. In this chapter, two major issues concerning 
occupational attainment will be addressed. The first concerns the determinants of 
female occupational attainment and whether they are similar to those of male 
occupational attainment. The second is whether the difference in occupational 
attainment between men and women has an impact on the gender wage differential in 
the TVP sector. A comparison of wage discrimination between the TVP sector and 
other developing and industrial countries will also be undertaken in this chapter.
10.1 Methodology for estimating wage discrimination by considering 
occupational segregation
Blinder's approach (1973) (Chapter 9) is mainly focused on wage discrimination 
without considering the difference in occupational attainment between men and 
women. He incorporated occupational dummy variables into the wage equation to 
mitigate the impact of the different occupational distributions of the gender groups on 
the gender wage differential.
Prior to the model of Brown, Moon and Zoloth (1980), few studies tried to 
incorporate differences in occupational distribution between men and women into the 
conventional decomposition developed by Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973). Some
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studies, such as Zellner (1972) and Stevenson (1975), did attempt to estimate the 
effect of occupational discrimination on wage differentials. However, these studies 
make only a simple adjustment for differences in average productivity between men 
and women.
Brown, Moon and Zoloth's (1980) model is more comprehensive. They decomposed 
the total wage differential between men and women into components related to 
within-occupation wage differences, denoted wages, and occupational discrimination, 
denoted occupations, as follows1:
w m -  w f = -  p f w / )
=  1  j (p "a ?- r f< * l ) + 'Z i (p ’ K P "
= £ / /« ■  -a' -xf Pf
" wÄSEs '  "  OCCUPATION
where: j  as a subscript represents occupations;
Pjm is the proportion of male observations in the y'th occupation;
/y  is the proportion of female observations in the y'th occupation;
The component of the wage differential labelled "wages" was further decomposed by 
Brown, Moon and Zoloth into a portion due to differences in productivity (PD) and a 
portion attributable to discrimination (WD) between men and women as follows:
w a g e s  = ' E . P / x f  ( ß r  - ß / ) + £ . p / ß ; ( x~  - x f )
' WB] /  "  JpB] "
Similarly, the component labelled "occupations" was further decomposed into a 
portion relating to differences in the structure of occupational attainment between 
men and women (OD) and a portion relating to differences in qualifications for the 
occupation (QD) as follows:
OCCUPATION = Y  Wjm(P" - P / )  + Y  i (Pf -  )
v W) ' V (ÖB) '
1 In their paper the decomposed term "wages" is different from that shown here. Instead of 
xfof)* their formula is (xfoJm-xJm$f). The detailed derivation is shown in appendix A.
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where the new term Pf  represents the proportion of women in the sample who would 
be in occupation j  if women faced the same occupational structure as men. Thus the 
full model becomes:
w m -  w< = £ .  /» '( a ;  -  a / ) + £ .  P/Xf (ß Z,  p! ß ? -  X f >
V " '  ___  (WÖ) " S ( ^ )  "
+ Z, -P/) + Z; W'/V/ - )
' (235 "' W) '
Brown, Moon and Zoloth defined I and WD as unjustified differences in within- 
occupation wages, PD as the justifiable within-occupation wage differential, and QD 
and OD as the justifiable and unjustifiable portions of occupational segregation, 
respectively. Terms that are justifiable capture the wage differentials due to 
differences in characteristics between men and women, while those which are 
unjustifiable capture the wage differential due to discrimination.
The way Brown, Moon and Zoloth estimated wage discrimination can be summarised 
as follows:
(1) Estimate a wage equation for men only for each occupational group to get the 
coefficients ß;m and
(2) Use the multinomial (or binomial) logit model (which is used depends on how 
many occupational groups there are) of occupational attainment to estimate Pj
(proportion of women in occupation k if they faced the same structure of occupational 
attainment as men);
(3) Estimate the predicted average wage for women (TW) if they attained occupations 
and received wages within occupations according to the same occupational and wage- 
attainment structures as men using the formula:
7W=Z / / w i f i  ? + < * ? )
The predicted average wage for women minus the actual average wage for women 
divided by the total actual wage difference between men and women is the proportion
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of the wage differential between men and women due to endowment differences. The 
rest of the wage differential is due to discrimination.
(4) They also estimated two partial wage discrimination coefficients2 :
PWj is the partially adjusted wage due to endowment differences within occupations 
and is defined as:
w ,  = £ . / > '( * / / ? ; + a;)
while PW2 is the partially adjusted wage due to differences in occupational 
distributions between men and women and is given by:
PW2 = £ //(* //? / + « / )  = Zf/w/
Brown, Moon and Zoloth’s method is superior to Blinder’s and Oaxaca 's where the 
occupational distributions of the gender groups differ appreciably. Since there is a big 
difference of occupational distribution between men and women in the TVP sector, 
Brown, Moon and Zoloth's approach is adopted.
10.2 Comparison of women’s occupational attainment with men's
The determinants of occupational attainment for men were estimated in Chapter 6. 
The results show that three main variables (education, other job experience and firm 
tenure) are very important in determining an individual's occupation for both the 
binomial and the multinomial logit models.
To capture whether the pattern of determinants of occupational attainment for women 
is similar to that for men, both binomial and multinomial logit models have been
2 These two partial adjustments normally do not sum to the total unexplained portion because of an 
index number problem (see Section 1 of Chapter 6).
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estimated for women. The comparison of the results of the binomial model for 
women with those for men is presented in Table 10.1.
Table 10.13
Comparison of binomial logit estimated results of female and male occupational
attainment
(0=workers, l=staff)
women men
coefficient t-ratio coefficient t-ratio
Constant -3.850 -6.00 -5.153 -9.03
Schooling 0.219 4.03 0.435 8.95
OJ 0.050 2.63 0.085 6.65
FT 0.139 4.35 0.115 5.37
Jieshou -0.745 -2.18 -0.393 -1.61
Shangrao -0.125 -0.29 -0.397 -1.18
Nanhai -1.261 -3.12 0.094 0.31
Note*: (1) Total male sample=531. Total female sample=424.
(2) Likelihood ratio=294.35, x2=145.84, pseudo R2=0.20 (male binomial logit model).
(3) Likelihood ratio=188.12, x2=56.82, pseudo R^O.131 (female binomial logit model).
The marginal effects of the three main variables for women are also estimated5. They 
are shown in Table 10.2 together with those for men.
Table 10.2
Marginal effects of three main variables for women and men
women men
Schooling 0.0504 0.0726
OJ 0.0102 0.0210
FT 0.0328 0.0276
Tables 10.1 and 10.2 demonstrate that all three main variables (education, other job 
experience and firm tenure ) have important impacts on determining who will become 
a staff member for both male and female groups. This implies that both male and 
female employees who are better educated, have longer firm tenure and other job
3 The total male samples for the binomial and multinomial logit models in Chapter 6 are different 
from those reported in this Chapter. The reason is that in Chapter 6 a group of people who got their 
job through introduction by their relatives and friends is excluded from the total male sample.
4 The methodology for calculating the Chi-Squared and pseudo R2 is reported in footnote 9, Chapter
6.
5 The method of estimation can be found in Chapter 5.
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experience are more likely to be in the staff group. Comparing the marginal effects of 
these three variables for men to those for women, it appears that both education and 
other job experience are more important determinants for male occupational 
attainment, while firm tenure is more important for female occupational attainment.
Multinomial logit results for women and men for four occupational levels6 are shown 
in Table 10.3, where the workers group is used as the reference category. Table 10.4 
presents occupational rankings by size of coefficient on the three main variables
Table 10.3
Multinomial results of female and male occupational attainment
______________________ (workers=0)______________________
shift leader ordinary staff middle level staff
women men women men women men
Constant -3.750 -4.478 -5.427 -6.475 -7.082 -7.757
(-4-13) (-5.54) (-5.74) (-9.48) (-5.33) (-7.96)
Schooling 0.082 0.274 0.314 0.489 0.304 0.508
(1.04) (3.97) (3.98) (8.70) (2.91) (6.59)
OJ 0.037 0.030 0.052 0.104 0.085 0.094
(1.30) (1.45) (1.99) (7.30) (2.26) (4.69)
FT 0.100 0.070 0.108 0.109 0.294 0.184
(2.17) (2.26) (2.31) (4.37) (4.90) (5.89)
Jieshou -0.305 -0.576 -0.737 -0.112 -1.313 -0.991
(-0.56) (-1.41) (-1.58) (-0.40) (-1.74) (-2.27)
Shangrao 0.682 -0.231 -0.324 -0.047 -17.861 -1.984
(1.22) (-0.44) (-0.48) (-0.12) (-0.004) (-2.46)
Nanhai -0.529 0.506 -10.28 0.121 -19.395 -0.946
(-0.94) (1.24) (-1.85) (0.35) (-0.008) (-1.57)
Note: (1) t-ratios are shown in parentheses.
(2) For female sample
total=473, workers=366, shift leaders=30, ordinary staff=50, middle level staff=22;
(3) For male sample
total=531, workers=271, shift leaders=53, ordinary staff=157, middle level staff=50.
(3) Likelihood ratio=520.68, x ^ lS ö JS , pseudo R^O.16 (male multinomial logit model).
(4) Likelihood ratio=265.90, x2=89.84, pseudo R^O.14 (female multinomial logit model).
6 The reason for summing over the original six levels of occupation into four levels is that the sample 
size is too small for female technical personnel (n=12), operational personnel (n=21) and ordinary 
staff (n=18).
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Table 10.47
Occupational rankings by size of coefficient on education, other job experience
and firm tenure
W o m e n S .L . O .S . M .S .
S c h o o lin g 3 1 2
O th e r  j o b  ex p . 3 2 1
F ir m  te n u r e 3 2 1
M e n S .L . O .S . M .S .
S c h o o lin g 3 2 1
O th e r  j o b  e x p . 3 1 2
F ir m  te n u r e 3 2 1
Tables 10.3 and 10.4 show that a person with more education and with longer other 
job experience and firm tenure is more likely to be in a higher position in this 
administrative hierarchy for both men and women, though education and other job 
experience are not statistically significant determinants for female shift leaders. This 
picture implies that the pattem of occupational attainment among women is quite 
similar to that for men.
10.3 The impact of occupational attainment on the gender wage gap
The approach used by Brown, Moon and Zoloth (1980) to decompose the gender 
wage differential into differences in endowments and wage discrimination by 
considering differences in occupational distribution between men and women has 
been presented in Section 10.1. Their approach will be adopted here to determine (1) 
whether and to what extent the differences in occupational attainment between men 
and women is due to the difference in endowments of men and women and to what 
extent it is due to discrimination in occupational distribution; (2) whether and by how 
much this difference of occupational distribution between men and women has an 
impact on the gender wage differential in the TYP sector.
7 For detailed explanation of the table, see Chapter 6.
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Women's predicted occupational attainment
By calculating the predicted female occupational distribution the question of whether 
and to what extent the differences in occupational attainment between men and 
women is due to the difference in endowments of men and women and to what extent 
it is due to discrimination of occupational distribution can be answered.
The general procedures which were used to calculate the predicted female 
occupational distribution can be summarized as follows (Brown, Moon and Zoloth, 
1980):
(1) The parameters of the occupational attainment model for male observations are 
obtained by using binomial or multinomial logit models;
(2) The female data are then substituted into the estimated equation(s) producing for 
each woman a (vector of) predicted probabilities of belonging to each occupation;
(3) The predicted probabilities of being in each occupation are summed over 
observations to produce the predicted occupational distribution of women.
The first step of the above procedure was undertaken in Chapter 6 (the results are also 
presented in Table 10.1 for the binomial logit model and Table 10.3 for the 
multinomial logit model in this chapter).
Binomial results. By substituting female data into the estimated male binomial logit 
model and summing over the predicted probabilities of being in each occupation, a 
simulated occupational distribution of women is obtained. Table 10.5 exhibits the 
actual occupational distribution of men and women and the predicted distribution for 
women assuming women are treated the same as men in terms of occupational choice.
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Table 10.5
Predicted occupational distribution (binomial logit model)
w om en 's actual 
occu p ation a l 
d istrib ution
w om en 's p red icted  
occu p ation a l 
d istrib ution
m en 's actu a l 
o ccu p ation a l 
d istr ib u tion
W ork ers 336  (79.2% ) 259 (61.2% ) 270  (50.9% )
S ta ff 88 (20.8% ) 165 (38.8% ) 260 (49.1% )
S ta ff/W ork ers 26.2% 63.7% 96.3%
Table 10.5 shows that by treating women in the same way as men in terms of their 
occupational attainment, the proportion of women predicted to be staff will be 18 per 
cent higher than it actually is. However, it is still 10 per cent lower than the actual 
proportion of males in this category (see the figures in the parentheses). This result 
suggest that there is discrimination against women in terms of occupational 
distribution in the TVP sector.
Multinomial results. A multinomial logit model is also adopted to see which 
particular levels of staff women would be predicted to attain. The actual and predicted 
occupational attainment for females and the actual male occupational distribution are 
presented in Table 10.6.
Table 10.6
Predicted occupational distribution (multinomial logit model)
w o m en ’s actual 
occu p ation a l 
d istrib ution
w o m en 's p red icted  
o ccu p ation a l 
d istrib ution
m en 's  actual 
o ccu p ation a l 
d istrib ution
frequency % frequency % frequency %
W o rk ers 338 79.3 261 61 .2 271 51.0
S h ift  lead er 30 7 .0 43 10.2 53 10.0
O rd in a ry  s ta ff 38 8.9 94 22 .0 157 29 .6
M id d le  level s ta ff 20 4 .8 28 6.5 50 9 .4
The prediction of the female occupational distribution based upon the multinomial 
logit regression results suggests that, in the absence of discrimination, there would be 
a shift from female workers to female staff groups (about 18 per cent). The majority
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of the shift that does occur is from the workers group to the ordinary staff group 
(about a 13 per cent increase in the ordinary staff group). However, even with the 
absence of discrimination, the predicted female staff membership is still 10 per cent 
lower than that for men. This seems to suggest that the different occupational 
distributions of men and women are partly due to the endowment differentials 
between the two, and partly due to occupational segregation between gender groups. 
The binomial and the multinomial results are consistent with each other.
Calculation of discrimination by considering differences of occupational 
distribution
All the elements which are needed when calculating wage discrimination according to 
Brown, Moon and Zoloth’s approach have been derived in the previous sections. This 
sub-section intends to answer the second question raised, that is whether and by how 
much differences of occupational distribution between men and women impact on the 
gender wage differential in the TVP sector.
Before calculating the decomposition of the wage differential, it is worth noting two 
important points.
First, Brown, Moon and Zoloth (1980) suggest two different techniques. One is to 
estimate wage functions for each occupation and gender category and then use the 
results obtained to calculate I, WD, PD, QD and OD (defined in Section 10.1) and 
sum them to obtain the total gender wage differential. By dividing the sum of /  and 
WD by the total gender wage differential, the proportion of the within-occupational 
wage differential that is unjustifiable is obtained. Similarly, PD over the total wage 
differential is equal to the proportion of the within-occupational wage differential that 
is justifiable; QD and OD over the total wage differential are, respectively, equal to 
the justifiable and unjustifiable portions of occupational segregation. This can be 
called the decomposition technique.
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Brown, Moon and Zoloth did not adopt this technique. Instead they calculated a total 
predicted female wage (7W) and two partially adjusted predicted female wages (PWl 
and PW2) using the formulae presented in Section 10.1. This technique only considers 
a male estimated wage function and a female actual and predicted occupational 
attainment. This can be called the women predicted wage technique.
The weaknesses of this technique are as follows: when calculating PW} the inter- 
occupational wage discrimination is not considered; but when calculating PW2, the 
within-occupational wage discrimination is not considered. With these calculations, 
therefore, it is still impossible to judge exactly how much of the total gender wage 
differential is due to the differences in occupational attainment and how much is due 
to the within-occupational wage differences. The only result that can be deduced from 
the calculation of PWj and PW2 is the relative importance of occupational segregation 
versus wage discrimination within occupations.
Brown, Moon and Zoloth adopted the second technique, while some others adopted 
the first technique (Miller, 1987; Hawke, 1991). This study uses the decomposition 
technique.
Second, two different sets of calculated results, distinguished by the use of male and 
female mean values of regional dummies, are reported in this study. This strategy is 
adopted because there is a big difference between the regional distributions of men 
and women (see Table 10.7) and regional distribution has a relatively large impact on 
an individual's wage determination. Consequently, the use of the female mean values 
of the three regional dummies in estimating the female predicted average wage will 
distort the results. One way to avoid this problem is to further decompose the 
estimation according to the four regions (calculate each occupational group's 
predicted female average wage for each region separately). This method would 
require a larger sample for each region than is available in this study. An alternative 
approach must, therefore, be used to avoid this regional distortion. One alternative is
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to use male mean values of the three regional dummies to calculate female predicted 
wages so that the effect of the difference of regional distribution can be ignored. This 
methodology is used in this study. However, one shortcoming of this alternative is 
that the decompositions do not sum to the total gender wage differential. In this study, 
both the results with and without the regional effect are reported.
Table 10.7
Difference of regional distribution between men and women (%)
s t a f f w o r k e r s
total sh ift leader ordinary sta ff m id d le  lev e l s ta ff
m en w o m en m en w om en m en w om en m en w om en m en w om en
W u x i 50% 58% 43% 40% 46% 58% 70% 85% 39% 34%
J ie sh o u 25% 19% 21% 20% 29% 21% 18% 15% 31% 29%
S h a n g r a o 10% 10% 11% 20% 12% 8% 4% 0 12% 10%
N a n h a i 15% 13% 25% 20% 13% 13% 8% 0 18% 27%
T o ta l 2 6 0 88 53 30 157 38 5 0 2 0 2 6 8 3 3 4
Binomial results:
The decomposition of gender wage differentials for the binomial case (using the 
decomposition formula presented in Section 10.1) is presented in Table 10.8. The 
calculation is based on the results of wage equations estimated for female and male 
workers and staff separately (see Table 8.3 in Chapter 8) and mean values of all the 
variables for male and female workers and staff (presented in Appendix B)
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Table 10.8
Decomposition of gender wage differentials (binomial case)8
Female regional dummy Male regional dummy
value % of total value % of total
Total LDW differential 0.2225 100.0 0.2568 100.0
Intra-occupational 0.1677 75.4 0.2020 78.7
Justifiable (PD) -0.0566 -25.4 0.0167 6.5
Unjustifiable (I+WD) 0.2243 100.8 0.1853 72.2
Inter-occupational 0.0547 24.6 0.0547 21.3
Justifiable (QD) 0.0199 9.0 0.0199 7.7
Unjustifiable COD) 0.0348 15.6 0.0348 13.6
Total justifiable -0.0376 -16.4 0.0366 14.3
Total unjustifiable 0.2591 116.4 0.2201 85.7
The above results suggest that the gender wage differential in the TVP sector mainly 
comes from within-occupational wage discrimination (72 per cent to 100 per cent). A 
relatively small amount comes from discrimination of occupational attainment (14 to 
16 per cent).
As noted above, the difference between the regional distributions of male and female 
observations plays a very important role when calculating the decomposition of the 
gender wage differential. If the regional distribution is kept constant, the proportion 
of the gender wage differential due to discrimination (unjustifiable) is 86 per cent, 
while if the difference of regional distributions between men and women is also 
considered this ratio is increased sharply to 116 per cent. The main conclusion 
obtained from both estimations, however, does not change: within occupational wage 
discrimination is much more serious than occupational segregation.
Multinomial results:
8 In this table and Table 10.9, the total wage differentials reported in column 3 are not the actual 
differentials but the ones adjusted for regional effects (see page 210 about the methodology of the 
adjustment). In column 4, the percentage of decompositions are presented, where the adjusted total 
wage differentials are presented as 100 per cent.
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Table 10.9 presents the results of decomposition of gender wage differentials for five 
occupational groups (multinomial case).
Table 10.9
Decomposition of gender wage differentials (multinomial case)
Fem ale regional dum m y M ale regional dum m y
value % o f  total value % o f total
T o t a l  L D W  d i f f e r e n t i a l 0.2231 100.0 0.2515 100.0
I n t r a - o c c u p a t io n a l 0.1707 76.5 0.1991 79.2
Justifiable (PD) -0.0501 -22.5 0.0191 7.6
U njustifiable (I+W D ) 0.2208 99.0 0.1800 71.6
I n t e r - o c c u p a t i o n a l 0.0524 23.5 0.0524 20.8
Justifiable (QD) 0.0213 9.6 0.0213 8.5
U njustifiable (OD) 0.0311 13.9 0.0311 12.3
T o t a l  j u s t i f i a b le -0.0288 -12.9 0.0404 16.1
T o t a l  u n  j u s t i f ia b le 0.2519 112.9 0.2111 83.9
Calculations based upon the disaggregated occupational grouping brings some 
changes to the decomposition results. The most important change is that with the 
inter-occupational wage differential, the proportion attributable to discrimination 
decreases slightly (from 14-16 per cent to 12-14 per cent). At the same time the 
portion attributable to endowment differences increases (from 7-8 per cent to 8-9 per 
cent). These results suggest that the inter-occupational wage differential is attributable 
to both differences in productivity between men and women and occupational 
segregation.
Both binomial and multinomial results seem to suggest that, on average, about 80 per 
cent of the total wage differential can be attributed to discrimination. Of this, over 90 
per cent can be attributed to the within-occupational wage discrimination (about 70 
per cent of the total wage differential).
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10.4 Comparison with other developing and industrial countries
A number of studies dealing with decomposition of the gender wage differential are 
available for developing countries, but most have adopted Blinder's or Oaxaca's 
approach. Many studies based on Brown, Moon and Zoloth's approach are available 
for industrial countries.
Comparison with developing countries
Chua (1984) presents a decomposition of the gender wage differential for Malaysia. 
Oaxaca's decomposition approach was adopted. Her results show that with 
occupational dummies and other human capital variables included in the estimating 
equation, the proportion of the gender wage differential due to discrimination was 36 
and 54 per cent for male weighted and female weighted estimations, respectively9. 
The simple average of these estimations was 45 per cent.
By using Blinder's approach, it was found that in the TVP sector, the proportion of 
the gender wage differential due to discrimination is 84 per cent for the simple 
average estimation (see Table 8.12 in Chapter 8). Comparison of this finding with 
Chua’s results suggests that within-occupational wage discrimination in the TVP 
sector was nearly double that in the Malaysian labour market.
Comparison with industrial countries
By using the decomposition technique Miller (1987) and Hawke (1991) conducted 
similar studies for the United Kingdom, Australia and the United States. Their results 
are summarized in Table 10.10.
9 The data set used for her study is from the Malaysian Household Income Survey 1973 and the 
Malaysian Labour Force Survey 1974.
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Table 10.10
Summary of decomposition of gender wage differential for UK, US and
Australia
UK (Miller) US (Hawke) Australia (Hawke)
value % value % value %
Total wage diff. 0.495 100 157.05 100 109.27 100
Intra-occupational 0.433 87.34 185.95 118.4 109.60 100.3
Justifiable 0.191 38.6 22.30 14.2 35.29 32.3
Unjustifiable 0.242 48.9 163.65 104.2 74.30 68.0
Inter-occupational 0.062 12.6 -28.93 -18.4 -0.33 -0.3
Justifiable 0.134 27.1 0.13 0.1 8.09 7.4
Unjustifiable -0.072 -14.5 -29.05 -18.5 -8.41 -7.7
Total justifiable 0.325 65.6 22.43 14.3 43.38 39.7
Total unjustifiable 0.170 34.4 134.6 85.7 65.89 60.3
The number of occupational groups used in Miller's study is 6 and in Hawke's study it 
is 5 for the US case and 8 for the Australian case. The results obtained in this study 
which are most comparable to their studies are the multinomial results.
Comparing the results obtained in this study using the decomposition technique 
(columns 2 and 4 in Table 10.9) with the research by Miller and Hawke, it is clear 
that10: (1) If the portion attributable to intra-occupational discrimination is higher 
than 72 or 99 per cent it is much higher than the case in the UK and Australia and 
slightly lower than that in the US. (2) The portion attributable to inter-occupational 
discrimination in the TVP sector (a positive value less than 13 per cent) seems higher 
than in any of the three countries but is not as large as the portion due to intra-
10 The difference between my results and those of Miller and Hawke may be partly due to the 
different nature of the occupational groupings and number of occupational categories used. (1) In 
their studies, the "western standard" occupational classifications are used, such as professionals, 
clerical and trades. While in this study the occupational classification used is based on the job 
hierarchy within the firms. The degree of substitution between the occupational classifications in this 
study (say, ordinary staff and middle level staff) may be different from those in their studies (say 
clerical and trades). (2) The number of occupational categories used in this study is 4 which is less 
than that used in their studies. These differences, presumably , affect the measured degree of 
occupational segregation and the wage decomposition. The degree and the direction of these effects, 
however, are unpredictable and untestable.
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occupational discrimination. (3) The total wage differential attributable to 
discrimination for the TVP sector seems higher than that for Britain and Australia in 
each estimation.
To sum up, the overall picture of the gender wage differential in the TVP sector 
seems to be as follows: within-occupational discrimination is very serious, both 
compared with developing and developed countries; discrimination of occupational 
distribution is also greater than other developed countries. But compared with intra- 
occupational discrimination it is, however, less serious.
To explain why there is greater within-occupational discrimination but less 
discrimination of occupational distribution, it is necessary to recall the situation of 
TVP's employment and wage decision-making. As illustrated in Chapter 3, above 50 
per cent of employees are assigned to their current job by the township or village 
authorities while more than half of employees' wages are determined by the firm 
leaders rather than by community authorities. It can be concluded that in the TVP 
sector, the decisions of occupational distribution are mainly made by the local 
government while the decisions of within-occupational wages are mainly made by the 
directors of firms.
A local government, township or village authority represents both the interests of 
local people and of higher level governments. Community authorities, thus, have dual 
objectives. As a representative of local government, they aim to fulfil economic, 
political and sometimes ideological targets set by the central and provincial 
governments. As a representative of local people, they want to increase local 
employment and income levels. One of the political and ideological targets set by the 
communist government in China is equality of opportunities and income. Since 
traditional Chinese culture treats women extremely unfairly, the government has paid 
greater attention to improving the position of women in society. It is not unusual to 
hear in China that there is a government (or Communist Party) regulation that there
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has to be a given percentage of women in some important positions. Sometimes there 
is a serious attempt to reach this kind of target. Generally speaking, women have 
equal opportunity in terms of occupational attainment and income distribution in 
state-owned enterprises where both decisions of employment and wages are made by 
the government. In rural township and village enterprises, community authorities 
have incentive to implement this kind of government policy (which determines the 
promotion of the officials in the community authorities). At the same time, they are 
more or less affected by the traditional culture. Therefore, when they make decisions 
of occupational distribution, they would try to not strongly discriminate against 
women. Nevertheless, the fact that occupational discrimination is more serious in the 
TVP sector than in other industrial countries reflects the impact of traditional culture 
on the policy implementators.
Within-occupational wage determination mainly depends on the directors' tastes. 
Government opinion does not have a strong influence on individual wage 
determination in the TVP sector. Therefore, the following points might be able to 
explain the serious within-occupational wage discrimination:
(1) Traditionally, gender discrimination is very serious in China especially in rural 
areas. Discrimination in income distribution against women can be traced back to the 
old commune system. Under the commune system, income was distributed according 
to working-points evaluations among the members of the production team. However, 
there was a well-known unwritten rule for the evaluation of working-points between 
men and women which was that women would receive one or two points less than 
males even if they did the same job and made the same contribution. The TVP sector 
appears to have followed the same rules for their wage determination. The 
extraordinary serious discrimination within the piece rate group reinforces this 
impression.
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(2) The TVP firms have monopsony power11. In most rural areas in China, 
employment opportunities are scarce outside the home township or village. The only 
alternative is to work in the agricultural sector which has even lower income. 
Therefore no matter how low (so long as it is higher than what is paid in the 
agricultural sector) the wage paid to the employees they have to accept it. Given the 
tradition of discrimination, employers in the TVP sector might have a special dislike 
of female employees. If this is the case, they pay a lower wage to female employees 
than to males employees. The women have to accept the situation. Because there is no 
labour market competition, this wage discrimination can be sustained for a very long 
period.
10.5 Conclusion
Several issues have been studied in this chapter. The following points can be made in 
conclusion:
(1) The determinants of occupational attainment for women are similar to those for 
men;
(2) Within-occupational discrimination in the TVP sector is high compared with other 
developing and industrial countries;
(3) Discrimination of occupational attainment is not as high as within-occupational 
discrimination;
(4) The above phenomena can be explained by decision-making with respect to 
employment and wage level in the TVP sector. Township and village governments 
have decision-making power over occupational distribution. They implement equal
11 The monopsony power expressed here is slightly different from the one in Madden’s (1975) model 
(see section 4.3 in Chapter 4). In the TVP sector, labour supply is controlled by the local community 
authorities. Therefore, instead of an upward sloping labourer supply curve, the firms face an upward 
sloping effort supply curve and a vertical labourer supply curve. So long as the wage is set above 
agricultural income, employees will choose to stay in the TVP sector. Given the effect of traditional 
culture, female employees will not shirk as they are paid a lower rate compared to their male co­
workers.
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opportunity policy in determining the TVP occupational distribution. TVP firms 
make decisions of wage levels, and the directors of these firms may have a special 
dislike of women.
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Appendix lOB
Mean values and standard deviations of dependent and independent variables
for four occupational groups
workers S.L. O.S. M.S.
men women men women men women men women
LDW 1.279 1.131 1.457 1.048 1.423 1.216 1.653 1.513
(0.58) (0.45) (0.46) (0.57) (0.46) (0.43) (0.47) (0.44)
Schooling 7.627 7.831 8.903 7.933 9.682 9.605 9.755 9.65
(2.69) (2.80) (2.37) (2.98) (2.87) (2.50) (2.70) (2.37)
OJ 8.634 7.433 8.365 9.233 12.879 8.711 11.33 10.05
(8.25) (6.98) (8.78) (7.17) (11.19) (7.74) (7.81) (8.07)
OJ2 142.42 103.89 145.5 134.97 290.3 134.13 188.02 162.85
(257.2) (172.3) (237.5) (166.6) (428.8) (200.9) (225.01) (256.1)
FT 5.030 4.039 6.231 5.467 6.140 5.105 8.388 8.300
(4.78) (3.38) (4.17) (4.37) (5.20) (4.69) (7.31) (5.59)
FT2 48.09 27.69 55.89 48.333 64.48 47.47 122.71 98.600
(122.3) (62.84) (74.9) (73.99) (129.8) (89.37) (217.9) (137.6)
JS 0.317 0.285 0.212 0.200 0.287 0.211 0.184 0.150
(0.47) (0.45) (0.41) (0.41) (0.45) (0.41) (0.39) (0.37)
SR 0.119 0.101 0.096 0.200 0.121 0.079 0.041 0
(0.32) (0.30) (0.30) (0.41) (0.33) (0.273) (0.20) 0
NH 0.179 0.270 0.250 0.200 0.134 0.132 0.082 0
(0.38) (0.44) (0.44) (0.41) (0.34) (0.343) (0.28) 0
Note: (1) S.L.=Shift leader; O.S.=Ordinary staff; M.S.=Middle level staff.
(2) Figures presented in parentheses are standard deviations.
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Appendix IOC
Regression results of model 1 for four occupational groups separately
w o r k e r s S .L . o . s . M .S .
men women men women men women m en women
n=268 n=337 n=52 n=30 n=157 n=38 n=49 n=20
C o n s ta n t 0.967 0.721 1.248 0.624 1.390 0.419 1.795 2.172
(7.53) (7.30) (3.22) (1.64) (7.43) (1.16) (4.47) (3.67)
S c h o o lin g -0.001 0.023 -0.003 -0.008 -0.005 0.040 -0.009 -0.039
(-0.10) (2.81) (-0.09) (-0.25) (-0.37) (1.49) (-0.39) (-1.21)
O th e r  j o b  e x p . (O J )
OJ 0.015 0.017 0.060 0.015 0.030 0.024 0.004 0.055
(1.86) (1-52) (2.85) (0.38) (3.64) (0.90) (0.17) (1.32)
O J2 -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0019 0.0002 -0.0007 -0.0004 0 .0 0 0 0 2 -0.0019
(-0.74) (-0.61) (-2.55) (0.10) (-3.11) (-0.37) (0.03) (-1.64)
F ir m  te n u r e  (F T )
F T 0.050 0.055 0.018 0.123 0.004 0.106 -0.019 -0.115
(3.45) (3.82) (0.35) (2.07) (0.21) (2.04) (-0.59) (-1.40)
F T 2 -0.0017 -0.0017 0.0002 -0.0047 -0.0002 -0.0053 0.0008 0.0052
(-2.90) (-2.50) (0.08) (-1.25) (-0.30) (-1.89) (0.78) (1.62)
C o u n ty  d u m m y
Jieshou -0.216 -0.235 -0.444 -0.270 -0.250 -0.232 -0.309 -0.556
(-3.63) (-5.05) (-3.13) (-1.27) (-3.28) (-1.35) (-1.92) (-1.46)
Shangrao -0.221 -0.405 -0.502 -0.615 -0.655 -0.356 -0.987
(-2.81) (-4.47) (-2.36) (-3.25) (-6.54) (-1.44) (-3.67)
Nanhai 0.823 0.253 0.109 0.302 0.190 0.308 0.743
(8.24) (4.40) (0.81) (1.05) (1.94) (1.46) (3.36)
B r e u s c h - P a g a n  %2 3 5 .3  (8 ) 54 .4  (8) 8 .2  (8) 3 .4  (8 ) 2 .8  (8 ) 5.8 (8 ) 5 .5  ( 8 ) 10.3 (81
A d  ju sted  R 2 0.41 0.32 0.35 0.62 0.32 0.32 0.43 0.07
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CONCLUSIONS
This thesis has examined individual wage determination in the TVP sector in the 
period of economic evolution towards a market economy. The emphasis has been 
placed on the applicability of the human capital model. This chapter summarizes the 
main findings of the thesis and its contributions to enriching our understanding of the 
TVP labour market. It also provides some possible directions for further research.
11.1 The main findings
The TVP sector is a newly developed sector, having emerged out of the economic 
reform period. Its system of labour allocation and income distribution has undergone 
a gradual change from a highly controlled system towards one that is more market 
oriented. Up to 1985 (the year this study has investigated), the TVP labour market 
appeared to be a mixture of old and new systems: on the one hand, employment was 
still mainly controlled by the local community authorities, and dismissal was hardly 
allowed; on the other hand, the majority of firms had decision-making power over 
wage setting.
Model for wage determination in the TVP sector
The human capital model is based on the assumption that there is a free labour 
market. To be able to analyse wage determination in this special mixed labour market 
that the TVP sector represents, a model for wage determination in the TVP sector is 
formed. The model posits a special function for wage determination in a situation 
where local governments allocate labour and the wage is not used to attract
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employees to the firm. In this model the wage is used to encourage employees not to 
shirk and to induce work effort from each individual. To do this, employees are paid 
according to their marginal productivity of effort so that extra productivity is 
rewarded. Hence, this model hypothesized that the human capital model should be 
applicable to individual wage determination within the TVP sector.
Empirical analysis of wage determination in the TVP male labour market
Empirical analysis was conducted for both the male and female labour markets with 
1985 cross-section data1. The basic human capital model is specified to test the 
impact of human capital variables (schooling, other job experience, firm tenure, 
agricultural experience, other non-agricultural experience) and some other personal 
characteristics (occupation, number of children in the family) on individual wage 
determination in the TVP sector.
Experience. Experience is an important determinant of wages. Other job experience 
(total experience minus firm tenure) and firm tenure are statistically significant and 
are associated with a rate of return of about 2.5 to 3 per cent for each additional year 
of experience over most of the first decade of work. When other job experience is 
further disaggregated into agricultural experience and non-agricultural experience, the 
estimates of the coefficients appear very similar across the experience variables. This 
indicates that perhaps the source of labour market experience is largely irrelevant. 
This result is a little surprising in that one might not expect a close relationship 
between learning experience in agricultural and non-agricultural jobs.
However, when the total male sample is disaggregated into workers and staff sub­
groups the situation becomes clearer.
1 The data were collected by the Institute of Economics at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences 
and the World Bank in 1986-1987.
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For workers, firm tenure and other non-agricultural experience are statistically 
significant, with firm tenure having the most important impact on workers' wage 
determination. Agricultural experience is insignificant for workers. These results 
accord well with human capital theory. As individuals' experience in the firm or in 
other non-agricultural jobs increases, their labour productivity is expected to increase. 
Consequently, their wage should increase.
For staff, however, the most important source of experience seems to be agricultural 
employment. Other non-agricultural experience ranks second. Firm tenure seems 
unimportant. Two conjectures have been proposed: (1) The community authority 
normally assigned the leaders of the production team or the brigade to be the 
management staff of the firm. The rank and starting wages in the firm reflected the 
length of the time that individuals were agricultural leaders. This might be the reason 
for the strong relationship between agricultural experience and wages for staff. Once 
they become staff members and gain experience in one firm, they are often assigned 
to a new firm as a higher level staff member. If the wage level set for the staff 
depended on firm tenure (either in the old or the new firms) they would be reluctant 
to move. Hence, there is no strong link between firm tenure and earnings but between 
other non-agricultural job and earnings. (2) Management skills learned in agricultural 
and other non-agricultural sectors are easily transferred to management in the 
enterprise.
Education. The most unusual result for the male labour market analysis is an 
insignificant effect of education on individual wage determination. The poor 
performance of the education variable appeared for both the analysis of the total male 
sample and the analysis based on data disaggregated into workers and staff groups. A 
question naturally arises as to whether this unusual result reflects a labour 
productivity effect or socially determined rules of payment.
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Fortunately, among our sample, 40 per cent of employees are paid by piece rate and 
their earnings can be considered as a direct measure of labour productivity. The 
results suggest that education is an insignificant determinant of the wage level for the 
time rate and the piece rate groups.
It is this result that leads us to the following explanation. In the TVP firms many jobs 
are unskilled, and therefore it might be expected that education does not matter in 
terms of increasing labour productivity.
However, a further analysis displays a new picture. When the institutional change of 
employment system in the TVP sector is considered, our understanding of the role of 
education in TVP wage determination is enriched.
In the sample, among those who had 8 years tenure (being employed at 1978) about 
70 per cent of employees were assigned to their jobs, and only 20 per cent found their 
jobs through their own efforts. Among those who had tenure of 1 year (being 
employed at 1985) 48 per cent found employment through their own efforts, while 
only 17 per cent were assigned to their jobs. This shows the gradual liberalization of 
the TVP employment system.
The total male sample is disaggregated into market (those who found their jobs 
through their own efforts) and non-market groups (those who were assigned to their 
jobs). Wage equations are estimated for the two groups separately. The most 
interesting result for these estimations is that education is significant for the market 
group but insignificant for the non-market group.
This result raises a concern about why education is significant for the market group 
but not for the non-market group. Does this reflect labour productivity effects? To 
examine these questions, both the market and non-market groups are sub-divided into 
piece rate and time rate groups. The estimation results indicate that education is a 
significant determinant of wages for both piece rate and time rate employees in the
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market group, while it is insignificant for both piece rate and time rate employees in 
the non-market group.
One reason why education might have a significant impact on labour productivity for 
the market group but not for the non-market group is that the underlying 
technological processes of the work undertaken by each group are different. Because 
of these technological differences, people involved in higher technological production 
need to be more educated compared with those who undertake more simple jobs.
The type of model we have in mind is as follows. Assume there are two different 
kinds of firms, one employing high technology and the other low technology. Before 
economic reform, most of the TVP firms probably employed low technology. Some 
might have employed high technology but were not allowed to choose high quality 
employees according to the firms' technological requirements. The gradual 
liberalization of the TVP labour market has allowed those firms with higher 
technology to hire employees according to their educational level. And most 
importantly, because firms are allowed to choose the quality of their employees, more 
new firms may start to employ high technology. Education has a significant impact on 
these high technology firms' labour productivity, and productivity is rewarded.
Firms whose technology is relatively low, however, remain with the old recruitment 
system. They also pay their employees according to labour productivity. However, 
education does not increase labour productivity.
This speculation can be reinforced by a steeper tenure-earnings profile for the market 
group compared with the non-market group. It suggests that firm-specific training is 
more important for the former than the latter, and this in turn suggests that the 
underlying technological level for the market group may higher than for the non- 
market group.
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Does education, therefore, play no role for the non-market group? Although 
education does not seem to affect earnings for the non-market group, perhaps it brings 
with it other rewards.
In the literature on human capital, there is a controversy about whether education 
affects wages via its impact on labour productivity or only as a screening device. The 
logic behind the screening device hypothesis usually consists of two steps. First, 
schooling provides information about an individual's innate productive capabilities 
which determine the individual's job assignment; second, the individual's occupational 
level in turn determines his/her earnings.
Although it is difficult to disentangle these two hypotheses empirically, it is possible 
to test whether the TVP sector uses schooling as a signal to assign employees to a 
certain level of occupation for both the market and non-market groups. This is tested 
by adopting an occupational assignment2 logit model. This model tests whether 
education plays a significant role in TVP occupational assignment.
The results of the binomial logit model (workers and staff) for the market and non- 
market groups suggest that education is an important determinant of occupational 
attainment for both groups. And the marginal effect of education on the probability of 
becoming a staff member is even stronger for the non-market group than for the 
market group. The results for a multinomial logit model (which further disaggregate 
the staff group into five sub-groups) suggest the same conclusion: people with more 
education are not only more likely to be in the staff groups, but also more likely to be 
in a higher level of management staff group.
Does the level of occupation in the TVP sector has a positive effect on earnings? This 
question then is examined by estimating a wage equation with occupational dummies
2 This model was originally called an occupational attainment model (Brown, Moon and Zoloth; 
1980). In our case, it was community authorities who assigned people to their job. Therefore, I refer 
to it as an occupational assignment model.
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for both the market and non-market groups. The results indicate that for the market 
group the effect of education is consistent with the theory. More education brings 
about a higher occupational level, and this in turn brings more earnings. For the non- 
market group, however, the results suggest that although the TVP uses education as a 
criterion for job assignment, the level of occupation is not a significant determinant of 
their earnings.
This is indeed a puzzle. If education has neither a direct nor indirect (through 
occupation) effect on wage determination for the non-market group, why do some 
people still invest in education? Furthermore, if occupation does not have an impact 
on wage determination, what is the motivation for people to seek to be promoted?
Perhaps people invested in education because this is necessary to achieve a high level 
occupation which might be correlated with non-wage benefits. For example, being a 
staff member means that there is no need to undertake heavy labour; individuals can 
gain a good reputation; and may have priority when attempting to establish 
employment opportunities for their children and relatives. In other words, payment in 
the TVP firms contains both wage and implicit benefits. If these non-wage benefits 
are considered as part of income, we might be able to find a significant effect of these 
occupational dummies on income determination. Unfortunately, it is impossible to 
measure these non-wage benefits in these data and incorporate them into the 
regression.
One survey question, however, can partly provide support for the relationship 
between high level of occupation and non-wage benefits. The question asks all the 
directors of the surveyed firms: "How many of your family members are there in your 
firm?" The survey results show that on average each of 115 directors in the sample 
has 2.65 family members employed in his/her own firm.
To sum up, it is clear that the relationship between education and earnings in the TVP 
sector reflects productivity effects. It is shown that for both the market and non-
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market groups the TVP firms paid their employees according to their labour 
productivity. Education, however, has an important impact on labour productivity for 
the market group but not for the non-market group. This relationship can be detected 
directly from the regression results.
Nevertheless, education does play an important role in individual's occupational 
assignment for both the market and non-market groups in the TVP sector. Employees 
with higher education are more likely to be assigned in a higher occupational level. 
For the market group, there is a direct correlation between occupation and earnings. 
For the non-market group, it cannot be directly observed from the estimation of a 
wage equation. It may be captured, however, in some kinds of non-wage benefits.
Comparison. A comparison of the earnings distribution in the TVP sector with those 
in Japan and the United States reveals the following picture: (1) The rate of return to 
education for men in total in the TVP sector seems very different from that of the 
industrial economies. However, for the market group, education is a significant 
determinant of earnings and the rate of return is about the same as for the United 
States. (2) In terms of the lifetime employment system the TVP sector seems more 
like Japan, but the TVP workers' experience-earnings profile is more like the United 
States. The reason for this is the different roles that the wage plays in the TVP sector 
and in Japanese firms.
As Japan is characterised by rapid technological change, more investment in firm- 
specific training and retraining is required. This in turn requires that employers hold 
their specialized employees to minimize training costs. Similarly, employees prefer to 
stay with the specific firm so they can maximize the benefit from their specialized 
skill. This process generates a steep tenure-earnings profile to ensure that the 
employees and employers attach to each other.
Lifetime employment is also an important feature of the TVP sector, but the outcome 
is generated by a different process. The community authority controls the firms'
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employment levels and the only alternative jobs for the employees are in the 
agricultural sector. Although lifetime employment is similar to that of Japan, the 
relationship with the wage determination process is different. In the TVP sector, the 
wage is not used as an instrument to ensure that the employees stay with the firm but 
rather as a tool to induce effort from individuals. If this is true then the payment 
system must be more similar to that of the free market (the United States), where it 
reflects labour productivity.
Female wage determination and the gender wage differential
Female employees account for about 45 per cent of the total sample. In general 
women earn 20 per cent less than men in the TVP sector. To understand wage 
determination in the TVP sector, it is important to know the structural differences of 
wage determination between the male and female labour markets and the role of pay 
discrimination.
Difference of male and female wage determination patterns. The most important 
difference between the two markets is the effect of education. It has a significant 
impact on female wage determination but is insignificant in total male wage 
determination. One explanation might be the different situations of demand for, and 
supply of, education for men and women. When supply of education is less for one 
group than for the other group, the rate of return to education will be higher for the 
former group than for the latter. In this regard the most telling fact is that men are 
given preference over women for education in rural China. According to Knight and 
Li (1991), on average, men received more years of education than women in China. 
The national mean difference of the years of education between men and women is 
2.3 years, while in rural areas it is 2.5 years.
However, this conjecture is not very strong. There might be some other reasons, for 
example, firms’ demand for male and female education might be different, and this
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will bring different rate of returns to education for men and women. Further research 
is needed to establish the relative importance of these explanations.
Regarding the disaggregation across staff and workers groups, it is observed that there 
is no real difference between the wage determination patterns for male and female 
workers. Nevertheless, there is a significant difference between the effect of the 
experience variables on male and female staff wage determinations. For female staff, 
firm tenure and non-agricultural experience are more important determinants of their 
wage level, while for male staff, agricultural experience is the most important 
variable.
The situation for piece rate and time rate wage determination in the female labour 
market is similar to that in the male labour market. That is, in the female labour 
market, the wage structure for the time rate workers group is closer to that for the 
piece rate workers group than to that for the time rate staff group. Moreover, the 
difference of wage determination patterns between the female market and non-market 
groups is similar to that in the male labour market.
Decomposition of gender wage differential. The wage differential between gender 
groups may be caused by two different factors: (1) a difference in productivity, and 
(2) discrimination. Within the second category, there are two potential sources of 
discrimination—wage discrimination within the same occupation and discrimination 
in the distribution of the male and female work forces across occupations.
The overall picture of the gender wage differential in the TVP sector seems to be as 
follows: the within-occupational wage discrimination is greater, both compared with 
developing and industrial countries; the discrimination of occupational distribution is 
not as serious as intra-occupational discrimination.
The explanation of why there is greater within-occupational discrimination but less 
discrimination of occupational distribution is as follows: In the TVP sector, the
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decisions of occupational distribution are mainly made by the local government while 
the decisions of within-occupational wages are mainly made by the directors of firms.
A local government, township or village authority represents both the interests of 
local people and of higher level governments. Community authorities, thus, have dual 
objectives. As a representative of local government, they aim to fulfil economic, 
political and sometimes ideological targets set by the central and provincial 
governments. A political and ideological target set by the communist government in 
China is equality of opportunity and income. Since traditional Chinese culture treats 
women extremely unfairly, the government has paid greater attention to improving 
the position of women in society. It is not unusual to hear in China that there is a 
government (or Communist Party) regulation that there should be a given percentage 
of women in some important positions. Sometimes there is a serious attempt to reach 
this kind of target. Generally speaking, women have equal opportunity in terms of 
occupational attainment and income distribution in state-owned enterprises where 
both decisions of employment and wages are made by the government. In rural 
township and village enterprises, community authorities have an incentive to 
implement this kind of government policy (which determines the promotion of the 
officials in the community authorities). Therefore, when they make decisions 
regarding the occupational distribution, they do not strongly discriminate against 
women.
Within-occupational wage determination mainly depends on the directors' tastes. 
Government opinion does not have a strong influence on individual wage 
determination in the TVP sector. Therefore, the following points might be able to 
explain the serious within-occupational wage discrimination:
(1) Traditionally, gender discrimination is very serious in China, especially in rural 
areas. Discrimination in income distribution against women can be traced back to the 
old commune system, where there was a well-known unwritten rule for the evaluation 
of working-points between men and women. Women would receive one or two
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points less than males even if they did the same job and made the same contribution. 
The TVP sector appears to have followed the same rules for their wage determination. 
The extraordinary serious discrimination within the piece rate group reinforces this 
impression.
(2) The TVP firms have monopsony power. In most rural areas in China, employment 
opportunities are scarce outside the home township or village. The only alternative is 
to work in the agricultural sector which has even lower income. Therefore no matter 
how low the wage paid to the employees they have to accept it (so long as it was 
higher than agricultural income). Given the tradition of discrimination, employers in 
the TVP sector might have a special dislike of female employees. If this is the case, 
they pay a lower wage to female employees than to males employees. The women 
have to accept this situation. Because there is no labour market competition, this wage 
discrimination can be sustained for a very long period.
11.2 Issues for further research
This dissertation has examined individual wage determination in the TVP sector in 
1985. It enriched our understanding of the TVP labour market in several aspects. 
However, due to limitations on the data available, some important issues have not 
been analysed.
Regional differences of wage determination
China is a large country. The dispersion of economic development and institutions in 
different regions is very wide. The data used in this study were collected in four 
different counties. As described in Chapter 1, these four counties represent different 
levels of rural industrialization and different degrees of administrative control or 
different ownership structures.
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These differences apparently have a significant impact on wage determination. The 
regression results in each case in this study show that county dummies are always 
very significant. It is noticed that compared with Wuxi county, the wage levels in 
Jieshou and Shangrao are about 25 to 50 per cent lower, while in Nanhai county it is 
about 40 to 50 per cent higher.
Nevertheless, incorporating county dummies into earnings equations can only 
measure the difference in wage levels. The difference in the pattern of wage 
determination is not captured. There are two equivalent ways to examine the impact 
of regional differences on wage determination:
(1) Incorporate regional dummies and their interaction terms on all other variables in 
a wage equation estimated on the total sample.
(2) Estimate wage equations for each county separately.
To get sensible results for a wage equation one needs a relatively large sample. 
However, the sample size used in this study is not big enough to enable an 
examination of the regional effect on wage determination. Nevertheless, the role of 
regional differences in wage determination in the TVP sector is a very important issue 
for further research.
The role of firms' characteristics in wage determination
Gelb (1990) estimated a wage equation for the TVP sector using 48 firm dummies 
alone as independent variables. The adjusted R2 in his estimation is 57 per cent. This 
means that the firms' characteristics alone can explain over half of the variation in 
wages in the TVP labour market.
The characteristics of the firms which might have an impact on individual's wage 
determination include firm size, profitability, ownership structure, technological level 
(labour/capital ratio) and industrial specification. These data are available in the 
Quantitative Questionnaire. However, it is impossible for us to identify each
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individual's firm specification. Being aware of the important role of firms' 
characteristics on wage determination, research should be conducted to analyse the 
role of firms' characteristics on wage determination in further depth when data are 
available.
Impact of reform on liberalization of the TVP labour market
This study is confined to the period of 1985 by the limitation of the data available. 
Since 1985, the TVP sector has undergone a remarkable change. The TVP labour 
market, presumably, has been further liberalized.
If it is possible, a new survey on the development of the TVP sector should be 
conducted. And a research project based on this new survey data will definitely enrich 
our understanding of the current TVP labour market. Moreover, a comparison 
between this study and the new study will throw light on how the TVP labour market 
has been liberalized since 1985.
Apart from these insights into the TVP labour market, a comparison between wage 
determination in the TVP sector in 1985 (this study) and in the state-owned sector 
will also be of interest. Compared with the state-owned sector, the TVP sector, since 
economic reform, is a more market oriented sector. Although reform in the state- 
owned sector has been undertaken for more than 10 years, labour market reform is 
much slower than the other set of reforms as it is an area of particular political 
sensitivity (White, 1985). It is suspected that even in the current period of 
liberalization, the labour market in the state-owned sector is not as market oriented as 
the TVP labour market in 1985. A comparison between a study of the current labour 
market in the state-owned sector and this study will provide a general view about how 
liberalized the labour market in the state sector is, and in which direction it is 
heading.
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